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The two of us have been thinking and writing about Greater Los Angeles for a long 
time. Some of this work pertains to projects we have pursued separately: scholarly 
articles and books on this or that theme or topic pertaining to the history of South-
ern California. But much of what we’ve done has been collaborative as friends and 
colleagues. We edited a collection of essays about Progressive Era California; we 
brought out a volume devoted to the 1920s in Los Angeles and all its attendant 
growth and cultural busyness. We worked together on a biography (which Tom 
authored) on Los Angeles harbor and transit pioneer Phineas Banning.1
Through many joint projects such as these, as well as what amounts to an ex-
tended conversation stretching across many years, we have studied and thought 
about various facets of the institutional and infrastructural growth of the me-
tropolis from the beginning of the American period forward. We approach the 
subject and themes of Los Angeles history differently, but those differences have 
been, in every instance, mutually reinforcing and, we think, enriching to our 
readers and students.
Like they all seem to be, this project has been several years in the making. We 
knew that the primary source material on Los Angeles growth and metropolitan 
ambitions was rich and evocative and needed wider circulation among students. 
We also knew that the environmental history of Greater Los Angeles stood as a 
remarkably complex, hugely important feature of the history of the region, of Cali-
fornia, of the nation, and of the world.
Hence this project. In the pages that follow, we examine the growth of Los An-
geles by way of the three rivers that play critical and fundamental roles in supply-
ing freshwater to the landscape and its many millions of people. Our focus is on a 
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riparian triptych: the Los Angeles River, the Owens River, and the Colorado River. 
They are, each in its own way and together as an interconnected system, of para-
mount importance to the history and the future of the region we call home. In this 
volume, we limit our investigation of each river to a discrete and relatively short 
time period, from the start of the twentieth century to the coming of the Second 
World War. The era from World War II to the present is unquestionably important 
to the riparian history of metropolitan Los Angeles. We cast our analytical net ear-
lier, however, because we believe that this four-decade period is especially critical 
to how Greater Los Angeles brought each river, in both different and related ways, 
to bear on the global future of Southern California. Perhaps a subsequent volume 
will pick the story up from the 1940s and carry it forward to the recent past. To be 
sure, the rivers and the ways in which they roll through Los Angeles and through 
Los Angeles history deserve far more than a single scholarly examination.
We do not think that histories of these three rivers—so alike in some ways and 
so profoundly different at the same time—have ever been put together in the ways 
we try to do in this book. That seems odd to us: a missed, critical opportunity and 
obligation to deepen understanding about the region and the environmental and 
other challenges it faced in the past and which are growing more difficult with each 
passing year. Without the Colorado, the Owens, and the Los Angeles, there is no 
modern Los Angeles. Such a simple truism and statement of fact is but the first—
important—insight about the region and its rivers. More complicated, and hardly 
less important, is to try to understand how and why the region developed such a 
complex technological, fiscal, political, and environmental relationship with three 
entirely different and diffuse riparian systems. The stories of Los Angeles and its 
namesake river, the stories of Los Angeles and the Owens River, and the stories of 
Los Angeles and the Colorado River are historical narratives that illuminate and 
illustrate broad sweeps of western and American history.
That’s the purpose of this book—to know a region’s rivers and the ways in which 
those rivers explain historical change of gargantuan proportion and to know about 
broad themes in American history that these water stories illustrate and highlight. 
The prisms we bring to the river history of Southern California—political, envi-
ronmental, technological—help us figure out the regional past and, at the same 
time, help us place the region into wider frames of western, national, and even 
international history.
Putting this book together has been a pleasure, and we hope and expect that the 
documents (for the most part in their original grammar and syntax) and images 
that follow will help you think about, ask about, and better understand the South-
ern California past. We hope, too, that in so doing you will find ways to think 
creatively about the Southern California present and future.




RIVERS OF GROW TH AND EMPIRE
It all happened very fast. In but two generations, Anglo-Americans and the wildly 
expansive American nation established dominion over the arid landscapes of the 
far West (and the indigenous inhabitants who lived upon them) through inter-
related, mutually reinforcing processes of conquest and violence. The brief and 
brutal war with Mexico (1846–48), a giant land grab ineptly disguised as a pa-
triotic defense of national sovereignty, brought the entire northern third of the 
Republic of Mexico into U.S. possession, with California as the great prize. At the 
very moment of territorial cession, the discovery of Sierra Nevada gold suggested 
to many an American that Manifest Destiny’s fervent presumption—that God 
wished Americans and America to expand continentally from sea to sea—had 
been revealed and forever validated in the instant that it took startled James Mar-
shall to pluck a small gold nugget from the millrace at Sutter’s mill in Northern 
California. “I have found it,” he said, and the world changed in the instant of his 
saying so.
Our focus here in this book is on what we might call the next phase or phases 
of that conquering era, the consolidation and further incorporation of territory in 
the latter half of the nineteenth century and the early years of the twentieth. In-
stead of concentrating on gold and Northern California, we look here to Southern 
California, with a tight focus on water and the ways in which control of water is at 
the very foundation of Southern California’s meteoric rise to metropolitan power 
about a century ago. Just as the nation grew at a remarkable pace by way of territo-
rial ambition and warfare with Mexico and Native America, so, too, did Greater 
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Los Angeles explode—in ways more urban and suburban than bellicose—from 
the latter nineteenth century through the early twentieth. Water is at the heart 
of that process (and, to be sure, battles over water), and the growth of the nation, 
growth of the West, and growth of Los Angeles are intricately linked and concen-
tric examples of many of the same phenomena.
This book is about that single city, its namesake county, the hinterlands stretch-
ing in three compass directions from both, and the freshwater on and under all 
those millions of acres of land. It is at once a story about Los Angeles and Greater 
Los Angeles and a story about the four decades leading up to the Second World 
War. One fact to keep in mind: Los Angeles becomes greater Los Angeles in so 
many ways precisely because of water. Metropolitan growth depended on all kinds 
of ingredients; water was certainly high on that list. With water came growth. That 
sounds simple, but it was not.
This is also a story about the far West, about its mountains, deserts, and flat 
landscapes. And at its heart, this book, like this story, is about how the control 
over three rivers made modern Los Angeles. Those three rivers are the Colorado, 
the Owens, and the Los Angeles. They are entirely and utterly different; the Los 
Angeles River is tiny, the Owens River is (or was) pretty big, and the Colorado 
River, the mighty Colorado, rolls through a watershed that draws in seven states 
and a lot of northern Mexico. But as a Goldilocks fable put together as histo-
ry, these rivers—one small, one medium, and one gigantic—tell a linked story 
about all the issues of growth and politics important to the entirety of the modern 
American West.1
Our project is about the past, and we conclude our investigation as the Sec-
ond World War commences. But do not be mistaken. The water story is a story 
saturated in the relationship between past and future. As the twenty-first century 
deepens, water is only going to get more important in the West. Growth, pollu-
tion, climate change: these are all now intertwined in complicated ways such that 
water—its availability, its reliability, its price, its conservation, and how it travels 
from point A to point B, not to mention point Z—is increasingly at the forefront 
of political decision-making and political tussles in Southern California (and ev-
erywhere else in the West and Southwest).
Our approach in this volume is to put water and history together. Understand-
ing how water sources and systems have been envisioned, corralled, captured, 
toyed with, fought over, and championed is fundamental to fostering awareness 
and knowledge of contemporary or upcoming challenges. The history of water, as 
it relates to the history of Los Angeles, is not just interesting. It is vital. We have to 
understand key features of that history so that we can better understand what the 
constantly changing world of water means in contemporary Southern California 
and, by extension, across the vast expanses of the West.
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MAKING SENSE OF WATER AND THE SOUTHERN 
CALIFORNIA PAST
Given the chronological focus of this volume—forty years or so, from the begin-
ning of the twentieth century to the coming of the Second World War, we want 
students to gain a lot of insight into the periods of U.S. history generally bracketed 
as the Progressive Era—1900–1920—and the New Deal era, from 1930 to the com-
ing of the World War. We think that exploring water in the West, and especially 
water in Southern California, is an ideal way to do that. Why? Because the  issues 
that help us define and understand these eras (and “the Twenties” in between 
them) are brought into very sharp focus with investigation of the history of water 
development in Southern California as it relates to each of the three rivers this 
book tracks.
A review of some of those themes and big concepts is in order. From there, you 
will be able to contemplate them more fully as you read sections of this book and, 
especially, the documents that we have selected for each of those sections.
American historians mark the Progressive Era as, more or less, the period en-
compassing the first twenty years of the twentieth century. This kind of dating 
can be arbitrary, and it has a lot to do with the ease and convenience of decadal 
brackets (the 1920s, the 1930s, and the like). We can find ways in which the 1890s 
exhibit facets and features of proto-Progressivism, just as we can find aspects of 
Progressivism that cross the divide between 1920 and what comes after in the eras 
of the Great Depression and New Deal. Nonetheless, this two-decade chunk at the 
start of the new century is a reasonable bracketing of a complex period of reform 
and change within American society and politics.
Progressivism constituted a broad range of ideas, faiths, beliefs, actions. And 
the personnel invested and interested in Progressivism constituted a broad and 
diverse lot. Some things stand out, however, and historians are in general agree-
ment about them. For one, progressives (we make a distinction between pro-
gressives, as a general political category, and Progressives, or those who pledged 
allegiance to the Progressive Party)—often optimistic, often idealistic, mostly 
middle-class professionals, mostly white, mostly men, mostly urban (with im-
portant exceptions to each of those “mostly” assumptions)—wished to harness 
the power of government so as to put an end to, or at least to arrest the political 
will to perpetuate, the extremes of the previous era’s runaway moneymaking and 
enshrinement of industrial capitalism and industrial capitalists. What concerned 
many a progressive was the gilt and excess of the Gilded Age, that era which 
had drifted from the late nineteenth century into the twentieth: too much in the 
hands of too few, unregulated industrial expansion, immigrant and other labor-
ers risking life and limb in dangerous factories and sweatshops, cities that were 
too crowded, too dangerous, too diseased.
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Progressives aimed to bring order to chaos, to dial back on all the excess, to 
establish controls. One important way they wished to do this was through a regu-
latory recipe drawn from governmental response in oversight and enforcement 
of laws, often new laws that they put on the books. In other words, progressives 
recognized that the power and purse of government—local, state, and especially 
federal government—could provide the legal and enforcement brake upon the 
specter of industrial power run amok. And so they ran for office, they ran cam-
paigns for office, they wrote and wrote and wrote, and they tried to figure out ways 
beyond inept or corrupt or otherwise “politics as usual” as they perceived them.
Progressives evinced an inordinate faith in expertise and technical prowess. 
Some of this looks naive to us now. Many a progressive championed technical 
or scientific prowess out of the charming belief that such training or experience 
necessarily lifted an individual beyond the reach of crass political or financial or 
other aims and motivations. One important legacy of progressivism is the early 
twentieth century’s initiation of large-scale projects dependent on newly profes-
sionalized cadres of engineers, planners, and scientists. This faith in technology 
and a “technocracy” was evident in the Progressive and New Deal periods, con-
necting the early twentieth century and the New Deal’s big engineering footprint 
across the entire United States, from the Grand Coulee Dam in the Northwest to 
the Tennessee Valley Authority in the Southeast and everywhere in between.
That embrace of, and faith in, technical expertise—which Progressives thought 
could be applied to politics itself by way of such innovations as the city manager 
system of executive government—undergirded a fervent desire to establish control 
over nature. This in turn relates to a generalized progressive desire to sculpt order 
from chaos and to bring hygiene atop all manner of dirt: dirty water, dirty politics, 
dirty bodies, dirty minds, and dirty bloodstreams, with all that those fears entailed 
in reflexive and ugly racial and moral presumptions.
Control of nature, which we can see in all three of our river case studies about 
Progressive and New Deal Los Angeles, nestled right up against faith in the neces-
sity of public ownership and management of natural resources.2 Fearful that the 
messy and inefficient excesses of capitalism and capital markets would sully and 
impinge the efficient delivery of such commodities as water and electricity, pro-
gressives worked hard to bring natural resource exploitation into regulatory order 
and public oversight.
How and where do we see these themes playing out in the far West? That’s easy: 
all over the place, in all kinds of instances and initiatives—whether in campaigns 
to reform the approach to incarceration and education in the juvenile delinquency 
system in Denver, or in early and important campaigns for women’s suffrage in 
the Rockies. (Progressives were generally in favor of suffrage for women, however 
caricatured the reasons, in that they believed that the impact of women’s votes 
would be uplifting, even soothing, in the hurly-burly of politics.) In our case-study 
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region of Southern California, the engineering feats attached to the histories of 
the three rivers under scrutiny are nothing short of extraordinary. Holding the 
Los Angeles River in place by a concrete hug was a new thing in the early decades 
of the twentieth century. Bringing a big river 250 miles to Los Angeles, by gravity, 
was an incredible feat in the same era. And tugging the Colorado River west and 
north of the route it wanted to take to the Pacific Ocean, by way of an aqueduct 
system so that it watered Greater Los Angeles’ mouths and fields, lawns and swim-
ming pools, brings in visions of the Roman Empire in terms of design, execution, 
and impact. Add to that last effort the imagining and eventual building of Hoover 
Dam, and the story becomes a set of grand riparian actions at the instigation and 
scale of a civilization.
Building great things, or at least building great big things, does not make a so-
ciety great. Certainly, it does not come with moral congratulations as accompani-
ment to a high regard for, even awe at, the achievements themselves. Hoover Dam 
is a great engineering feat. But is Hoover Dam great? Is the control of the Colorado 
River great? Is the Los Angeles Aqueduct great? Is Los Angeles great? We have a lot 
of analytical, historical, and other work to do before we can grapple successfully 
with such questions as these.
Where does all this leave us? How, at river’s edge, or at rivers’ edges, can we 
learn about the way things work in the far West? How, with attention upon river 
histories, can we better understand the way to move forward into a world changed 
by climate differences, irrevocably changed and challenged by the fact of too little 
water for too many demands?
D OWN BY THE RIVERS
As a way to organize our investigation, think of three circles, one inside the other, 
each touching upon or wrapping around parts or all of Southern California. At the 
center is the local setting and local stories that are tied to a single riparian land-
scape feature: the Los Angeles River. All history is, at some level, local history, and 
the Los Angeles River allows us to zoom into a highly localized landscape across 
reasonable dimensions of time and space. It is a little river flowing atop (and some-
times below) a big geologic basin, and it empties into the Pacific Ocean, if it ever 
gets that far, season to season, year to year.
The next circle of inquiry and geography spreading outward is a more state-
focused view. That takes us out to the Owens River in southeastern California. That 
landscape has its own local stories and local lore, to be sure, but our focus here is 
on the ways in which the history of the Owens River, from about 1900 forward, 
helps us understand broad themes across a century of California history. It is a big-
ger river: it flows nearly two hundred miles through a valley created by the Sierra 
Nevadas on the eastern side and the White and Inyo Mountains on the west. By 
6    Introduction
way of what is now a set of highly engineered delivery systems, the Owens River 
answers more than gravity’s demands, running nowadays to the very edges of the 
city of Los Angeles.
Farthest out in our concentric reckoning is the Colorado River, and our inves-
tigation of its relationship to urban and suburban growth brings us to the national 
and international level of analysis. The Colorado is a giant river, flowing nearly 
fifteen hundred miles through the center of an immense watershed, where it has 
carved out astonishing canyons and gorges across millennia, and where its history 
and flow influence millions upon millions of people.
We are accustomed to people taking each of these rivers on separate historical 
terms. We know of dozens of studies and tales that speak to time spent think-
ing about or rafting on the mighty Colorado River. The Owens River has its own 
adherents or mourners, as the case may be; and the tiny Los Angeles River elicits 
commentary, too, ranging from jokes to elegies. But we want to do something very 
different and not spend time or analytical energy on the rivers apart.
At least insofar as reference to Southern California is concerned, it is his-
torically interesting and viable not to uncouple these three stories, these three 
rivers, from one another. They are linked—and it is also important to grapple 
with all three and their intricate and particular relationships to growth in the 
Greater Los Angeles region of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
Figure 1. Bucolic, tiny, seemingly innocuous: the Los Angeles River (and cattle) in the 
 nineteenth century.
Photo photCL 49 (7f), courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
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Understand them, understand them together, and we will understand a lot about 
modern Los Angeles.
Let’s begin locally, with the littlest river. Los Angeles grew up precisely because 
of the Los Angeles River. The river once began as a tiny stream that came up from 
underground springs in the San Fernando Valley and then, gathering surface wa-
ter, meandered southerly toward the Pacific Ocean. The river often ran dry, or 
nearly so, in the hot summer months. Spanish explorers and settlers laid out Los 
Angeles near it and, as a result, very close to the indigenous habitations that had 
also risen up alongside the river. By the end of the eighteenth century, the river had 
been given a Spanish name, El Río de Nuestra Señora la Reina de Los Ángeles de 
Porciúncula, and from it was carved the name of the pueblo nearby. The tiny Euro-
pean outpost of Spanish colonialism and Catholicism grew slowly through the first 
decades of the nineteenth century, drawing agricultural and other water from the 
modest Los Angeles River by way of ditches (zanjas) or other means, such as water 
carriers. Anglo-American arrivals in the years before and after American conquest 
(1848) continued these practices, and the agricultural hinterlands just beyond the 
village boundaries grew with water the river supplied.
Up until about 1900, the Los Angeles River—surprisingly, given its tempera-
mental, streamlike stature—supplied enough water, by way of its aboveground 
flow and the artesian wells that tapped into it, to fulfill most of the freshwater 
needs of Los Angeles and its immediate hinterlands. People drank the river, they 
watered their crops with it, used it as a sewer, tossed their household trash and 
other refuse, their dead dogs and dead horses (and occasional human dead), into 
the river in hopes that it would wash away or at least move conveniently down-
stream. Such has been the use of rivers since time immemorial, so it’s no surprise 
that the Los Angeles River fared the same.
This river had long been fickle—disappearing when the weather was hot and 
dry, but at times, especially in winter months, giving in to floods. When heavy 
rains fell in the nearby foothills and San Gabriel Mountains, the precipitation 
could overwhelm the river’s tributaries and the river itself, which had a ten-
dency to spill over its banks and flood large sections of the Los Angeles basin, 
which had been scooped out like a bowl below the steep San Gabriel Mountains 
to the northeast.
At first, or at least for several late-nineteenth-century decades, this did not 
seem like such a big problem. The river flooded, it brought nutrient-rich silt into 
groves and agricultural fields, and it usually returned to its bed, where it occasion-
ally just ran dry in the summer. At times, the river leapt from its bed and headed 
off in an entirely different direction. When it flooded, some land could be dam-
aged, livestock or houses occasionally swept away, and human lives lost. But on the 
whole, those living in the basin had learned through time and experience to build 
away from the river’s banks in anticipation of a flood every ten or so years.
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That changed. Los Angeles grew so rapidly in the latter decades of the nine-
teenth century that Los Angeles River floods became much more problematic. 
Real estate excitement and speculation attached dollars and optimism to land; 
when some or a lot of that land washed away in the wintertime, that created a 
problem. And when, in the early twentieth century, two years (1914 and 1916) saw 
flooding of gargantuan proportions—floods that knocked out communication 
and transportation connections to the outside world—Angelenos decided that 
they had had enough.
That response, which we can characterize as an ambitious and largely successful 
attempt to exert muscular and modern technological control over nature, begins 
our local story about Los Angeles’ growth and its riparian cultures.
At virtually the same time—and, again, it is important to think beyond 
coincidence—municipal leaders and institutions in Los Angeles began to look 
for a river better suited to the breathless ambitions of a city on the make. Early 
twentieth-century Los Angeles leaders—businesspeople, government officials, 
Figure 2. Flooding, gently, into neighboring fields: the Los Angeles River through the Elysian 
Gap, late nineteenth century.
From the C. C. Pierce Collection of Photographs, photCL Pierce 06837, courtesy of The Huntington Library, San 
Marino, California.
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boosters of all stripes—often painted their city with hyperbole. Los Angeles would 
be, they shouted, the greatest American city of the twentieth century. Los Angeles 
would rival the great capital cities of the world. Los Angeles would triumph as the 
American contribution to urban life, culture, and success. On the one hand, it’s 
easy to cut through much of this language and see it as overheated rhetoric laid 
atop crass commercial ambitions to sell Los Angeles, its land, its houses, its agri-
cultural products, and its future to eager newcomers, visitors and settlers alike. But 
we ought to remember, too, that this kind of energetic selling of the future of Los 
Angeles had its counterpart in the actual reshaping of the landscape in ways every 
bit as ambitious, whether the exact consequences were intended or not. And it was 
the same in most U.S. cites at one time or another.
With the coming of the twentieth century, then, Los Angeles faced an ironic 
situation with its namesake river. On the one hand, the Los Angeles River, which 
could run dry in the summertime, did not look as if it were up to the task of sup-
plying enough water for the people, the animals, the crops, and other needs of 
the growing metropolis. Having too little freshwater posed a big challenge to the 
growth machine that had already begun to flex its industrial, agricultural, tourism, 
and other muscles. On the other hand, come the wintertime rains, the little Los 
Angeles River could and did occasionally morph into an angry maker of danger-
ous and destructive floods. Big floods came in the 1860s, and again in the 1880s, as 
the Los Angeles River washed out its banks and pooled water across the basin for 
Figure 3. Harsh floods—the 1880s.
Photo photST Tyler (1), courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
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weeks at a time. Houses washed away. Fields became caked with silt and debris. 
Livestock drowned. Roads and bridges disappeared.
When floods returned in the early years of the new century—rainfall in 
February of 1914 and 1916 again brought the river, as noted earlier, out of its 
channel—regional engineers and political leaders initiated ambitious plans to cor-
ral the usually little river, to hold it on the landscape, floods or no floods, eventu-
ally by way of a concrete straitjacket.
What a story! Ambitious metropolis sells land and the idea of land (and land 
bathed in year-round sunshine) to the world. The world begins to come in bigger 
and bigger numbers, a journey made easier by post–Civil War railroad expan-
sion across the West. But danger lurks on that landscape, in the form of a seem-
ingly innocuous water source. Rains come. The river leaps its banks. It destroys 
the very land that boosters and champions are selling, and it can be deadly as well. 
Nineteenth-century people are not generally swimmers. They drown.
What to do? Modest, or at least relatively modest, plans are hatched in early 
twentieth-century Los Angeles to prevent the worst from seasonal floods. Maybe, 
engineers suggest, the answer lies high in the canyons and arroyos of the nearby 
San Gabriel Mountains. These steep, geologically new mountains look down on 
the basin from just north of towns such as Pasadena and Arcadia, which were then 
starting to expand. If rainfall could be gathered there, some opined, at the point 
Figure 4. The Los Angeles River floods in winter, 1914.
Photo photPF 09441, courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
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where gravity is prepared to rush it downstream to the tributary Arroyo Seco, and 
thence on to the Los Angeles River, the worst of the flooding could be avoided. The 
plan was to put small dams, or weirs, a couple of feet in length, at multiple (dozens, 
hundreds, more) sites in the nooks and crannies of the San Gabriel Mountains, at 
places where water could pool and percolate back into the earth before roaring a 
dozen or fifteen miles downhill to Los Angeles and creating havoc.
Not bold enough. And maybe it wouldn’t work. Leaders in Los Angeles of a 
century ago could be faulted for many things—corruption, greed, intellectual and 
cultural provincialism among them—but the embrace of small plans and small 
planning options was not usually on that list. A series of check dams, as an idea 
and practice, was largely abandoned (though hikers can still see remnant dams in 
the mountains) in favor of something far, far more ambitious.
Why not glue the Los Angeles River in place? Why not concretize the petulant 
stream? And so it went. Bonds went up for sale, Angelenos bought them, and en-
gineers went to work. It took the better part of a century, as we shall see, but in the 
end, the Los Angeles was forcibly adhered, by concrete adhesive, to the landscape 
it once roamed.
Figure 5. Cement for paving the Los Angeles River, 1939.
Call No: “Dick” Whittington Collection, photCL Whitt 0909, courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, 
 California.
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Look to our next circle radiating outward: the Owens River. A couple of hun-
dred miles to the north and east of Los Angeles lies the Owens Valley, now well 
known as the landscape through which skiers and other year-round recreation 
enthusiasts pass on their way from Southern California to the Sierra Nevadas and 
places like Mammoth Mountain ski area. In 1845, an exploring party of Americans, 
which included one Richard Owens, wandered into the valley, and Owens left his 
name behind when he departed.
A river that, in its natural course, flows some two hundred miles, the Owens rises 
from snowmelt. It runs into—and drains—two valleys, the Long Valley and the Ow-
ens Valley, not far from Yosemite National Park and California’s highest peak, Mount 
Whitney. The Owens Valley, bigger by far than Long Valley, is a long stretch of land 
lying in between the Sierra Nevadas and the White Mountains, about 250 miles to 
the northeast of Los Angeles. As the Los Angeles River threw regular fits of flood 
and tempestuousness, steady (and big) rivers such as the Owens beckoned thirsty, 
ambitious Angelenos. Especially smitten was William Mulholland, chief engineer 
of the city’s water department. Bold, smart, self-made, and gruff, Mulholland knew 
more about the city’s watercourses and water needs than anyone. By the early years 
of the twentieth century, Mulholland had begun a quiet investigation, along with his 
surveyors and hydrologists, into the idea of bringing a river so reliable, so clear, and 
so seemingly accessible as the Owens was to Los Angeles.
Such were the ambitions of the Progressive Era. See it, want it, take it. Or, as 
William Mulholland of Los Angeles put it even more succinctly in response to the 
completion of the Owens River Aqueduct in late 1913: “There it is. Take it.” And 
that is precisely what happened. Voters in Los Angeles purchased bonds; bureau-
crats in Los Angeles purchased water rights in the Owens Valley. Engineers—Mul-
holland chief among them—designed a brilliant metal straw that they stuck in the 
river and used for drawing water (water that the city of Los Angeles now owned) 
all the way to Los Angeles. That made the aqueduct (which they called the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct when it reached the city); and for a moment at least, proud and 
slaked Angelenos even allowed themselves to imagine that they had, in one fell 
riparian swoop, solved their water needs for all time. Such naïveté did not last; it 
fell away when “plenty” of water turned out to be “not nearly enough.”
That the Owens River project and ambition required stealth, science, politics, 
and money is a given; look beneath many a water deal in the West and you’ll find 
such things. But it is the Owens River story that spawned a classic of American cin-
ema. Voilà! Decades later, screenwriter Robert Towne, attuned to history and noir 
fiction, and partnered with film director Roman Polanski, gave us Chinatown (1974).
In the pages that follow, we examine some of the real-life issues and stories 
that lurk behind the scenes and sayings of the film. The intricate Chinatown plot 
revolves around a conspiracy in which wealthy Los Angeles businessman Noah 
Cross plots to bring Sierra Nevada water to his recently acquired agricultural 
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acreage in the northwest San Fernando Valley by murdering a man who opposes a 
$10-million bond issue to finance the building of an aqueduct and reservoir. Cross 
uses hired muscle and city personnel to enforce the secrecy and fraudulence of his 
plot. Private investigator Jake Gittes eventually uncovers the plot to convince Los 
Angeles taxpayers that drought necessitates that they pay for the transfer of water 
that would irrigate Cross’s land, raise prices, and make him another fortune.
The conspiracy theory concerning the origins of the actual Owens Valley project 
evolved in the early 1900s as newspaper editor Sam Clover, local socialists, and oth-
ers sensed a plot by regional capitalists to use public funding to enrich themselves. 
In 1910, the delightfully named William T. Spilman wrote a little booklet called 
The Conspiracy, which spelled out the ramifications of the theory, and which has 
been embellished by others (screenwriter Robert Towne most famously) ever since. 
Steven P. Erie, Abraham Hoffman, and other scholars have demonstrated that the 
Figure 6. William Mulholland surveys the water future of Los Angeles.
Courtesy of the  University of Southern California, on behalf of the USC Libraries.
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overall theory does not hold up. In brief, the syndicate—including newspaper pub-
lishers Harrison Gray Otis and Edwin T. Earl, railroad magnates Henry E. Hunting-
ton and E. H. Harriman, banker Joseph F. Sartori, developer L. C. Brand, and several 
others—publicized their plans to develop agricultural land in the San Fernando Val-
ley long before the aqueduct project was even a possibility. In fact, one invited inves-
tor, Dr. John R. Haynes, confided to Upton Sinclair that he had declined to join the 
syndicate precisely because the water project was not mentioned, or even known of, 
as he believed. The syndicate did not become aware of the aqueduct project until 
city engineers had already decided to pursue it; one of the water department com-
missioners most likely passed along the inside information to them. After that, the 
syndicate members acted as typical Angeleno boosters in campaigning for a project 
that would advance the interests of the city as well as their own.
That said, there certainly was plenty of conflict of interest to go around, includ-
ing on the part of a former Los Angeles mayor (Fred Eaton) who purchased land 
in Owens Valley; a water commissioner who was also an investor in the San Fer-
nando Valley (Moses Sherman); and an engineer working for the federal govern-
ment and city of Los Angeles at the same time (J. B. Lippincott).
Our last circle outward: the Colorado River. Rising out of the Rockies, a river 
famed in the history of the American West, the river that carved the Grand Can-
yon (first among so many spectacular gorges worn away by the river), and the river 
explored so magnificently by one-armed explorer, scientist, and Civil War soldier 
John Wesley Powell, the Colorado is a one-of-a-kind river of North America. At 
Figure 7. A portion of the Los Angeles Aqueduct spilling Owens River water into newly 
claimed land attached to the city of Los Angeles.
From the William Deverell Collection, courtesy of William Deverell.
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nearly fifteen hundred miles long, it is about ten times the length of the Owens 
River and well more than twenty times bigger than the Los Angeles River. While 
the Los Angeles River drains but part of the Los Angeles Basin, and the Owens 
River drains the valley it rolls through, the Colorado River drains a great deal of 
the American West on the western slope of the Continental Divide.
Its sheer bigness has been, as we expect to show you, matched by the sheer and 
grandiose size of Southern California’s designs upon it. For as the Los Angeles 
River gave way to the Owens River as the Los Angeles water source round about 
1915, so, too, did the Owens give way to the Colorado two decades later. It was one 
thing for an ambitious metropolis to go after, and get, a snowpack river out of the 
mountains of the same state. It was another thing altogether for the region to set its 
sights on one of the world’s great rivers. But set their sights Los Angelenos did, by 
means of legal innovation, treaty-making acumen, engineering prowess, and lots 
of money. By the beginning of the Great Depression, the Colorado River had been 
coaxed, legally and otherwise, toward Southern California, where it arrived by 
1941. A consortial arrangement had been hammered out by which its waters would 
be further distributed, its energies converted to electricity, and its impact felt in the 
growing towns and neighborhoods of Southern California.
One, two, three: the Los Angeles, the Owens, and the Colorado. A Tale of Three 
Rivers: Los Angeles and Southern California as we know them come into being, 
get the water they need (though never enough), and in the process, launch stories, 
tales, animosities, careers, and pathos enough for a hundred novels and films.
Figure 8. Inside the Colorado River Aqueduct, under construction, early 1930s.





Gentlemen, today you can walk out that door, turn right, hop on a streetcar 
and in twenty-five minutes end up smack in the Pacific Ocean. Now, you 
can swim in it, you can fish in it, you can sail in it, but you can’t drink it, 
you can’t water your lawns with it, you can’t irrigate an orange grove with 
it. Remember, we live next door to the ocean but we also live on the edge of 
the desert. Los Angeles is a desert community. Beneath this building, beneath 
every street, there’s a desert. Without water the dust will rise up and cover us 
as though we’d never existed!
—Los Angeles mayor Sam Bagby, Chinatown
If Los Angeles does not secure the Owens Valley Water supply, she will never 
need it.
—William Mulholland, 1906
There it is. Take it.
—William Mulholland, at the opening ceremonies of the Los 
Angeles Aqueduct, 1913
Without water there would be no major growth for Los Angeles. Its Mediterranean 
climate can be very dry, and there are few sources of freshwater nearby. Sometimes 
there is too much water in the area: floods have destroyed homes and infrastruc-
ture, necessitating projects to control the floodwaters. At other times a lack of 
rain has caused the earth to dry up, destroying agricultural crops and limiting the 
amount of water available for thirsty city dwellers and suburbanites, not to men-
tion future residents and industries. City officials and city boosters who promoted 
urban growth knew that they needed a dependable water supply and to control 
periodic winter flooding if Los Angeles was to grow to the size they envisioned.
In the early twentieth century, Los Angeles boosters and water seekers made 
the control of watercourses and the addition of new supplies a crusade for urban 
expansion. For the Los Angeles River, that meant maintaining and harnessing it 
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to avoid costly damage. The Owens River would be acquired to expand the supply 
for a growing population in the near future; it became a major project, similar to 
the simultaneous construction of the Hetch Hetchy Dam, which would quench 
the thirst of San Francisco. Colorado River water would allow further expansion 
through a major federal project much like others that developed in, and devel-
oped, the West at this time. For Los Angeles, three rivers determined the pathways 
of growth in the early twentieth century, as the city swelled from a population of 
just over one hundred thousand in 1900 to the fifth largest in the nation by 1940.
• • •
THE LOS ANGELES RIVER
In the early stages of the Progressive Era many residents of Los Angeles became 
dissatisfied with the service of the private water company that held most of the 
city’s freshwater supply. They were persuaded to vote for city ownership of water 
resources by engineers and boosters who feared the supply would not meet future 
demand as the city grew. Municipal ownership of some public resources became 
a progressive initiative throughout the nation and in Los Angeles, where the city 
would eventually add other resources to its list of assets and regulation in order to 
ensure orderly growth.
From “Municipal Ownership: Citizens’ Committee on Water Bond Election Meet” 
(Los Angeles Times, August 18, 1899).
“Municipal Ownership
Citizens’ Committee on Water Bond Election Meet
Plan of Campaign to Get out the Vote Adopted—Question Reviewed  
and Opinions Given. Meeting to Be Held This Evening.”
The Citizens’ Committee of One Hundred met last evening in the Council chamber 
at the City Hall. The meeting was called to devise ways and means for getting a full 
expression of public opinion, regarding the municipal ownership of the waterworks, 
at the election for the issuance of bonds, to be held on Wednesday next. The meeting 
was an enthusiastic one, and another will be held this evening at 7:30 o’clock, at the 
same place.
Ex-Mayor Henry T. Hazard presided, and briefly stated the reasons for which the 
meeting was called. Maj. H. T. Lee, associate counsel for the city in the present water 
litigation, was called upon and reviewed the history of the Los Angeles water system. 
He said, in part:
“In the twenty-three years that I have lived in Los Angeles, I have been impressed 
with the persistence and vehemence of the contention of the citizens of the old pueb-
lo that they owned the water supplied to the city. The city has owned the water ever 
since the town was nothing but a Mexican village. The proposition that the citizens of 
Angeles have to face is entirely different from the general question of the municipal 
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ownership of private utilities. Here we already own the water, the only point is, who 
shall control the supply?
“The coming election is to decide whether the city will vote the bonds necessary 
to discharge the contract which it entered into with the water company thirty years 
ago. No vituperation of the water company will avail, it is a plain business proposi-
tion. We must meet the water company face to face: fight every point, and establish 
our legal rights. To vote for the bonds is a duty, and no citizen should be negligent 
in discharging it.” The speaker concluded by advocating that a fund be raised to give 
voters information regarding the location of voting booths.
Figure 9. One section of the Los Angeles River in 1912 demonstrates its limitation as the 
 primary source of water for a growing city.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
20    Rivers of Growth
Ex-Judge A. M. Stephens was the next speaker. In the course of his remarks he 
said: “It never occurred to me until confronted with the issue that it would be neces-
sary to urge the people of Los Angeles to assume control of the water system. This 
system has meant a mint of money to the water company. All that we now have to do 
is buy the pipes. We already own the water.”
• • •
Not all residents agreed that municipal ownership was called for or right. Some 
opposed a long-term bonding effort to purchase the Los Angeles Water Company; 
others opposed the takeover as anathema to the principle of private enterprise. The 
city’s boosters, mostly political conservatives, were overwhelmingly behind the 
acquisition and campaigned diligently for its victory. The following are only two of 
many newspaper stories promoting the purchase.
From “The Opposition to the Bonds” (Los Angeles Times, August 27, 1901).
“The Opposition to the Bonds”
The opposition to the voting of the water bonds appears to be dwindling away, and it 
looks as if the bonds are likely to be carried by an overwhelming vote, unless, indeed, 
those who favor them should exhibit too much careless confidence, and stay away 
from the polls. Many a battle has been lost by overconfidence, or by underestimating 
the strength of the opposition.
There is no doubt whatever—as may be clearly seen from the numerous inter-
views that have been published in The Times—that a great majority of the voters of 
Los Angeles are in favor of paying the water company the $2,000,000 which it has 
agreed to accept, so as to bring to an end the apparently interminable litigation over 
the question, which a leading attorney recently declared could be prolonged by the 
water company, if it sees fit, for at least fifteen years. This is quite easy to believe, in 
view of the instances which come to light so frequently of legal controversies that 
have been drawn out to outrageous lengths, wherever one or both of the contestants 
happens to be possessed of the means to hire legal ability that has made a study of 
the multitudinous methods by which mills of justice may be prevented from turning 
out the grist too rapidly to suit their clients.
The lucid, complete and convincing reply prepared by the City Council to the 
obstructionist and published a few days ago in The Times, was undoubtedly the fin-
ishing stroke which settled the question definitely in the minds of a great many wa-
vering voters, who have all along been in favor of the acquisition of the waterworks 
by the city, but were somewhat in doubt as to the possibility of doing so with safety 
and advantage to the community. A large number of these citizens—probably a great 
majority of them—fully agree with the opposition in their contention that the price 
to be paid for the water system is more than it is intrinsically worth, but, like sensible 
people, they recognize the fact that, through the loose and indefinite action of those 
who granted this franchise to a private corporation at a time when neither the city 
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nor the corporation had the least idea of how valuable it was to become, we are, to 
a certain extent, at the mercy of the water company, and therefore the path of good 
judgment and good sense lies in the direction of the best compromise that can be 
made. This, again, is in the payment of $2,000,000 to the water company for all its 
rights, privileges and possessions.
From “Today will Decide Water Campaign” (Los Angeles Times, August 28, 1901).
“Today will Decide Water Campaign:
Friends of Bonds, Confident of Success if Voters do Their Duty;
‘Last Card’ of Opposition”
Whether the city shall own and operate its waterworks now or hang on to the uncer-
tainties of litigation, is the question to be decided at the polls today.
If the bonds carry, all pending litigation involving the waterworks will be termi-
nated and the city will come into possession of the plant and its revenues as soon as 
the bonds are sold.
If the bonds fail, all compromise proceedings will be declared off and the city will 
again resort to legal measures to force the water company to a settlement.
Friends of the bonds will do well to remember that it takes a two-thirds vote to 
carry them and that one vote cast by the opposition will offset two ballots in favor of 
the $2,000,000 issue.
Voters will have an opportunity of recording their verdict from 6 o’clock a.m. to 
5 o’clock p.m., during which hours the polls will remain open. The ninety general 
election precincts of the city have been grouped into twenty-nine municipal elec-
tion precincts. A full list of the polling places and election officers was published in 
yesterday’s Times.
Facts to Be Considered
A material reduction of water rates will be made possible by the purchase of the plant 
for $2,000,000. For the first few months, at least, the revenue from the plant will be 
diverted to making needed extensions to the waterworks. This work will employ only 
citizens and voters[,] and the State law provides that the minimum wage shall be $2 
for eight hours’ work.
If the $2,000,000 bond issue is voted, the Los Angeles City Water Company will 
allow judgment to be entered in all suits now pending in favor of the city and will 
sign such documents as will effectually secure the city in the ownership of the plant. 
This will put an end to the protracted and very expensive litigation which the city 
has carried on with this company for the last two years with slight success. Whereas, 
if the bonds fail, it is probable that the question will not be settled for the next fifteen 
years and the city will not only be out the revenue from the plant during that time, 
but will have heavy bills to pay for attorneys’ fees and court costs.
When the city owns its waterworks, great prestige will be given it in suits involv-
ing riparian rights on the river. In all cases where the right of the city to claim the 
waters of the river has been involved, the specious argument has been made that, 
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while the city had no waterworks it had no use for the water, and therefore could not 
plead necessity for the vital fluid on that score.
It should be remembered that the property covered by the compromise agree-
ment is far greater than that included in the arbitrators’ award of 1893. Then the 
main plant of the Los Angeles City Water Company was the only property under dis-
cussion. The compromise agreement of $2,000,000 covers the main plant, additional 
property of that company valued at $40,000 omitted from the arbitration, extensions 
since made costing $30,000 and the holdings of the Crystal Springs Land and Wa-
ter Company and the East Side Springs Company. All the property included in the 
agreement has been valued by ex-City engineer Dockweiler at $1,988,000 or $12,000 
less than the $2,000,000 which the city is asked to pay for the plant.
That Interest Dodge
The committee of the “antis,” led by Waldron and Sherman Page, is seeking to make 
much anti-bond capital out of the provision in the agreement that allows the company 
7 per cent interest on the $2,000,000 until final settlement is made. The same section 
of the agreement provides that the city shall come into the revenues of the plant at the 
time the bonds are officially canvassed, and it is determined that they have carried.
The gross revenue of the plant is over $38,000 per month, and the net revenue, 
or profit, is estimated at more than $25,000 per month. If the water company gets 7 
per cent on the bond price, it will amount to $11,666 per month. Deducting this sum 
from the net revenues of the water plant leaves a balance of profit in favor of the city 
of $13,334 per month.
In case the compromise for any reason is not consummated, neither interest nor 
taxes will be paid on the plant by the city. In case the final payment of the $2,000,000 
is delayed the city will be making a revenue of $18,334 per month until such time 
as control of the water plant is secured. Now the city is getting nothing. What more 
favorable agreement for the city could be secured?
Leads to Litigation
The only alternative offered by the anti-bondites is a return to the uncertainties of 
litigation. They may vote bonds in the sum of $884,000 and offer the money to the 
company. This will be refused and then the city can go ahead and build headworks.
But does not the average voter think that this would lead to a long and expensive 
court of litigation as the legality of such a tender would have to be determined? It 
may not be generally known, but there is now a suit filed in court testing the right of 
the city to do just this very thing. As the litigation has progressed up to this time[,] 
several years at least would be required to get a final decision in this case.
Not Municipal Ownership
It is not a question of municipal ownership that is submitted to the voters at the 
polls today. That question was effectually decided when the city entered into the 
thirty-year contract in 1868. The city then bound itself to take over the plant at the 
expiration of the time, and entered into a contract that is equally binding on the city 
and the water company.
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The trouble has arisen over the interpretation of that contract and its peculiar ver-
biage, and the water company has effectually shown its ability to hang on to the plant 
and its revenues despite the efforts of the city. The reason why the water company 
is now willing to agree to a compromise is because the heavy expense of retaining 
three or four of the leading lawyers of the State has eaten into the profits to such an 
extent that the stockholders, or a majority of them, are willing to compromise for a 
reasonable sum.
On both the city and the water company the drain has been exceptionally heavy, 
and many well-informed persons state that they believe it for the best interests of 
both the water company and the city to compromise the existing difficulties.
What Merchants Think
Further returns have been received from the straw poll taken by the Merchants’ and 
Manufacturers’ Association. Perhaps these additional returns, better than anything 
else, show how the opinion of the voters has crystalized in favor of the $2,000,000 issue.
Three days ago the returns showed 230 votes for the bonds and seven against. Last 
night over 300 answers had been received and of the additional returns not one vote 
is against the bond issue.
The vote now stands 301 for the bonds and 7 votes against.
• • •
1902: Now that the city owned its water works, it needed to keep it from flood-
ing and destroying homes, business buildings, and infrastructure, which the river 
seemed to do with wintertime regularity. After terrible 1914 floods, city and county 
boosters joined local government officials and engineers in mounting an effort to 
stop major damages and protect their investment in the future. A special commit-
tee of engineers devised a plan to control the runoff. The preservation of the Los 
Angeles and Long Beach harbors, where the Los Angeles River and the San Gabriel 
River, respectively, emptied into the Pacific Ocean, was of paramount importance 
in assuring future commerce for the Los Angeles region.
From Los Angeles County Board of Flood Control Engineers, “Report of the Board 
of Engineers to the Board of Supervisors” (typescript, 1915, pp. 6–15, Huntington 
Library, San Marino, CA).
introductory
For many years successive Boards of Supervisors have sought to give the county pro-
tection against floods. The heavy flood damage of 1888 emphasized the need of ac-
tion. In 1893 an unavailing effort was made to secure concerted action to control the 
San Gabriel River above El Monte. In 1898 a commission consisting of J. A. Street, 
C. T. Healey and H. Stafford were [sic] employed to investigate and report upon a 
suitable flood channel location and design for the San Gabriel River. Their report 
made, a period of comparatively dry years followed. Interest flagged and the need of 
adequate provision for controlling floods was forgotten.
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The high water of 1911 occasioned by heavy rainfalls in January, February and 
March awakened the people again to the fact that floods recur in Southern Califor-
nia. In answer to a general demand that action be taken, the Supervisors appointed 
Mr. Frank H. Olmsted, now a member of this Board, to investigate and report on 
San Gabriel River control. His report was filed and published October 1913. From 
that time on[,] the County authorities have been active, both in devising plans and 
as far as the legal limitations to their powers permitted[,] bettering flood conditions 
throughout the County. This has been impossible of wide accomplishment by reason 
of the narrow limits of their lawful powers. The Act which goes into effect on the 8th 
of August next enlarges these powers.
The flood control protection districts heretofore established in Los Angeles 
County, seven in number, have on the whole, been a disappointment and the protec-
tive works constructed have proved inadequate.
The Act of the Legislature now about to become effective provides a means 
whereby a general plan can be carried into effect. And protection of a permanent 
nature secured.
The flood control problem that confronted this Board involved studies of the 
physical characteristics of an area which includes precipitous mountains, detrital 
valleys and coastal plains, with rivers subject to enormous winter flood discharges 
Figure 10. Although it usually stayed within its banks in the summer, the Los Angeles River 
could flood vast areas in the winter.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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through channels whose gradients rapidly change and whose courses, by the natural 
process of the upbringing of the valleys, gyrate through wide stretches of the most 
highly improved agricultural and horticultural districts in the United States. The en-
gineering problems involved include flood prevention, flood protection, and harbor 
preservation. . . .
san fernando district
The San Fernando Valley, containing 112,000 acres of fertile valley land, is sur-
rounded by high and precipitous mountains on its eastern side and by lower foot-
hills and mountains on the north, west and south. The general trend of the valley 
floor is towards the southeast, with outlet some two miles in width near the town of 
Tropico. . . .
The eastern mountains are of crystalline rocks. The torrential streams erode these 
rocks and spread the debris over the eastern side of the valley in slopes of approxi-
mately fifty feet per mile. There have been thus built up great detrital deposits on the 
eastern side of the valley composed of coarse granite sands and boulders covering an 
area of about 30,000 acres possessed of great underground storage capacity, which 
act as a covered regulating reservoir. The floods being discharged on this pervious 
mass are absorbed in part and create an underground body of water[,] which sloping 
toward the narrow outlet of the valley there reappears on the surface as the constant, 
regulated flow of the Los Angeles River, which has furnished the water supply of 
practically the entire population of Los Angeles until the bringing of the waters of 
the Aqueduct. . . .
The Big and Little Tujungas [Rivers], now unrestrained, menace an area six miles 
in width and nine miles in length on the eastern side of the valley. Destructive floods 
make erratic excursions through orchards and garden tracts worth approximately 
$1,000.00 per acre. No lands within this district are safe under existing conditions. 
In the western portion of the valley broad sheets of water have spread over highways, 
orchards and town sites, causing great damage and inconvenience and creating con-
ditions which demand remedy. . . .
The detailed report on the valley shows it to be the most advisable to carry the 
flood waters of the Tujunga through their westerly channel to the Los Angeles Riv-
er, and those of the Pacoima in a southerly course from its canyon mouth past the 
county rock quarry at Pacoima to a junction with the main channel of the Tujungas.
In addition it is proposed to provide adequate conduits for the conveyance of the 
flood waters from the extreme northeast corner of the valley through to the Los An-
geles River, and also from the western portion of the valley to the central depression 
of the valley south of Owensmouth. This will include a channel from Chatsworth 
Park and one from Zelzah. Rights of way would have to be obtained for this conduit 
as well as for a main channel of the Los Angeles River from a point west of Owens-
mouth through to its connection with the Tujungas. . . .
The conduit from north of the town of San Fernando through to the Los Ange-
les River would be of masonry, as well as the Zelzah conduit, and a portion of the 
Chatsworth conduit south of 12th Street, and the Los Angeles River Channel west 
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of De Soto Avenue through the town of Owensmouth. The main channel of the Los 
Angeles River from De Soto Avenue to its junction with the Big Tujunga would not 
be lined unless future experience should demonstrate the need thereof. . . .
coastal plain south and east of los angeles
The coastal plain south and east of Los Angeles extends inland from the Pacific 
Ocean to the Paso de Bartolo about twenty miles, and from Inglewood to the east 
county boundary between fifteen and twenty miles. It rises gradually from sea level 
to an elevation of about 250 feet. The gentle slope is broken only by the line of low 
hills of which Dominguez Hill and Signal Hill are the chief elevations.
The Los Angeles River from 1824 to 1889 flowed directly south from the City 
of Los Angeles to its present mouth at Long Beach. In 1889 it changed its course 
easterly through Vernon[,] rejoining its old channel near the County Farm. The Rio 
Hondo has followed fairly uniformly its present channel to a confluence with the Los 
Angeles near the County Farm. The San Gabriel after passing the Whittier Narrows 
has at various times emptied either into Alamitos Bay or joined the Los Angeles 
River via the Rio Hondo, or as in 1888 when it passed near Bouton Lake. The most 
vital requirement in the control of these three rivers is the protection of Los Angeles 
Harbor from the immense amount of silt which these rivers have brought down in 
time past and which they will continue to bring in increasing measure until properly 
controlled. This is true not only because Los Angeles Harbor is probably the greatest 
single asset of the County, but because the authority of the Federal Government in 
protecting navigable water is such that all efforts to control the rivers higher up must 
comply with whatever plans may be adopted by the Government for the protection 
of the harbor. . . .
From the City of Los Angeles, south to Dominguez, the Los Angeles River should 
be returned to the channel which it occupied prior to 1889. In general, it is proposed 
to provide a central trapezoidal channel sufficient for the ordinary flows with wide 
berme planted to cane and willows and rip-rap protection where needed. . . .
public necessity
The estimated cost of the complete works outlined in this report is $16,508,900. The 
loss which occurred in the flood of 1914 was over ten million dollars, or over sixty 
per cent of this amount. Destructive floods will occur in average intervals of less 
than five years.
The costs of rights of way are rapidly increasing. The value of menaced property 
and of consequent damages will advance with the improvement of the country.
Prompt relief from these floods is an urgent public necessity. Supine indifference 






Map 1. Some nineteenth-century Angelenos remembered (or learned from their elders) that 
the Los Angeles River once flowed westward from the site of the present-day Los  Angeles 
 Coliseum and emptied into Santa Monica Bay at Ballona Creek. In 1825 the river jumped 
its banks and headed south to the San Pedro Bay harbor. In this map, geographer Blake 
 Gumprecht traces the several moves the river made before it was finally encased in concrete. 
Courtesy of Blake Gumprecht.
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In the same year, public officials and boosters organized an effort to create a spe-
cial agency encompassing most of Los Angeles County to finance and manage the 
flood control system. Over the next several decades, many more plans would be 
made and infrastructure created to protect an ever-increasing number of homes, 
stores, and other structures that sprouted on the landscapes of urban growth. 
Eventually the riverbed would be set in concrete in an attempt to fasten it in place 
and make it behave.
From “First Long Step Made Toward Flood Control” (Los Angeles Times, July 28, 1915).
“first long step made toward flood control: County Board of  
Engineers Submits Exhaustive Plans Calling for Five Years’  
Work at Cost of Sixteen and a Half Millions—Next Move is to  
Form District, Vote Bonds, Hire a Boss and Start”
Estimating the cost of adequate flood control for Los Angeles County at $16,508,900, 
the Board of Engineers, Flood Control, submitted collective and individual reports 
to the Board of Supervisors yesterday, and the body was dissolved, after spending 
$100,000 in investigations and drafting plans.
The estimate includes an item of $1,827,000 for work in connection with the har-
bor. This expenditure will probably be borne by the government, thus reducing the 
county’s estimated outlay to $14,681,900, or $5,000,000 in excess of the preliminary 
estimate, made shortly after the board was organized.
Further reductions in the county’s outlay through State aid is expected. In this 
connection it is recommended that steps be immediately taken looking towards co-
operation by the State and Federal governments in the work, which it is estimated 
will take about five years to complete. . . .
All five of the engineers agree that the diversion of flood waters from the harbor 
is the major desideratum of the whole plan, it being set forth in axiomlike form in 
the main report that the harbor is the county’s greatest asset. In this connection the 
proposed visits [in] the coming month of both the Rivers and Harbors Committee 
of the United States House of Representatives and the Board of Engineers for Riv-
ers and Harbors, War Department, is considered as recognition that the harbor is a 
government asset to be safeguarded.
The Next Step
Dissolution of the Board of Engineers, Flood Control, means simply that one unit of 
the great work of “removing the risk” from 215,300 acres of land, valued conserva-
tively at more than $50,000,000, has been completed. The second step, under the terms 
of a bill passed by the last Legislature, at the solicitation of the Los Angeles County 
Flood Control Association, is to create a flood control district, issue bonds and ap-
point an engineer to supervise the work. To give the electorate an opportunity to study 
the subject, before initiatory steps are taken, the Board of Supervisors authorized the 
printing of the full text of the engineers’ report in the following words: “At a meeting 
looking to relief from flood damage recently held in Topeka, Kan., it was estimated 
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that flood damage in the State of Kansas during the present year, 1913, amounted 
to $15,000,000. The State of Kansas has an area of 82,158 square miles. Los Angeles 
County has 4067 square miles. If the relative economic interests are directly propor-
tional to the amount of damage and inversely as to the area, then Los Angeles has an 
incentive about twenty times as great as that of Kansas to accomplish flood control.”
In general, the plan of both the majority and minority of the Board of Engineers 
for adequate flood control contemplates, in the words of Mr. Reagan [a member 
of the board], “conservation, retardation, reforestation, spreading of the waters of 
some streams, diversion of those of others, and channel rectification and improve-
ments.” . . .
In the San Fernando
Spreading and assisting waters to percolate under-ground is proposed for the San 
Fernando Valley, with conveyance of the flood waters of the Tejungas through their 
westerly channel to the Los Angeles River, and those of the Pacoima in a southerly 
course from its canyon mouth past the county rock quarry at Pacoima in a junction 
with the main channel of the Tejungas. In addition it is proposed to provide adequate 
conduits for the conveyance of the flood waters from the extreme southeast corner 
of the valley through the Los Angeles River, and also from the western portion of the 
valley to the central depression of the valley south of Owensmouth. This will include 
a channel from Chatsworth Park and one from Zelzah, to cost $679,000 for struc-
tures and $80,000 for rights of way, including work at San Fernando and Wilson.
“A rapid increase in the population of the valley is expected,” says the board’s 
report. “The time is opportune for acquiring rights of way.” . . .
Hundreds of other recommendations are made, affecting all parts of the coun-
ty, and calculated to make all land area from the mountains to the sea immune 
from flood.
• • •
In the mid-1930s the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers assumed most of the respon-
sibility for flood control work in the county. The major downpour in 1938 caused 
massive flooding in the area and spurred civic and business leaders, as well as 
federal and local officials and engineers, to search for a more permanent method 
of controlling the Los Angeles and other rivers to prevent future destruction and 
ensure continued urban growth. Lining the riverbed with concrete was the pre-
ferred method of the Army Corps of Engineers. Such a scheme was designed to 
speed floodwater to the ocean so that it would not rise over the river’s banks and 
wreak havoc. Over the next several decades, about fifty-one miles of the Los An-
geles River would be encased in concrete.
From U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, “Flood Control in the Los Angeles County 
Drainage Area” (May, 1938, pp. 1–4, held by Special Collections, Claremont Col-
leges Library, Claremont, CA).
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The populous city of Los Angeles and its suburbs are situated on a fertile plain which 
is under a more dangerous flood menace than any similar region in the United States.
An unfavorable relation of topography, volume and occurrence of rainfall, and 
occupancy by a large city and numerous adjacent towns and settlements call for an 
extraordinary variety of design and construct in order to provide adequate flood 
protection. The topography is made up of mountains and ridges which border and 
traverse the land except on the ocean side. Drainage is provided by the Los Angeles 
River; its large tributary, the Rio Hondo; the San Gabriel River; and Ballona Creek, 
each fed by many branches, arroyos, and washes from mountain and ridge slopes. 
All these streams follow a general southerly direction on their course to the ocean. 
The rains are torrential, transforming the streams, normally dry or of little volume, 
into raging torrents which transport soil, gravel, and boulders, scouring their chan-
nels and flooding the low-lands. The impetus and fierceness of these floods can be 
likened to that of the discharge of a bursting dam. This was vividly illustrated by the 
New Year’s Day flood of 1934, when flood-transported debris devastated the suburbs 
of Montrose and La Crescenta, and again by the flood of March 2, 1938, when de-
struction was general along the foothill area from San Bernardino to San Fernando. 
The combination of these factors, which affect or are affected by the floods, makes 
Figure 11. Damage in North Hollywood as a result of the 1938 flood.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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necessary regulation at many points by many kinds of structures for the achievement 
of adequate flood control.
Attention was first formally directed to the problem of flood control about 
23 years ago, resulting in the formation of the Los Angeles County Flood Control 
District. However, instead of diminishing, the requirements for protection against 
flood have increased as the work has proceeded. One of the principal factors con-
tributing to this increase is the increase in the rate of run-off, with its consequent 
increase in flood peaks. This manifestation is explained in the history of the growth 
of Los Angeles and its neighboring cities, with the increase in imperviousness which 
accompanies such growth through increase in roof and street areas. The flood con-
trol requirements are further augmented by increased land values, new residential 
districts, and the development of high-priced orchards. More specifically, the prop-
erty valuation in the county is six times the valuation two decades ago.
The magnitude of the problem is made comprehensible by the fact that Los An-
geles County has already spent sixty millions in the building of parts of the required 
protective works, and a plan is now contemplated which will aggregate seventy mil-
lions more. Even the size of these figures, however, cannot reveal the difficulty and 
diversity of the engineering problems involved. In addition to the need for curbing 
the flood waters and debris, matters are further complicated by the necessity of con-
serving as much as is possible of the discharging flood waters to replenish the ground 
water storage, heavily depleted in recent years, and on which the life of much of the 
region depends. . . .
Since the inauguration of work under an allotment of W.P.A. funds, the passage 
of the Flood Control Act of 1936 has placed the flood protection of the Los Angeles 
area under the category of a Definite Federal Project, and provides for the ultimate 
expenditure of federal funds not to exceed $70,000,000 for its completion, subject 
to approval of plans by the Chief of Engineers, on recommendation by the Board of 
Engineers for Rivers and Harbors.
The work to date has been done at points where flood danger was most immi-
nent. In foothill areas, basins and dams have been built to trap water-borne debris 
and to check water traveling at high velocities; and channels have been constructed 
to control the water flowing from those debris basins. Below the foothills and on the 
coastal plain, various channels have been enlarged, straightened, and provided with 
bank protection, or inclosed in reinforced concrete channels. In low-lying areas, the 
drainage problem has been met by providing more efficient drainage into the ocean, 
or by the installation of pumping works, to raise the storm water to elevations where 
it will drain off.
Present and contemplated work is of a nature similar to that already accom-
plished, except that several large earth-filled dams will be constructed to form flood 
control basins. These will serve the triple purpose of reducing peak run-off, catching 
debris carried by the stream, and holding the water so that it can be released at a 
rate which will permit increased percolation into the streambed, thereby conserving 
much of the run-off which would otherwise waste into the ocean.
• • •
Map 2. Los Angeles receives water from several sources besides the Owens and Colorado 
Rivers appearing in this map of the major conveyances (the Los Angeles River is not included). 
One other major source is the State Water Project, which carries water through the California 
Aqueduct from Northern to Southern California, where some of it is emptied into the Colorado 
River Aqueduct headed toward Los Angeles and nearby communities.
Courtesy of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California.
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THE OWENS RIVER
Plans to control the flow of the Los Angeles River did not satisfy boosters for long. 
In fact city engineers immediately began to look for more water to support antici-
pated growth. It was found about 250 miles away, in Inyo County. Engineers pro-
posed building an aqueduct on, or in, the Owens River to bring it to Los Angeles. 
This rapidly became a major project for the city’s progressives as a public effort 
to expand and manage a natural resource for the good of all city residents. Over 
the years, the progressives fought to protect this venture from those who sought 
to take advantage of it, and from those who claimed it had been a plan hatched 
in perdition. City officials desirous of acquiring patronage jobs and implicated in 
possible graft were often challenged; in the meantime, investors who had bought 
once-dry land saw their property values rise when the water arrived. And Los 
Angles’ city limits expanded as communities and incorporated cities were annexed 
to it in order to obtain a dependable water source.
From Burt A. Heinly, “Municipal Progressiveness and the Los Angeles Aqueduct” 
(The American City 6 [April 1912]: 662).
In 1905 the city of Los Angeles voted to undertake the construction of the Owens 
River project. September 20, 1907, the first shovelful of earth was thrown in the exca-
vation of the 240-mile aqueduct. Today sees the work 85 per cent completed in point 
of hardship and 79 per cent in point of distance. January 1, 1913, should find the 
floods of the Sierra watering the soil of the San Fernando Valley near the city’s gates.
For 130 miles this water course of steel and concrete skirts the western edge of 
the Mojave Desert, then tunnels the Coast Range and enters the Pacific coastal plain, 
bringing not merely the certainty of a pure and copious domestic water supply, but 
tremendous possibilities of hydro-electric power development and the irrigation of 
135,000 acres of dry land contiguous to the city. The history of the undertaking is a 
record of seven years of public unity in which no bickerings or party politics have 
been permitted to enter; the men to whom the city intrusted the enterprise have been 
left free to perform their duty to the best of their ability, knowing that Los Angeles 
believed in them—trusted them. The enterprise is a remarkable one, even if it were 
not one of the most daring engineering feats ever attempted. With the exception of 
one small contract amounting to less than three per cent of the whole, all the work 
has been done by the city itself. The task is being completed nearly a year in advance of 
the time for which it was promised and well within the $24,500,000 issue of bonds voted 
for the purpose [italics in original]. This statement is based on the percentage of the 
mileage now finished and the cost of work to date.
For the past three years the progress has been at the rate of a little more than fifty 
miles annually. The army of 4,000 men equipped with power shovels and other forms 
of the most powerful and modern forms of excavating machinery have worked si-
multaneously from fifty camps, wherein water, food and all other necessities of life 
have had to be carried into the desert for them. . . .
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One feature of the work to which little or no publicity has been given is that the 
municipality is dividing with labor the profits resulting from labor’s intense applica-
tion to its task. In addition to a daily wage, labor is paid pro rata whenever a certain 
rate of progress is exceeded in a ten-day interval. Along the aqueduct the man with 
the shovel or ’barrow or trowel has learned to measure his task, not by the eight-hour 
day, but by how much it is possible for him to accomplish in that period. To this com-
munity of interest between the municipality and its copartner, labor, is to be traced 
much of the low cost and unusual speed with which the enterprise is being advanced 
towards completion. . . .
With all the available power fully developed, and with a ready market for her 
water to irrigators and domestic consumers, Los Angeles estimates that for a total ex-
penditure of $31,500,000 she will have a going concern that will pay her a net annual 
revenue of $4,425,000, which is the equivalent of 5 per cent interest on $88,500,000.
• • •
Aqueduct plans were initially kept secret to prevent the escalation of the price of 
water rights and land values in the Owens Valley; the project was finally made pub-
lic knowledge in 1905. Soon thereafter, it was revealed that a syndicate of wealthy 
businessmen who purchased property in the San Fernando Valley had been tipped 
off about the aqueduct project ahead of time. The syndicate they formed was able 
to buy up thousands of acres of land at pre-aqueduct prices, very near to where the 
aqueduct would in fact terminate.
From Articles of Incorporation of the San Fernando Mission Land Company 
( December 3, 1904, Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles 
County Museum of Natural History).
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
That we, the undersigned, a majority of whom are citizens and residents of the State 
of California, have this day voluntarily associated ourselves together for the purpose 
of forming a corporation under the laws of the State of California.
AND WE HEREBY CERTIFY:
FIRST—That the name of said corporation shall be the San Fernando Mission Land 
Company.
SECOND—That the purposes for which it is formed are to buy and sell land and 
water, to subdivide land into farm or town lots and sell same, to develop water for 
domestic or irrigating purposes and sell same, to form stock corporations for the 
development, use and sale of water, to buy stock of any corporation where water can 
be obtained for the use of land and to do a general land and water business in buying 
and selling same, to incur bonded or other indebtedness, to execute Deeds, Mort-
gages, Powers of Attorney or other instruments, to facilitate the purchase and sale of 
land and water, all of which business is to be done for profit.
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THIRD—That the place where the principal business of said Corporation is to be 
transacted is ____________ Los Angeles, California.
FOURTH—That the term for which said Corporation is to exist is fifty years, 
from and after the date of its incorporation.
FIFTH—That the number of Directors or Trustees of said Corporation shall be 
seven and that the names and residences of the Directors or Trustees, who are ap-
pointed for the first year, and to serve until the election and qualification of such 
officers, are as follows to-wit:
Name Whose Residence is at
H. E. Huntington Los Angeles, Cal.
E. H. Harriman New York
H. G. Otis Los Angeles, Cal.
W. G. Kerckhoff Los Angeles, Cal.
J. F. Sartori Los Angeles, Cal.
L. C. Brand Los Angeles, Cal.
E. T. Earl Los Angeles, Cal.
Figure 12. Harvesting grain on the Van Nuys Lankershim Ranch in the San Fernando Valley 
circa 1905.
From the C. C. Pierce Collection of Photographs, photCL Pierce 05519, courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, 
California.
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SIXTH—That the amount of the Capital Stock of said Corporation is One Million 
Dollars, and the number of Shares into which it is divided is Ten Thousand of the par 
value of One Hundred Dollars, each.
• • •
Figures 13, 14, 15, and 16. Members of the San Fernando Mission Land Company 
included (clockwise from top left) Henry E. Huntington, Harrison G. Otis, Joseph Sartori, and 
Edwin T. Earl.
Photo of Huntington from the Henry E. Huntington Collection, HEH 61/2/7 (10), courtesy of The Huntington 
 Library, San Marino, California. Photo of Otis courtesy of the University of Southern California, on behalf of the USC 
Libraries. Photo of Sartori courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection. Photo of Earl from the C. C. 
Pierce Collection of Photographs, photCL Pierce 08609, courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
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• • •
Although the syndicate had purchased the San Fernando Valley property long be-
fore the Owens River project was announced, the timing of this revelation spurred 
some opponents to charge that the entire project was created by the syndicate to 
reap the profits from a publicly financed venture. This conspiracy thesis became 
a much-believed tenet of local history over the years and was a central feature in 
the famed motion picture Chinatown. In all likelihood the syndicate was probably 
informed of the planned purchase by Moses Sherman, a city water commissioner 
and an associate of some of the syndicate leaders. Below is an early description 
of the conspiracy by an opponent who was criticized by project proponents for 
frequently stretching the truth.
From W. T. Spilman, The Conspiracy: An Exposure of the Owens River Water and 
San Fernando Land Frauds ([Los Angeles: Alembic Club, 1912], 57–60, Huntington 
Library, San Marino, CA).
The summer of 1903 was the time of the City’s first artificial shortage of water. It was 
also the second year of constructing the fake tunnel. The newspapers paraded this 
alleged shortage of water and the fake tunnel to the people throughout the season 
without there being any move or sign of an exposure of these deceptions. Book 1919, 
Page 153, Record of Deeds, Los Angeles County, shows that in the autumn of this 
same year Mr. L. C. Brand took a three-years’ option in trust of date, October 13, 
1903, on the Porter Land and Water Company’s great ranch at a price of $35 per acre.
This trust has since been terminated by incorporating it under the name of the 
San Fernando Mission Land Company with:
1. H. G. Otis, chief owner and general manager of the Los Angeles Times.
2. E. T. Earl, owner of the Los Angeles Express and The Tribune
3. L. C. Brand, largely interested in the Los Angeles Times.
4. E. H. Harriman, deceased, and late president of the Southern Pacific, whose 
railroad interests are now represented by Judge Robert S. Lovett.
5. W. H. [sic] Kerckhoff, president of the Pacific Light & Power Company of Los 
Angeles.
6. H. E. Huntington, president of the Los Angeles Railway Company of Los An-
geles.
7. J. F. Sartori, president of the Security Savings Bank of Los Angeles, California, 
as directors.
Mr. M. H. Sherman, vice president of the Los Angeles Pacific Railroad[,] was a stock-
holder in this land company and also a member of the Board of Water Commission-
ers at the time of taking this option.
This princely estate is better known as the George K. Porter Ranch; and it has 
an area upwards of twenty-eight square miles. It is situated in the upper end of the 
San Fernando valley, immediately at the point where the Owens River aqueduct 
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terminates. This vast body of land is of little value in its natural dry state, but with 
water it stands unexcelled as an orange and lemon belt in Southern California. It is 
fertile and practically frostless.
Now the question is, did these gentlemen have knowledge of the Owens River 
project at the time they took that extraordinary long-period option[,] and have they 
been secretly guiding the workings of this great scheme; or was it due to the kindness 
of the fates that Messrs. Otis and Earl with their wealthy associates fell into this great 
land bargain? Or did they unwittingly take a three-year’s option on this land with 
only a blind hope that something would occur to make it valuable?
The San Fernando valley contains 112,640 acres[,] and Messrs. Otis and Sherman 
with other wealthy gentlemen have, since the first purchase, bought at about the 
same price practically all of the remainder of the valley, except a small tract in the 
vicinity of Burbank that was subdivided a number of years ago.
(Quotation No. 34)
In a booklet issued in 1910–1911 by the Los Angeles Suburban Homes Company, a 
corporation composed of H. G. Otis and his wealthy associates as owners and devel-
opers, they say:
“At the Northerly Gateway of Los Angeles.”
“And this beckoning gate is now ajar.”
 “View of portion of the aqueduct which will bring  
Owens River water to a vast reservoir adjacent to these lands.”
More About the Water Supply
“There will be created a great reservoir-lake for the storage of the pure fluid com-
ing down from the base of the snow-clad Sierras, the reservoir having already been 
selected in the foothills hard by the tract of land here described; and to reach the city 
the Owens River water must traverse the San Fernando valley.
“Purchasers of land here will share equitably in the primary right that will un-
doubtedly be accorded the residents of the San Fernando valley to be the first con-
sumers beyond the City limits to share in the surplus water that will be brought down 
by the great aqueduct. They will thus enjoy greater advantages than can come to any 
other section, besides such special advantages as may result from contiguity.
“Surveys and plans of distribution are already being made for covering all the 
available portions of the great valley with the immense surplus of the Owens River 
water which it is confidently believed will be available when the capacious conduit is 
in full operation less than three years hence.”
Comment
This alluring advertisement [above] is put out by the corporation composed of Mr. 
H. G. Otis and his wealthy associates and it only applies to the Van Nuys–Lankershim 
lands which are situated in the lower half of the San Fernando valley, the upper por-
tion not having as yet been put upon the market.
By this class of advertising[,] which virtually promises the Owens River water for 
the irrigation of this land[,] they have boosted its price from about $35 to $400 per acre,  
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making their profit more than tenfold. Thus they reap a golden harvest while the 
people of the City of Los Angeles pay the bills.
The lower half of the valley is not nearly as valuable as the upper half will be when 
supplied with water[;] nevertheless, even at the prices they are selling the low lands 
show what colossal fortunes these gentlemen are making out of this scheme and that 
without any regard as to the welfare of either the city or the poor people who buy 
these lands of them.
• • •
The idea that conspiracy explained the entire aqueduct project—a belief held by 
many at the time—was doubted by Dr. John Randolph Haynes, a wealthy physi-
cian and political activist in Los Angeles. In the following letter, Haynes informs 
his friend, the novelist and social critic Upton Sinclair, that he was invited to join 
the syndicate early on but declined because of the lack of available water.
From Dr. John Randolph Haynes to Upton Sinclair (August 13, 1919, Box 19, Upton 
Sinclair Papers, courtesy of the Lilly Library, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN).
Figure 17. Los Angeles political reform 
activist Dr. John Randolph Haynes, circa 1930.
Courtesy of the John Randolph Haynes and Dora 
Haynes Foundation.
Figure 18. Novelist and political activist 
 Upton Sinclair in 1934.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo 
 Collection.
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August 13, 1919
My dear Mr. Sinclair:
With reference to the building of the Owens River Aqueduct there are a number of 
stories in circulation which from my personal knowledge I know to be without foun-
dation. It has been charged, for example, that the “drouth” in the years immediately 
proceeding the undertaking was fictitious in character, gotten up by the promoters 
of the project to persuade people to take that action; that the purchasers of the Porter 
Ranch bought the property with the idea of getting the city to build the Aqueduct 
and of thereby reaping enormous profits; and that the work of construction on the 
Aqueduct was poorly and uneconomically done.
Regarding the “drouth” fiction, I remember very well the dry years because I and 
many others felt that it might mean an end to the city’s growth. I remember that I 
refused to loan money on certain city properties for that reason. I was then living at 
945 South Figueroa St., and the property adjoining me—on the corner—consisting 
of one hundred and eight (108) feet frontage was offered to me for $4500. For the 
reason I mentioned I declined to buy. That property today[,] although located 
a little beyond the present business district, is worth at a conservative estimate 
$130,000. There was much talk of bringing water from the so called “Bouton Wells,” 
from Mojave River, of sinking wells in the Tujunga Wash, etc., but all one after 
another were given up either because of engineering difficulties or  because of the 
doubt of being able to secure legal title to the water rights; and because none of 
these projects assured anything like an adequate supply. The Owens River idea met 
with approval because the supply was large; and there was no question of prior 
claims from other communities since it was at that time running to waste in a dead 
salt sea, Owens Lake.
I know that the syndicate organized to buy the Porter ranch had no thought 
at the time of securing Owens River water because I was asked to join and to take 
a one-tenth interest. I talked with Otis and the others who urged me to join. Al-
though many considerations were advanced in favor of the purchase, nothing was 
said about the Owens River as a source of water supply. I turned the matter down 
because I did not feel sure of the safety of the investment. Of course, after the ranch 
was purchased and the Owens River project was later put forward, these men boost-
ed it. I think that the owners of the Porter Ranch should have been compelled to 
pay a bigger bonus than they did to get the Aqueduct water, possibly two or three 
hundred dollars an acre; but I am sure that there is no truth in the charge that they 
bought the ranch with the idea that they could persuade the city to bring down the 
Owens River water.
With reference to the construction of the Aqueduct[,] there were of course, some 
mistakes made, only one of a serious character however. This involved a loss of pos-
sibly forty, or fifty[,] thousand dollars. On the whole, however, according to the opin-
ion of experts from all parts of the world, it is a wonderfully good piece of work, 
economically built. According to Edgerton, a member of the State Railway Com-
mission, and a very honest man, it is one of the best and cheapest engineering tasks 
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ever performed. It is a tribute to the enterprise of the people of Los Angeles and a 
magnificent monument to Wm. Mulholland the engineer.
I do not believe that Mulholland was as considerate of the interests of the workers 
on the aqueduct in some respects as he ought to have been[,] but I believe that he did 
drive the best bargain for the city that he could in all matters.
It is difficult for me to be patient sometimes with certain socialistic factions 
which on general principles are perpetually clamoring for public ownership of the 
industries and yet[,] whenever we do make a magnificent success of publicly owned 
enterprises, try to bark their heads off concerning minor defects and even resort to 
the circulation of reports false and misleading.
Even if their stories were true concerning the aqueduct, which they are not, in 
the interest of the socialist movement they should put in their time telling of the 
wonderful benefits the aqueduct is giving us instead of harping about the mistakes 
made in constructing it.
As a matter of fact the city today would be in an awful fix if the Owens River 
Canal had not been built. As it is, the city is growing and will continue to grow by 
leaps and bounds. The president of the Goodyear Company has publically stated that 
the water supply of Los Angeles and the cheap electrical power were the determining 
reasons for locating their immense plant at Los Angeles rather than at San Diego, San 
Francisco or other cities which were considered. And this is but the beginning. Los 
Angeles will soon be a city of a million people.
Apologizing to you for the delay in answering your letter, which was due, as I 




Some engineers and former city officials also came under fierce criticism for 
their roles in the project. J. B. Lippincott, an engineer with the U.S. Reclama-
tion Service, worked simultaneously for the City of Los Angeles as a consulting 
engineer while employed by the federal government. This was a clear conflict of 
interest, made all the more apparent when the Reclamation Service, which had 
initially considered developing the project, instead handed it over to Los Ange-
les. Former Los Angeles mayor Fred Eaton, who first suggested the Owens River 
as a possible source of freshwater for L.A., tried to personally cash in by selling 
land (especially for a reservoir site) that he had purchased in the Owens Valley 
when acting on behalf of the city. Eaton offered these holdings for sale to Los 
Angeles at an inflated price, offerings that his no doubt flabbergasted colleagues 
in the city rebuffed.
From J.  B. Lippincott to Fernand Lungren (September 15, 1905, Box 1, Fernand 
Lungren Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA).
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September 15, 1905
Mr. Fernand Lungren
201 E. Ave. 41
Los Angeles, Cal.
Dear Sir:
In compliance with our conversation of yesterday, I am writing you concerning 
the Owens Valley situation.
The water supply of Southern California in general, and particularly around Los 
Angeles, is failing. This section has far outgrown the point where it can sustain it-
self on the surface streams, and has started an invasion on the underground water 
supplies by pumping in practically every part of Southern California. These extrac-
tions from the underground waters have caused a most serious dropping of the water 
plane. The City of Los Angeles has avoided a water famine on several occasions of 
late by appeals to the people through the press to cease using water during certain 
periods of drouth and hot weather. . . .
The City for a period now of a year has been quietly investigating other sources 
of water supply. Mr. Fred Eaton, member of the American Society of Civil Engineers, 
has been Mayor of the City of Los Angeles, City Engineer, and repeatedly Consulting 
Engineer for the town. Eaton and I, previous to my accepting a commission with the 
Reclamation Service, were probably among the principal ones who assisted in bring-
ing about a municipal ownership of our water works, about five years ago. Today this 
system is owned by the City of Los Angeles. In the year 1904 this water works paid 
all operating and maintenance charges, provided interest and sinking funds for the 
bonds and depreciation of the plant and netted to the City as profit $640,000 after 
having reduced the water rate fully 10% upon the assumption of the plant by the 
municipality. We now have about the cheapest water rate in California. . . .
Mr. Eaton has lived in Owens Valley and he has called the attention of the City of 
Los Angeles to the possibility of bringing Owens River to that town. The work of do-
ing this will be probably one of the most monumental and gigantic undertakings for 
a municipal water system that has ever been attempted on this continent. It involves 
an expenditure ultimately of about $25,000,000, and the construction of a concrete 
conduit that will be 209 miles in length, with an internal diameter of about 15 feet. 
The Owens River drains the easterly face of the Sierra Nevada Mountains for a dis-
tance of about 100 miles, including the region in the neighborhood of Mt. Whitney, 




The Owens River Aqueduct project became a hot political issue in the 1911 mu-
nicipal election in Los Angeles. Candidates running on the Socialist Party plat-
form pledged to complete the project, while condemning both land syndicate 
“ exploiters” and the progressive city administration for the parts they played in the 
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project. In the primary election, Socialist mayoral candidate Job Harriman came 
very close to winning the election, an outcome that probably would have changed 
the course of water history in Los Angeles.
From “Municipal Platform: Socialist Party of Los Angeles” (August 6, 1911, Box 
57, John R. Haynes Papers, Department of Special Collections, Charles E. Young 
Research Library, UCLA).
Our Water Supply
We favor the hastening [of] the work of completing the Owens River Aqueduct, for 
which the people of Los Angeles have devoted $23,000,000 under the belief that the 
water and the electric energy to be derived therefrom was to be delivered to the 
people, and used for their benefit.
We demand that this electric power be held by the people to their use and not 
delivered now or at any time in the future to any corporation of avaricious and ex-
ploiting capitalists.
We pledge ourselves to take immediate steps towards bringing the Owens River 
water to Los Angeles. We view with utmost abhorrence plans which have been se-
cretly carried out for years and which, if allowed to be consummated, would result 
in flowing the waters of the aqueduct upon lands held by some of the most infamous 
exploiters of land and labor in America.
We condemn the present city administration for permitting and causing the 
workers on the aqueduct to be fed upon and forced to eat a short allowance of spoiled 
and unhealthful food in order to increase the profit of private contractors, and we 
pledge ourselves to remedy this evil if placed in power.
• • •
In 1912, critics of the aqueduct convinced the Los Angeles City Council to appoint 
an investigative body to examine all aspects of the project. In the following passage 
contained in the board’s final report (a report that filled seven volumes), former 
mayor Fred Eaton is singled out for special criticism for his self-interest.
From Ingle Carpenter report on Fred Eaton, in Los Angeles Aqueduct Investiga-
tion Board, Report of the Aqueduct Investigation Board to the City Council of Los 
Angeles (7 vols., 1912, 1:103–109).
To the Aqueduct Investigation Board,
Gentlemen:
Upon your request for a brief opinion on the law relative to the evidence taken 
before your Board as to the purchase, through Mr. Fred Eaton[,] of the land and wa-
ter rights during the year 1906, I give you the following brief opinion:
The evidence shows that Mr. Mulholland, at that time superintendent of the city 
water works, Mr. W. B. Mathews, at that time City Attorney, and Fred Eaton were 
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jointly interested in securing for the city the important lands and water rights in 
Owens River Valley in the fall of 1904 and in 1906.
That Mr. Mulholland had made a survey for the proposed aqueduct, and that care-
ful surveys are continued during the period referred to, in which he had out-lined 
the probable course of the aqueduct and the lands that would be necessary for the 
city to acquire.
That Mr. Mathews had been equally diligent in attending to the legal matters 
involved and in drawing up the necessary options to be taken upon the property that 
the city proposed to acquire. That it was necessary that the acquiring of this property 
should be concluded in the shape of options before the public in that locality became 
aware of the need of the city, and raised their prices. That Mr. Fred Eaton had resided 
in that locality and knew the various residents whose property it was desirable to 
purchase, and that he had been instrumental in bringing to Mr. Mulholland’s atten-
tion the possibilities of that section, for water purposes.
That Mr. Eaton at that time had no interest in any of these lands proposed to be 
acquired for the city, and had no options and no negotiations for options of any sort 
at that time.
Figure 19. Fred Eaton, mayor of Los Angeles, 1898–1900.
Courtesy of the Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History.
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That it seemed necessary to Mr. Mulholland and Mr. Mathews that some one 
should act for the city in order to assume to negotiate for the lands and to take the 
title in his own name, until all the lands were acquired. That it appeared to the best 
interest of the city that Mr. Fred Eaton should be the one to act in that capacity.
Under these conditions, the evidence shows that Mr. Eaton, under the direction 
of Mr. Mulholland as to what were the necessary and important lands to be acquired, 
and under the legal direction of Mr. Mathews, who drafted the necessary options for 
the signatures of the important land-holders, went into the valley and for the first 
and most important option secured the option from the Rickey Land and Cattle 
Company which covered what appeared to be the most important land required for 
the aqueduct undertaking.
The letters during this period, written by Mr. Eaton to Mr. Mathews, show that 
the first option secured was on this land on March 22nd, 1905, and that Messrs. 
Eaton, Mathews, and Mulholland were working jointly to secure the same. Further 
letters at this time show the continuance of this arrangement, and there is nothing 
to show that Mr. Eaton was working at all independently or in any other capacity 
than that of representing the city, sub-rosa, in these undertakings. In the letter of 
April 6, 1905, Mr. Eaton writes Mr. Mathews that he has retained a local attorney, 
Ben Yandell, to attend to his work while he was absent, and the disbursements from 
the Water Revenue Fund show that this retainer was with the City of Los Angeles.
The minutes of the Board of Water Commissioners of May 22, 1905, show that 
the written proposal to sell the city certain lands, by Mr. Eaton, which lands are 
referred to and are the lands included in the first important option secured by Mr. 
Eaton, is accepted by a resolution of the Board which provides that Mr. Eaton will 
assign and transfer to the Board all options and contracts held by him.
It is further to be considered that the evidence shows that there was no written 
proposal before the board at that time, as the only written proposal made by Mr. Ea-
ton was written a day later than the meeting of the Board, and was mailed at Carson 
City, Nevada.
It can but be concluded from this evidence that the only proposition before the 
board was the understanding under which Messrs. Mulholland, Mathews and Eaton 
seemed to have worked, which was that Mr. Eaton, in whose name these properties 
were to be taken for the benefit of the city, should transfer same by informal sale or 
transfer upon this resolution of the Board.
On June 6, 1905, the first payment on the property under the option appears to 
have been made, and this was made by Mr. Fay, President of the Water Board, at San 
Francisco[,] and $50,000 was paid over by him to the President of the Rickey Land 
and Cattle Company, and consisted of money belonging to the City of Los Angeles.
It appears from the evidence that about this time Mr. Eaton secured from the 
Rickey Land and Cattle Company a second option or agreement of sale, specifying 
only part of the property included in the original option, but taking another agree-
ment or option for the balance provided for in the first option.
The minutes of the Water Commissioners of June 6, 1905, show an agreement 
made on that date between the City of Los Angeles and Mr. Eaton for the purchase of 
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certain land which formed a part of the original option which Mr. Eaton had secured 
as already referred to. This agreement was made several days after Mr. Fay had paid 
the $50,000 on account of the purchase of the land and which he had paid direct to 
the president of the Rickey Land and Cattle Company.
It appears from the evidence that only a part of the lands in the original option 
which the resolution referred to seemed to require should be assigned and transferred 
to the Board of Water Commissioners, were included in this agreement of sale of 
June 6, 1905. It also appears from the testimony of Mr. Mulholland and Mr. Mathews 
that after Mr. Fay had paid the $50,000 upon the purchase of the property, the option 
or agreement on which stood in the name of Mr. Eaton, that Mr.  Eaton came to Los 
Angeles and that Mr. Mulholland and Mr. Mathews arranged for this purchase or 
transfer[,] and at this point Mr. Eaton held up all the land and property in the option 
that he could; and that the property which the city finally secured by this agreement 
of June 6, 1905, was only a part of the property under the original option secured as 
has been stated.
The evidence of both Mr. Mulholland and Mr. Mathews shows that Mr. Eaton’s 
attitude was unexpected, and was not in accordance with any arrangement that they 
may have had, and that for two days they fought at swords’ points in securing from 
Mr. Eaton the property needed for the aqueduct. This, also, notwithstanding the fact 
that in the securing of the option Mr. Mathews and Mr. Mulholland had performed 
as important, if not more important, services than Mr. Eaton, and that the city had 
paid the $50,000 which had been paid upon the option, and that the necessity of 
Mr. Eaton in the deal was only for the use of his name to forestall public knowledge 
in that locality.
It appears that the property which Mr. Eaton retained from the original option 
and refused to transfer to the city, although the resolution of the Board had contem-
plated an assignment or transfer of all options and contracts, including five thousand 
head of cattle, all buildings and equipment of the ranch and one hundred head of 
horses and mules, a rebate to be returned to the holder of the option of $8.00 per 
acre upon unpatented land which Mr. Eaton calculated at from 5,000 to 17,000 acres, 
and approximately about one-half of the total acreage of the land included in the 
original option.
It appears also from the testimony that the city has since been obliged to buy a 
considerable part of this land, and that in order to carry out the proposed plans as to 
the Long Valley Reservoir a very large portion of this land now held by Mr. Eaton will 
have to be purchased; and while the data as to the exact value of the properties that 
Mr. Eaton retained is not at hand, still placing an approximate value upon the cattle 
and other properties, and the rebate, the further purchase he made for the city and 
the value which he has stated that he holds the balance of the required land at, would 
approximate upwards of three-quarters of a million dollars.
Taking in conjunction the evidence upon other real estate transactions subse-
quent to that time, when, upon his own request, Mr. Eaton was receiving $10 per day 
from the city as shown by the minutes of the Board of Water Commissioners, and 
the expenditures from the Water Revenue Fund, which evidence is before the Board, 
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and which shows that he was receiving commissions during such period, aside from 
his salary, and that he made approximately $10,000 over and above any agreement 
on transactions involving $60,000, which, according to his agreement with the Water 
Board were purchased for a stipulated consideration, as shown in the minutes of said 
Board on June 6, 1905, I would conclude that any further evidence that might be se-
cured relative to the option of the Rickey Land and Cattle Company with Mr. Eaton 
would substantiate the facts already stated.
Inasmuch as all members of the Board of Water Commissioners who have given 
any testimony have stated that their understanding was that Mr. Eaton should assign 
and transfer the option received by him, retaining as a commission the cattle referred 
to, and inasmuch as the Original First Annual Report of the Los Angeles Aqueduct, 
in referring to the inception of the idea, shows a misunderstanding on the part of the 
Board as to the real situation at that time as to the options, I can but conclude that 
Mr. Eaton, was, at the time he secured that option, working in the employment of 
the city under arrangements that he had with Mr. Mathews and Mr. Mulholland, and 
that the placing of the property in the name of Mr. Eaton was purely that he should 
act as trustee for the city in holding that option for the city’s use and benefit, and 
that it was generally understood by the Board of Water Commissioners and by Mr. 
Mulholland and Mr. Mathews that Mr. Eaton should so act, and that he continued 
in that relation to the city until having actually secured the option in his name and 
the city having paid thereupon the sum of $50,000, when he arbitrarily insisted upon 
dealing with the city, claiming that he was the real owner of the option, and requiring 
the city to meet his terms; but that the Water Board were not informed of his change 
of front, and that the city was not getting the whole of the option.
This conclusion is fortified by the fact that it has been testified by Mr. Mathews 
and Mr. Mulholland and that it was necessary that the knowledge that the city was 
purchasing lands should be kept from the public in that locality and therefore at that 
time it was unwise to force Mr. Eaton, through the courts, to acknowledge his posi-
tion as trustee, only, in the holding of these options.
The situation would lead to no other conclusion but that Mr. Eaton, in assuming 
to take the option from the Rickey Land and Cattle Company, upon which the city 
had paid $50,000 while it stood in his name, had voluntarily assumed to act as trustee 
for the reasons already stated; and all the evidence seems to prove conclusively that 
such was his position in carrying through this land option and purchase.
The evidence also seems conclusive, both from the report of the Water Board and 
from the testimony of the former members thereof, that they were not informed that 
Mr. Eaton had held up this larger part of the property included under the option, 
and the efforts of Mr. Eaton in securing the second option or contract of sale from 
the Rickey Land and Cattle Company, carrying with it a side agreement for the bal-
ance of the property not shown to the water board, would force us to this conclusion.
Mr. Eaton therefore held the property in his name and under the later contract of 
sale, as a resulting trust, to which the city is a beneficiary.
While the statute of limitations of the State of California will run against a result-
ing trust, it can only be applied as a defense on the part of Mr. Eaton after the Water 
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Board had received definite knowledge that he had repudiated his trust, and that he 
claimed to hold the property individually and for his own benefit.
The burden will be upon him to show as a defense, should he be sued as a trustee 
for the return of this property, that he gave notice direct to the Water Board that he 
repudiated his trust; inasmuch as the testimony shows that he secured the additional, 
otherwise unnecessary contract of sale and undisclosed side agreement, he will also 
have to explain why such was obtained, unless it was to keep from the Water Board, 
which represented the city, any knowledge that he had repudiated his trust.
• • •
The Aqueduct Investigation Board split apart as its Socialist and non-Socialist 
members disagreed on methods and conclusions. The board majority, two of the 
three being Socialists, finally adopted several resolutions presented to the Los An-
geles City Council. The resolutions implicated Fred Eaton and city officials in the 
project, but the council declined to act upon or approve them.
From Charles E. Warner (chairman, Aqueduct Investigation Board, City of Los 
Angeles) to Los Angeles City Council (August 22, 1912, Box B-1978, Los Angeles 
City Records Center).
Los Angeles, Cal., August 22, 1912.
whereas, official records, various correspondence in the files of Aqueduct Depart-
ment, and the testimony of various witnesses who appeared before the People’s Aq-
ueduct Investigation Board, seem to indicate that the properties described in the 
original options on Owens River Valley lands, secured in the name of Fred Eaton 
previous to May 22, 1905, and, in some instances, subsequent to that date, were really 
held by said Eaton as Agent and Trustee for the City, and not of his own right; and,
whereas, this Board submitted these testimonies to Ingle Carpenter, Examiner 
for this Board, and an opinion has been rendered to the effect that these testimonies 
support the view that said Eaton acted as Agent and Trustee for the City, as aforesaid; 
and,
whereas, in the transfer to the City of the properties secured by said Eaton as 
aforesaid, he retained, as his own, land and other properties of great value, which as, 
Agent and Trustee as aforesaid, the said testimonies indicate he should have trans-
ferred to the city; and,
whereas, records and other evidence indicate that certain of the properties re-
tained by said Eaton were purchased afterwards by the City for a large consideration; 
and,
whereas, it appears from the records and testimonies that certain of the lands 
secured as aforesaid by Fred Eaton, and retained by him, are believed to be essential 
to the Aqueduct Enterprise, and its complete development, and will have to be pur-
chased by the City, in the event they are essential to said Project, should said Agency 
and Trusteeship of said Eaton not be established by due process of law; and,
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whereas, W. B. Mathews, Attorney; William Mulholland, Superintendent; John 
J. Fay Jr., President, and J. M. Elliott, member of the Water Board of the City of Los 
Angeles, were intimately associated with the conduct of the securing of said options 
by said Eaton;
now, therefore, be it resolved, That the People’s Aqueduct Investigation 
Board recommend to the City Council that legal proceedings be instituted on behalf 
of the City against all of the persons above named, in order that the Agency and 
Trusteeship of said Eaton may be established, and that a complete accounting be 
required from each and every of said parties; and for such other and further relief as 
may be deemed just and right under all of the evidence;
and be it further resolved, That the Secretary of this Board be instructed 
to transmit a copy of these resolutions to the City Council, and to each of the daily 
papers of the City of Los Angeles.
I hereby certify that the above and foregoing is a true copy of the resolutions 
passed by this Board at its meeting this 22nd day of August, 1912.
[Signed] Aqueduct Investigation Board Secretary
• • •
Completed on time and under budget in 1913, the Los Angeles Aqueduct was one 
of the major water-supply projects of its time. Grand celebrations in Los Angeles 
and the San Fernando Valley (see the cover photograph) lasted two days and in-
cluded the formal opening of the Los Angeles Museum of History, Science and Art 
(now the Natural History Museum of Los Angeles County) in Exposition Park.
• • •
With more growth came more thirst. And while the Los Angeles Aqueduct was 
successful, Los Angeles eventually needed more water and decided to return to 
the Owens Valley. Residents of the latter complained about this water imperialism 
and fought back with several bombings of the aqueduct. One critic was the sister 
of two of the leaders of valley residents, the Watterson brothers, who owned a bank 
in Bishop that failed during the turmoil and who were convicted of embezzlement. 
In this letter to novelist Mary Austin, who had lived in the Owens Valley, Elsie 
Watterson explained her views.
From Elsie Watterson to Mary Austin (April 4, 1928, AU5166, Mary H. Austin 
Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA).
My dear Mrs. Austin—
If you have read the California papers—particularly those of Los Angeles—any time 
within the past eight months you undoubtedly know of the dreadful disaster that has 
overtaken Owens Valley and especially our family, in the failure of the Inyo County 
banks, for which my brothers, Wilfred and Mark, are at present in San Quentin.
Figure 20. Owens River water enters the aqueduct, 1913.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
Figure 21. Crowds at the 1913 celebration of Owens River water finding its way to Los  Angeles. 
From the C. C. Pierce Collection of Photographs, photCL Pierce 06844, courtesy of The Huntington 
Library, San Marino, California.
Figure 22. Invitation to the Owens River Aqueduct completion ceremonies in Exposition 
Park, 1913.
Courtesy of the Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History.
Figure 23. “Official Program: The Los Angeles Aqueduct and Exposition Park Celebration, 
November Fifth and Sixth, Nineteen Hundred and Thirteen.”
Courtesy of the Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History.
Figure 24. “Official Program: The Los Angeles Aqueduct and Exposition Park Celebration, 
November Fifth and Sixth, Nineteen Hundred and Thirteen.”
Courtesy of the Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History.
Figure 25. “Official Program: The Los Angeles Aqueduct and Exposition Park Celebration, 
November Fifth and Sixth, Nineteen Hundred and Thirteen.”
Courtesy of the Seaver Center for Western History Research, Los Angeles County Museum of Natural History.
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This is only one chapter—but the most tragic—in a long story of tragedies in 
which the people of the Owens Valley have been the helpless victims of the Los 
 Angeles City Water Board. . . .
In all history there was never a more flagrant example of one part of the country, 
politically and financially powerful, destroying a weaker section, and doing it with-
out regard to obligations, moral or financial. There is more to the calamity in Inyo 
than appears on the surface, much more than simply a bank failure or sudden eco-
nomic distress of a community. There is a story of injustices stretching over a period 
of years; of ruthless methods on the part of one group to crush another, smaller and 
more helpless; the story of an oppressed people and of stricken leaders. . . .
I do not minimize my brothers’ mistakes. Neither is it possible for me to  exaggerate 
the ruthlessness of the City Water Board of Los Angeles or the long, heart-breaking 
struggle between the City and Owens Valley, during which I know it was my broth-
ers’ highest aim to protect the people of the Valley who, with them have suffered for 
many years through the policy of the Water Board.
For whatever of wrong there was in my brothers’ methods they are paying the 
 supreme price. They are branded as criminals, while there is at large today, representing 
Figure 26. Investigators examining dynamite found near the aqueduct after several bombings.
From the Los Angeles Times Photographic Archive, courtesy of Library Special Collections, Charles E. Young 
 Research Library, UCLA.
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the City of Los Angeles, a group of men who, in my opinion, are criminals at heart. Men 
who deliberately planned the devastation of the Owens River country; who worked 
calculating, relentlessly, over a period of years for the destruction of our communities; 
who laid waste to our fields, uprooted and burned our orchards; who, through most 
malicious propaganda, shattered the confidence of the people, undermined our finan-
cial institutions and finally, at the crucial moment, cut off our credit on the outside, 
thereby precipitating the more recent calamity—the failure of the Banks. Do you not 
call that Crime? . . .
Today some of the same men are busy explaining the failure of the St. Francis 
Dam—a task that will undoubtedly occupy them for some time unless this crime also 
is successfully “white-washed;” while others of the group have for several months past 
been actively engaged in Washington trying to outwit, out-maneuver six other states 
for the monopoly of the Colorado River. And for what purpose? For the benefit of 
California as a State? Scarcely. For a city’s domestic needs? Obviously not. For flood 
protection in the Imperial Valley? How ironical! That these men should show con-
cern for the Imperial Valley, knowing well that no menace of Nature could be more 
disastrous to that Valley than their own political intrigue has been to Owens Valley.
Daily it is becoming more apparent to the public at large what has been to us for 
many years a flagrant fact, that politicians and not engineers were the builders of the 
Los Angeles Aqueduct. . . . A system consisting of a 200-mile aqueduct the safety of 
which depends on armed guards and machine guns; and numerous reservoirs and 
dams which only a miracle of the Almighty could make safe. . . .
If the Los Angeles Aqueduct whose waters spring so crystal clear from the snows 
of the Sierras, could reflect the tragedy of Owens Valley, that stream would run red 
from its very beginnings—red as the heart’s blood of a valiant people!
• • •
Other critics were helpful in devising a political strategy for the Watterson broth-
ers to fight the Big City at the expense of farmers who would lose their bank sav-
ings. One of these critics offered to help—for a price.
From Burton Knisely to W. W. Watterson (November 18, 1926, as quoted in the 
Municipal League of Los Angeles Bulletin 5 [October 31, 1927]: 2).
I had envisioned myself helping outline and prepare the case and dividing its various 
phases among the witnesses and coaching them in their roles and seeing that we got 
the maximum obtainable publicity. * * * I will admit that if the project were abun-
dantly financed I would think my brains, in devising the program, financing it and 
preparing our case[,] would deserve a reasonable reward. * * * I don’t know whom 
you would wish to choose as your witnesses but for instance if in addition to yourself 
and myself we had Mr. Yandell with his long and intimate knowledge and his manner 
and capacity on the stand, Harry Glasscock with the atmosphere of tragedy he could 
work up, some good man on the City reparations angle, perhaps another ruined 
rancher of advanced age and two ruined women or perhaps just the first three men 
indicated and three women—couldn’t we take up the Committee’s time for three 
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weeks and cause some commotion. I’m confident we could make the entire nation sit 
up and take notice. * * * With this as a beginning, we might raise more money. We 
ought to be able to supplement the sum from other sources. The City of Los Angeles 
is out in front as the flag-bearer and the champion and the pure white example of 
municipal ownership for the entire nation. * * * the showing up of los angeles in 
her true colors is worth millions to the privately owned public utilities 
of the country to say nothing of a mere $3000 and if we can reach the 
right sources we ought to be able to add to the resources for our show.
• • •
The Los Angeles Times proved to be a stalwart and reliable defender of the aque-
duct and of the city’s purchase of further land and water rights in Owens Valley. 
Harrison Gray Otis, one of the paper’s founders and father-in-law of the Times 
publisher in this era, had been one of the members of the land syndicate that 
profited from escalating land values in the San Fernando Valley when  Owens 
River water became available there after 1915. The following Times editorial 
 argues for more taxpayer-funded bonds for the project seventeen years after 
its completion.
From “Why $38,800,000?” Los Angeles Times (May 16, 1930).
The item of $6,660,000 for the purchase of all water and land rights of ranchers in 
Owens Valley and Long Valley represents a schedule of values in line with prices 
heretofore paid by the city of Los Angeles for similar resources. Moreover, acquisi-
tion of such rights will give Los Angeles undisputed ownership to all ranch water 
rights in Owens Valley and remove the menace of water litigation designed to sharp-
ly curtail the present utilization of water by this community. . . .
every possible safeguard has been employed to prevent inflation of 
values and to frustrate any effort at profit-taking by owners’ represen-
tatives, optioners, agents, politicians or any individual of group of indi-
viduals other than the bona fide owners themselves. the times has given 
particular attention to this phase of the situation and is convinced that 
adequate precaution has been provided to protect los angeles taxpayers 
from the schemes of those who ordinarily seek to exploit needed public 
improvements for the purpose of selfish private gain. so far as such mat-
ters can be determined by fair and expert means, the times believes the 
prices agreed upon are justified. if the pressing need of the city for the 
facilities to be provided is properly weighed it will appear that the land 
and water valuations are exceedingly advantageous to los angeles.
• • •
Humorist Will Rogers gets the final word on the Owens River project here, 
 although the controversy surrounding this chapter of Los Angeles and California 
history continues today.
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From Will Rogers (in Bishop, California) to the editor, Los Angeles Times (August 
25, 1932; letter of Will Rogers used with permission from Will Rogers Productions).
Ten years ago this was a wonderful valley with one-quarter of a million acres of fruit 
and alfalfa. But Los Angeles had to have more water for the Chamber of Commerce 
to drink more toasts to growth, more water to dilute its orange juice, to water its 
geraniums for the tourists, while the giant cottonwoods here died. So now this is a 
valley of desolation, but wherever you find privation and oppressed people you find 
Democrats always bucking the giant octopus. Last night the local Democrats held a 
rally. Everybody in town, including the lone Republican (who, of course, is postmas-
ter,) attended. He agreed to change his politics in return for his present office, it was 




THE C OLOR AD O RIVER
By the end of World War I, Los Angeles engineers were already searching for an 
additional water source as the city’s population continued to grow. They joined 
with the U.S. Reclamation Service to build a high dam (Boulder Dam, or Boulder 
Canyon Dam, renamed Hoover Dam) on the Colorado River to store water and 
provide for flood control, the generation of electrical power, and several other pur-
poses. The effort resulted in the 1922 agreement between the federal government 
and the seven states bordering the Colorado River to share the water for agricul-
tural, residential, and industrial use and to compete for the hydroelectric power 
produced at the dam. Boosters in all of these states were interested in protecting 
their natural resources for use in future growth. Soon Los Angeles emerged as the 
leading force in the West to bring the project to fruition and obtain much of the 
water and resulting hydroelectricity for itself.
From the Colorado River Compact of the Seven States (1922, Huntington Library, 
San Marino, CA).
The Colorado River Compact
The States of Arizona, California, Colorado Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyo-
ming, having resolved to enter into a compact under the Act of the Congress of the 
United States of America approved August 19, 1921 (42 Statutes at Large, page 171), 
and the Acts of the legislatures of the said States, have through their Governors ap-
pointed as their Commissioners:
W. S. Norviel for the State of Arizona
W. F. McClure for the State of California
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Ralph E. Carpenter for the State of Colorado
J. G. Scrugham for the State of Nevada
Stephen B. Davis, Jr., for the State of New Mexico
R. E. Caldwell for the State of Utah
Frank C. Emerson for the State of Wyoming
who, after negotiations participated in by Herbert Hoover appointed by The Presi-
dent as the representative of the United States of America, have agreed upon the 
following articles:
Article I
The major purposes of this compact are to provide for the equitable division and 
apportionment of the use of the waters of the Colorado River System; to establish 
the relative importance of different beneficial uses of water; to promote interstate 
comity; to remove causes of present and future controversies; and to secure the ex-
peditious agricultural and industrial development of the Colorado River Basin, the 
storage of its waters, and the protection of life and property from floods. To these 
ends the Colorado River Basin is divided into two Basins, and an apportionment of 
Figure 27. Hoover Dam (formerly Boulder Dam) in 1960.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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the use of part of the water of the Colorado River System is made to each of them 
with the provision that further equitable apportionments may be made.
Article II
As used in this compact—
a. The term “Colorado River System” means that portion of the Colorado River and 
its tributaries within the United States of America.
b. The term “Colorado River Basin” means all of the drainage area of the Colorado 
River System and all other territory within the United States of America to which 
the waters of the Colorado River System shall be beneficially applied.
c. The term “States of the Upper Division” means the States of Colorado, New Mex-
ico, Utah, and Wyoming.
d. The term “States of the Lower Division” means the States of Arizona, California, 
and Nevada.
e. The term “Lee Ferry” means a point in the main stream of the Colorado River one 
mile below the mouth of the Paria River.
f. The term “Upper Basin” means those parts of the States of Arizona, Colorado, New 
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming within and from which waters naturally drain into 
the Colorado River System above Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said States located 
without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now or shall 
hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System above Lee Ferry.
g. The term “Lower Basin” means those parts of the States of Arizona, California, 
Nevada, New Mexico, and Utah within and from which waters naturally drain 
into the Colorado River System below Lee Ferry, and also all parts of said States 
located without the drainage area of the Colorado River System which are now 
or shall hereafter be beneficially served by waters diverted from the System below 
Lee Ferry.
h. The term “domestic use” shall include the use of water for household, stock, mu-
nicipal, mining, industrial, and other like purposes, but shall exclude the genera-
tion of electrical power.
Article III
a. There is hereby apportioned from the Colorado River System in perpetuity to 
the Upper Basin and to the Lower Basin, respectively, the exclusive beneficial 
consumptive use of 7,500,000 acre-feet of water per annum, which shall include 
all water necessary for the supply of any rights which may now exist.
b. In addition to the apportionment in paragraph (a), the Lower Basin is hereby 
given the right to increase its beneficial consumptive use of such waters by one 
million acre-feet per annum.
c. If, as a matter of international comity, the United States of American shall here-
after recognize in the United States of Mexico any right to the use of any waters 
of the Colorado River System, such waters shall be supplied first from the wa-
ters which are surplus over and above the aggregate of the quantities specified 
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in  paragraphs (a) and (b); and if such surplus shall prove insufficient for this 
purpose, then, the burden of such deficiency shall be equally borne by the Up-
per Basin and the Lower Basin, and whenever necessary the States of the Upper 
Division shall deliver at Lee Ferry water to supply one-half of the deficiency so 
recognized in addition to that provided in paragraph (d).
d. The States of the Upper Division will not cause the flow of the river at Lee Ferry 
to be depleted below an aggregate of 75,000,000 acre feet for any period of ten 
consecutive years reckoned in continuing progressive series beginning with the 
first day of October next succeeding the ratification of this compact.
e. The states of the Upper Division shall not withhold water, and the States of the 
Lower Division shall not require the delivery of water, which cannot reasonably 
be applied to domestic and agricultural uses.
f. Further equitable apportionment of the beneficial uses of the waters of the Colo-
rado River System unapportioned by paragraphs (a), (b), and (c) may be made in 
the manner provided in paragraph (g) at any time after October first, 1963, if and 
when either Basin shall have reached its total beneficial consumptive use as set 
out in paragraphs (a) and (b).
g. In the event of a desire for further apportionment as provided in paragraph (f) 
any two signatory States, acting through their governors, may give joint notice of 
such desire to the Governors of the other signatory States and to The President 
of the United States of America, and it shall be the duty of the Governors of the 
signatory States and of The President of the United States of America forthwith 
to appoint representatives, whose duty it shall be to divide and apportion equi-
tably between the Upper Basin and Lower Basin the beneficial use of the unap-
portioned water of the Colorado River System as mentioned in paragraph (f), 
subject to the legislative ratification of the signatory States and the Congress of 
the United States of America.
Article IV
a. Inasmuch as the Colorado River has ceased to be navigable for commerce and 
the reservation of its waters for navigation would seriously limit the development 
of its Basin, the use of its waters for purposes of navigation shall be subservient 
to the uses of such waters for domestic, agricultural, and power purposes. If the 
Congress shall not consent to this paragraph, the other provisions of this compact 
shall nevertheless remain binding.
b. Subject to the provisions of this compact, water of the Colorado River System 
may be impounded and used for the generation of electrical power, but such im-
pounding and use shall be subservient to the use and consumption of such water 
for agricultural and domestic purposes and shall not interfere with or prevent use 
for such dominant purposes.
c. The provisions of this article shall not apply to or interfere with the regulation and 
control by any State within its boundaries of the appropriation, use, and distribution 
of water.
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Article V
The chief official of each signatory State charged with the administration of water 
rights, together with the Director of the United States Reclamation Service and the 
Director of the United States Geological Survey shall cooperate, ex-officio:
a. To promote the systemic determination and coordination of the facts as to flow, 
appropriation, consumption, and use of water in the Colorado River Basin, and 
the interchange of available information in such matters.
b. To secure the ascertainment and publication of the annual flow of the Colorado 
River at Lee Ferry.
c. To perform such other duties as may be assigned by mutual consent of the signa-
tories from time to time.
Article VI
Should any claim or controversy arise between any two or more of the signatory 
States: (a) with respect to the waters of the Colorado River System not covered 
by the terms of this compact; (b) over the meaning or performance of any of the 
terms of this compact; (c) as to the allocation of the burdens incident to the per-
formance of any article of this compact or the delivery of waters as herein pro-
vided; (d) as to the construction or operation of works within the Colorado River 
Basin to be situated in two or more States, or to be constructed by one State for 
the benefit of another State; or (e) as to the diversion of water in one State for the 
benefit of another State; the Governors of the States affected, upon the request of 
one of them, shall forthwith appoint Commissioners with power to consider and 
adjust such claim or controversy, subject to ratification by the Legislatures of the 
States so affected.
Nothing herein contained shall prevent the adjustment of any such claim or con-
troversy by any present method or by direct future legislative action of the interested 
States.
Article VII
Nothing in this compact shall be construed as affecting the obligations of the United 
States of America to Indian tribes.
Article VIII
Present perfected rights to the beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River Sys-
tem are unimpaired by this compact. Whenever storage capacity of 5,000,000 
acre-feet shall have been provided to the main Colorado River within or for the 
benefit of the Lower Basin, then claims of such rights, if any, by appropriators or 
users of water in the Lower Basin against appropriators or users of water of the 
Upper Basin shall attach to and be satisfied from water that may be stored not in 
conflict with Article III.
All other rights to beneficial use of waters of the Colorado River System shall be 
satisfied solely from the water apportioned to that Basin in which they are situate.
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Article IX
Nothing in this compact shall be construed to limit or prevent any State from insti-
tuting or maintaining any action or proceeding, legal or equitable, for the protection 
of any right under this compact or the enforcement of any of its provisions.
Article X
This compact may be terminated at any time by the unanimous agreement of the 
signatory States. In the event of such termination all rights established under it shall 
continue unimpaired.
Article XI
This compact shall become binding and obligatory when it shall have been approved 
by the Legislatures of each of the signatory States and by the Congress of the United 
States. Notice of approval by the Legislatures shall be given by the Governor of each 
signatory State to the Governors of the other signatory States and to the President of 
the United States, and the President of the United States is requested to give notice to 
the Governors of the signatory States of approval by the Congress of the United States.
in witness whereof, the Commissioners have signed this compact in a single 
original, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Department of State of the 
United States of America and of which a duly certified copy shall be forwarded to the 
Governor of each of the signatory States.
done at the City of Santa Fe, New Mexico, this twenty-fourth day of November, 
A.D. One Thousand Nine Hundred and Twenty-two,
(Signed) W. S. Norviel
(Signed) W. F. McClure
(Signed) Delph E. Carpenter
(Signed) J. G. Scrugham
(Signed) Stephen B. Davis, Jr.
(Signed) R. E. Caldwell




Negative views of the Colorado River project emerged from different sources. In 
one published response to a description of the undertaking, novelist Mary Austin, 
who had lived in the Owens Valley, likened it to the Los Angeles Aqueduct in 
Owens Valley.1 The latter project was currently contested by many Owens Valley 
residents as Los Angeles continued to drain the valley of water while awaiting the 
additional water the city would draw from the Colorado River only two decades 
later. They saw the grasping hand of the Big City again grabbing resources and 
profits at the expense of farmers and everyone else.
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Business leaders in Los Angeles were wary of some aspects of the project, but 
were wholeheartedly behind the effort to acquire more water for residential and 
industrial growth in the region. The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce was one 
of many that lobbied Congress to approve the project. Sunset magazine, a longtime 
media outlet for corporations and boosters in the West, could be relied on to place 
the project in the best light as a crucial and urgent necessity for regional growth 
and prosperity.
From Lucius K. Chase (vice chairman, Citizens’ Committee of Fifteen), “The C. of C. 
Plan for Colorado River” (Southern California Business 4 [November 1925]: 13, 40–41).
Chamber’s Stand
The stand of the Chamber set forth in a document signed by President R. W.  Pridham 
was presented to the Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclamation at its recent 
hearings held in Los Angeles.
The statement presented follows:
“The Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce, in connection with the investigation 
now being made by the United States Senate Committee on Irrigation and Reclama-
tion now in session in this city, makes the following recommendations:
“1. We favor the construction of a high dam at or near Boulder Canyon in the 
Colorado river, for the following reasons: Such a dam will prevent flood destruc-
tion and give flood protection to the lands in the Parker Indian Reservation and the 
Yuma project in Arizona, and the Imperial and Palo Verde Valleys in California; will 
create a great reservoir of water to serve Los Angeles and other communities of the 
Southwest whose rapid growth will soon vitally need this as a dependable source of 
supply; will make available a large volume of hydro-electric energy, an important 
necessity for agricultural, industrial and community development in the Southwest; 
will permit the states of the lower basin with safety to approve the proposed compact 
between the seven states interested in the waters of the river; and for the further 
reason that it is a great economic waste to allow the flood waters of the river to spend 
themselves in the Gulf of California when by impounding them they can be made 
productive of great wealth and added prosperity to our nation.
“2. We also favor due and proper protection of the rights of all the other states 
having an interest in the waters of the Colorado river basin, and believe that all their 
rights should be justly and equitably considered and protected.
Urge Action
“3. We recommend that the Congress of the United States at its coming session 
should enact legislation providing for the construction of such a dam.
“4. That the waters conserved by the erection of said high dam be used exclusively 
for the irrigation and reclamation of lands within the United States and that proper 
provision be made in order that the United States soldiers and sailors may obtain the 
benefit of such reclaimed lands.
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“5. That the United States lend its assistance so far as practicable and when found 
feasible to the building of the necessary canals and distributing works in order that 
the water so conserved may be distributed to the lands within the United States, 
which will now or may hereafter be irrigated by such waters and that such canals and 
distributing works be located exclusively within the territory of the United States, if 
the same is found possible or practicable.
“6. That the right to generate and distribute the hydro-electric energy which may 
be developed by the said dam be sold to municipalities and other agencies which 
may have the facilities for the development and distribution of the same at such a 
price as will repay the United States government within a reasonable time the entire 
cost of the said dam in excess of such sums as the United States government may 
deem fit to contribute toward such flood control, which we estimate should be about 
thirty million dollars.”
From “Southern California Needs Colorado River Water” (Sunset 56 [March 1926]: 
50, 98; permission courtesy of the Sunset Publishing Corporation).
When there is not a sufficient supply of water to support both agriculture and human 
beings in a given area the former must do without water. That is a law of life, and the 
thickly populated section of Southern California is developing a condition which 
will test that law unless protective means are adopted.
The conflict of urban interests and country interests is already a fact down there. 
So those who understand the situation are in deadly earnest in their efforts to hasten 
settlement of the Colorado river controversy so some of the millions of gallons of its 
water, now wasted, can be used to permit the natural development of that section.
The coastal plain extending from the Pacific ocean to the base of the Puente hills 
and Santa Monica mountains and from the mountains to the San Joaquin hills, cov-
ering an area of 775 square miles, was originally saturated with ground water, held 
back by the coastal barriers. Most of that water has been used.
Orange county employed J. B. Lippincott, a Los Angeles engineer, to make a sur-
vey of the situation, and his report on water conservation and flood control of the 
Santa Ana river revealed astounding facts. His investigations proved that during the 
ten years preceding July 1, 1925, the amount of water pumped from the underground 
basin of Orange county had increased 300 percent!
In 1888 the total artesian area in the entire coastal plain was 315 square miles. In 
1904 it had been reduced to 206 square miles. At the beginning of 1925 it had nearly 
disappeared, the total area being only 55 square miles.
One test well was put down in Southern California in the late nineties and it has 
been watched carefully in the study of the underground water supply. At the start 
there was sufficient pressure to raise the water 60 feet above the ground surface. In 
the summer of 1924 the water level had dropped 50 feet below the surface, a total 
decline of 110 feet since the well was first observed!
With the population in the cities gaining rapidly and steadily, and with  demand 
for water for domestic purposes growing in proportion, it is inevitable that 
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 horticultural and agricultural interests will suffer unless the total water supply can 
be increased.
“We need the Colorado river water,” declared J. P. Baumgartner, publisher of the 
Santa Ana Register, to the writer of The Pulse department of Sunset Magazine. “Un-
less a new supply of water is brought in, you will see orange groves chopped down. 
The fight between the farmers and the cities of Southern California for water is al-
ready in progress.”
It is generally taken for granted by those without specific knowledge that the Ow-
ens river and the famous aqueduct built by the city of Los Angeles are capable of 
supplying all future needs. There is also a common belief that Los Angeles is using its 
source of water as a club with which to force neighboring cities to ask for annexation.
“Neighboring cities have been knocking at the doors of Los Angeles for water,” 
declared W. W. Hurlbut, office engineer for the Los Angeles Bureau of Water Works 
and Supply. “But the growth of Los Angeles has been so rapid that it can not spare 
water for the future. This department, consequently, sent a resolution to the city 
council suggesting that any city joining Los Angeles to be required to take care of its 
own water needs until a supplementary source is developed. By the time the Colo-
rado river can be dammed and an aqueduct can be built to Los Angeles, this city will 
be ready for the additional water.”
For the fiscal year ending June 30, 1925, the water department installed 20,000 
new services, and the 1920 Federal census proved that there were 5.4 inhabitants per 
service!
The water department now gives service all the way up from sea level to 1450 feet 
above sea level.
If a dam is built in the Boulder or Black cañon of the Colorado river, water for Los 
Angeles will be taken out sixty-five miles below Needles, Cal., and raised 1700 feet to 
the aqueduct! Power for the pumps will be generated by water falling over the dam.
The aqueduct will be 258 miles in length, 20 miles longer than the present one 
from Owens river. It will be three and three-fourths times as large as the Owens river 
aqueduct. But though cost of material and the wage scale have greatly advanced since 
the latter was built and though the cost of the new aqueduct has been estimated at 
approximately $150,000,000, the per capita cost will not exceed that of the Owens 
river project, so rapid has been the population increase.
Under the Colorado river plan, Los Angeles would receive 1000 second-feet 
of water and neighboring cities and towns would receive 500 second-feet. This 
would give Los Angeles an increase of 969,472,000 gallons a day as compared with 
258,000,000 gallons a day now available, and with a per capita consumption of 148 
gallons a day during the hot months of 1925 and with an average daily per capita 
consumption of 123 gallons during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1925.
Students of city development, with national reputations, freely predict that within 
twenty-five years the metropolitan area of Los Angeles will contain several millions of 
inhabitants. So when the magnitude of the Colorado river proposal is considered and the 
time required for completion is taken into account, the seriousness of delay is obvious.
• • •
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The main element that prompted opposition to the project—other than what some 
critics perceived as utter domination by Los Angeles because of its insatiable desire 
for water and hydroelectric power—was the stipulation that hydroelectric power 
produced at the Boulder Canyon Dam would be sold to both municipalities and 
private power companies to recoup the construction and operation costs of the 
federal government. In Los Angeles, as well as across the nation, allowing cities to 
buy power for municipal systems became a political issue for private-enterprise 
adherents, who did not mind local governments distributing water. In this passage 
from a then-contemporary pamphlet, a representative of a private utility organiza-
tion criticized this element of the plan.
From Frank Bohn, ed., The Boulder Canyon Dam: The Essence of the Swing-Johnson 
Bill ([n.p.: National Utilities Association, 1927], 3–6, held by Special Collections, 
Claremont Colleges Library, Claremont, CA,  http://ccdl.libraries.claremont.edu/
cdm/).
Eleven Points
The following pages contain the facts as to the proposals urged in Congress for the 
development of the Colorado River at National expense. There are many angles, and 
the documents are voluminous, but the principles involved may be summarized in 
a few paragraphs.
1. There is danger of property loss in the Imperial Valley in California from the 
Colorado River floods. Flood protection is essential to the well-being of the 
people of that valley.
2. Boulder Dam is not primarily for flood control. It has three great purposes for 
which it is alleged a high dam is essential: First, storage of water for irrigation 
in the Imperial Valley; second, the furnishing of a domestic water supply for 
the city of Los Angeles, and third, the development of electric power.
3. Flood control on the Mississippi has been carefully worked out. It has been 
studied for years. The Army Engineers will present to Congress at its next ses-
sion a comprehensive plan based upon detailed investigation. The situation on 
the Colorado is exactly the opposite. There is no study, no report, no complete 
plan. No one knows what the right way is. We have merely the suggestion that 
Boulder Dam would serve the purpose.
4. The reason for this anomalous situation lies in the fact that, when the appro-
priation was passed authorizing the Army Engineers to determine methods 
of flood control on the Mississippi and other rivers of the United States, the 
advocates of the Los Angeles project were able to write in a provision that no 
part of the funds could be used for investigation of flood control on the Colo-
rado River. They themselves prevented Congress from obtaining the informa-
tion on which to act intelligently.
5. There have been a few reports on the engineering features of Boulder Dam, as 
distinct from the river as a whole, notably a voluminous one of eight volumes 
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by the Reclamation Service, but nothing directed specifically to the ascertain-
ment of the best method of flood control.
6. Obviously, the first step in providing flood control on the Colorado should be 
the ascertainment of the facts and the determination of proper methods.
7. It has been frequently asserted that flood danger can be eliminated from the 
Colorado at a cost of $10,000,000 or less, in contrast with the $125,000,000 
estimated under the Los Angeles plan. Investigation will demonstrate whether 
the statements are true.
8. Disregarding flood control, the other purposes of the project represent merely 
local improvements for Southern California to be made at National expense. 
The bill is properly called “The Los Angeles Water and Power Bill.” There 
seems no reason why the taxpayers of Virginia, or Kansas, or any other state, 
should furnish municipal water for that city. If it be said that the funds are 
merely advanced, and that it is expected that the sale of electric power will 
reimburse the Federal government, the answer is that the United States has 
never heretofore entered into the business of financing municipalities, and 
that if it is now to undertake that new activity, there will be no end. Los Ange-
les is not the only ambitious city in the country, nor the only one willing that 
the Nation would assume its financial burdens.
9. Boulder Dam is to be constructed with an above surface height of about 600 feet. 
Its foundation will be 127 feet lower down, at bed rock. The total height will 
therefore be about 700 feet, twice as high as any dam in the world. The dam 
would contain nearly four million yards of concrete, three times as much as the 
Assuan Dam in Egypt. No such mass of masonry has ever been thrown together 
in engineering history. Excavations for the foundations will amount to more than 
a million cubic yards of material, equivalent to the space occupied by two city 
blocks solid with ten-story buildings, and must be done between flood stages of 
the river. Wholly novel engineering problems must be solved. Yet it is proposed 
to enter upon this stupendous undertaking merely upon the advice of the Recla-
mation Service of the United States, seriously questioned by many engineers, and 
which presents what the Secretary of the Interior has himself declared to be an 
insufficient basis. Here again thorough study is indicated before action.
10. The present proposal authorizes the Secretary of the Interior, in his discre-
tion, to build and operate a power plant in connection with the dam, and to 
sell the current produced. It would thus put the Government directly into the 
business of generating and selling electric power. It is directly contrary to the 
principle controlling in National affairs, that the government should confine 
itself to governing and not enter the field of business, which belongs to the 
individual. The proponents of the measure openly state that this is merely 
the opening gun in the campaign for government ownership and operation 
of public utilities. Apparently, they are threatened with the same baptism of 
fire which the railroads suffered and from which they finally emerged alive 
but badly burned. Nothing could be worse for the American people than to 
paralyze their present efficient service by the dead hand of government.
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11. The attitude of the public should be complete support for any sane plan for 
flood control, absolute opposition to any scheme for putting the government 
into private business.
• • •
Many arguments in favor of the Colorado River project celebrated it as a public 
development of a natural resource that would bring about national benefit to mil-
lions. One such plea for public development of water and hydroelectric power was 
made by Gifford Pinchot, former chief of the U.S. Forest Service and a leader in the 
national Progressive Party in the early twentieth century.
From Gifford Pinchot, “Who Owns Our Rivers” (The Nation 126 [January 18, 1928]: 
64–66 [©2016 The Nation Company, LLC. All rights reserved. Used by permission 
and protected by the Copyright Laws of the United States. The printing, copying, 
redistribution, or retransmission of this Content without express written permis-
sion is prohibited]).
“Who Owns Our Rivers?”
The Boulder Dam project supplies one of the most important problems before the 
present Congress. I would like to lead you to it along a winding trail. Three-fourths of 
the earth’s surface is water. But when you step off an ocean liner and come ashore you 
do not leave the water question behind you. The problem changes from salt water to 
fresh, but it does not evaporate. Of all the natural resources water on land is in one 
sense the most fundamental and the most clamorous for attention, just as the forest 
is in another sense.
A great part of man’s task on the land is dealing with water, because next to the 
air we breathe water is the most essential thing in human life. The number of people 
who can live in the United States is determined not by the available amount of land 
but by the available amount of water. We have land enough for a far larger popula-
tion than will ever inhabit the United States for the simple reason that we lack water 
enough to make all the land fertile and productive. Millions of arid and semiarid 
acres lie out under the sun to prove it. It takes many tons of water to grow an acre of 
corn. It takes additional tons of water to transform that corn into hogs. Forty acres 
without water will produce neither a single ear of corn nor a single pork chop.
Water, then, is indispensable, but as with other good things it is easily possible 
to have too much of it. We are apt to speak of fire as the destroying element, but an 
excess of water is far more destructive than an excess of fire. The greatest natural 
calamity in the history of the United States, the recent Mississippi flood, was due to 
too much water at one time in the wrong place.
The chief conservation problem facing the people of the United States is the con-
trol of our river systems. There are three river problems which have become immedi-
ate issues before Congress. One is that of the Mississippi, brought to a head by the 
great flood of a year ago; another, that of Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee; the third, 
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that of Boulder Canyon. In all three the development of electric power has become 
a crucial question, and for precisely the same reason. Briefly the issue is, For whose 
benefit shall the power be developed?
I would not have you understand that the question of electric power is the only 
one involved in Boulder Canyon. Navigation to some extent, irrigation to a very 
large extent, and flood control are all intimately involved; and so is the domestic and 
industrial water-supply for more than a million people in and around Los Angeles.
The Colorado River is formed by the junction of the Green and the Grand rivers 
in the State of Utah. From its headwaters to the Gulf it flows through or past seven 
States. There are along it thirteen principal power sites capable of developing three 
or four million water horsepower. Along its course in Arizona and California, and 
Mexico as well, are millions of acres of irrigable lands now desert; and near its mouth 
is the Imperial Valley, partly in California and partly in Mexico, inhabited mainly by 
American citizens, and redeemed from utter barrenness by water from the Colorado 
River.
Most of Imperial Valley, moreover, is below sea level, and there is serious danger 
that the Colorado, which flows past it at a high elevation, will break into this deep 
hole as it did into the Salton Sink and change a land of fertile farms into a Dead Sea.
In order to prevent this calamity it is proposed to build at Boulder Canyon, a dam 
twice as high as the next highest dam in the world, and create a reservoir a hundred 
miles long, capable of holding the entire flow of the Colorado for more than a year. 
This dam will make flood control certain and secure. At the same time it will develop 
from 600,000 to 1,000,000 continuous horse-power. And that is what the trouble is 
all about.
If there were no power question involved the Boulder Dam Bill would meet noth-
ing but smiles. The bill authorizes (but does not direct) the Secretary of the Interior 
to construct electric-power-generating works in connection with the dam, and sell 
the power for distribution to municipalities or to private power corporations. If the 
Government makes and sells that power, it can incorporate in the contract of sale 
such conditions as will insure ultimate justice to the consumer.
That is important to the domestic consumer especially (which means pretty near-
ly all of us) because the power companies have been making us pay several times as 
much as we ought to pay. It is important to the companies because they have been, 
and are now, charging us several times as much as they could afford to serve us for. 
Which brings us to the essential question: Shall the Government be authorized to 
build the power works at Boulder Dam, and so get a chance to protect the rest of us 
from the present extortion? Or shall the Government, having built the dam, let some 
private company build the works, and so lose the chance to prevent extortion? That 
is the gist of the whole matter.
There are, of course, complications. So vast a project could hardly be without them. 
Certain of the States through which the Colorado River flows demand that this great 
national project shall take second place to the States’ Rights theory and the individual 
interests of the States. Arizona, for example, proposes to hold up the project unless 
she can be guaranteed what amounts to the right to tax national property used for the 
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creation of electric power in the Colorado River. As a representative of Arizona said 
to me, “We propose to make the Government pay just as if it was a private company.”
But the more serious danger comes from the electric-power companies, which 
are also suspected of being behind some of the obstructive demands of the States. 
The object of the power companies is to prevent the establishment of a government 
standard by which their own rates to consumers of electric power can be measured. 
Their objection to the construction of Boulder Dam has nothing to do with the dam 
itself but is wholly centered in the power-generating works through which the Gov-
ernment, under the Swing-Johnson Bill, is authorized to utilize the hydro-electric 
energy made available by the dam.
The Government does not propose to go into the business of selling power to the 
consumer. What it contemplates doing at Boulder Dam is what it is already doing at a 
number of government-built irrigation dams, namely, to transform into electric cur-
rent the energy produced by the dam and to sell that current for distribution either 
by municipalities or private corporations. It does not propose to go into the power 
business but merely to produce the current, leaving to other agencies its distribution 
to the consumer.
That this is a proper function of the Government is attested not only by common 
sense but also by the man who has a better right to speak for the power industry than 
any other in America—Owen D. Young, head of the General Electric Company. In a 
speech on May 18, 1926, to the National Electric Light Association, Mr. Young said:
There is a class of water-powers which, in my judgment, must be separately 
considered. No suggestion has yet been made which adequately meets their 
needs. Where vast rivers either on international boundaries or within the 
United States require development for several purposes, such as navigation, 
irrigation, and flood control as well as for power, there arises a new kind of 
question which is wholly unrelated to the old controversy of government ver-
sus private ownership. The discussion of this question has been clouded by the 
old animosities. The private-ownership people feel that if the Government has 
anything to do with the development of power in these composite situations, 
it will be merely the starting-point from which the advocates of public owner-
ship will advance their operations. On the other hand, the public-ownership 
people feel that the privately owned companies which seek to throw dams in 
these great rivers, and incidentally perforce take over the effective navigation, 
irrigation, and flood control, are so intrenching themselves in purely public 
operations as not only to make all thought of public ownership impossible, 
but to create instruments of oppression rather than of service. While this de-
bate goes on, vast rivers go unharnessed for power, waterways are undevel-
oped, floods drown us, and droughts devour us. May I not call for a broader 
view in the public interest from the representatives of both the utilities and 
the public? . . .
Much has been made of the question as to whether these dams should 
be built and owned by the Government. If the dams really serve the great 
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purposes of navigation and flood control, which are clearly governmental ac-
tivities, then it seems to me public ownership of them cannot be objected 
to. Personally, I prefer that the construction and ownership of such an en-
terprise be in the hands of a public corporation, the stock of which should 
be government-owned, with the provision that that corporation finance the 
enterprise with its own securities.
Mr. Young favors the public development of the Long Sault rapids on the St.  Lawrence 
and the public construction of the power works there. Where he stands on the 
Swing-Johnson Bill I do not know, but the electric industry takes precisely the posi-
tion which he does not take in the quotation above, and has today a great lobby in 
Washington to defeat the Boulder Dam project.
The power companies have four lines of defense against the establishment of a 
government standard at Boulder Canyon. The front-line trenches are built to prevent 
the passage of the bill altogether, thus destroying the Government’s power not only 
to protect the consumer of electricity but also to protect the farmers of Imperial 
Valley against flood. This first line held at the last session of Congress. If the power 
companies can persuade Congress to defer action till the several States along the 
Colorado settle all their differences, and then can keep the States from agreeing, this 
first line may hold indefinitely.
The second line intends to restrict the Government’s action solely to the con-
struction of a flood-prevention dam, which need not be at Boulder Canyon and 
which would produce either a comparatively negligible amount of electricity or no 
electricity at all.
The third line is to prevent government-built electricity-generating works from 
being attached to the Boulder Dam project. The electric interests baldly offered at the 
last session to allow the passage of the Boulder Dam Bill provided the authority to 
construct these generating works was cut out.
But if they are defeated here and Boulder Dam is built with the government gen-
erating works attached, then the fourth line of defense of the power people is to 
saddle the government-made current with every possible or impossible expense, 
with the immediate hope of hampering the enterprise and the more distant hope of 
making the Government’s undertaking fail altogether.
Here is where the demand of Arizona and Nevada for the right to tax govern-
ment property fits the hand of the power companies like a glove. If Arizona can add 
its taxes to the cost of the power produced, if Nevada can do likewise, if later the 
similar claims of other States can add still further to the burden, then perhaps the 
power interests, driven out of their first, second, and third lines of defense, may still 
be able to hold out.
The vastness of the stake for which the power companies are playing must never 
be forgotten. Boulder Canyon is to them not a question of Los Angeles or California 
or Arizona or any of the seven States of the Colorado Basin. It is a question of the 
value to its owners of the gigantic electric monopoly now forming all over the United 
States—its value measured in excessive rates to the consumer. On no other theory 
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can their nation-wide opposition to Boulder Canyon be explained or understood. 
And just there lies your interest and mine in what is about to happen at a spot in the 
Colorado River that very few of us have ever seen or ever will.
• • •
Federal and Los Angeles officials were convinced of the need for the project, and 
they stressed the benefits that would accrue well beyond the city or metropolitan 
limits of Los Angeles. U.S. secretary of the interior and future U.S. president Her-
bert Hoover and the Los Angeles Water Bureau chief engineer William Mulhol-
land proved especially effective boosters in this regard. In one planning journal, 
the two contributed essays addressing the importance of the project.
From Herbert Hoover, “The Colorado River Problem” (The Community Builder: 
Regional Planning, Rural Planning, City and Town Planning Monthly 1 [March 1928]: 
9–12; held by Special Collections, Claremont Colleges Library, Claremont, CA).
The next most important line of conflict is over the character and location of the first 
works to be erected on the river. I believe the largest group of those who have dealt 
with the problem, both engineers and business folk, have come to the conclusion 
that there should be a high dam erected somewhere in the vicinity of Black Canyon. 
That is known usually as the Boulder Canyon site, but nevertheless it is actually Black 
Canyon. The dam so erected is proposed to serve the triple purpose of power, flood 
control, and storage. Perhaps I should state them in a different order—flood control, 
storage, and power, as power is a by product of these other works.
There are theoretical engineering reasons why flood control and storage works 
should be erected farther up the river and why storage works should be erected far-
ther down the river; and I have not any doubt that given another century of devel-
opment on the river all things will be done. The problem that we have to consider, 
however, what will serve the next generation in the most economical manner, and we 
must take capital expenditure and power markets into consideration in determining 
this. I can conceive the development of probably 15 different dams on the Colorado 
River, the securing of 6,000,000 or 7,000,000 horsepower; but the only place where 
there is an economic market for power today, at least of any consequence, is in South-
ern California, the economical distance for the most of such dams being too remote 
for that market. No doubt markets will grow in time so as to warrant the construction 
of dams all up and down the river. We have to consider here the problem of financing; 
that in the erection of a dam—or of any works for that matter—we must make such 
recovery as we can on the cost, and therefore we must find an immediate market for 
power. For that reason it seems to be that logic drives us as near to the power market 
as possible, and that it therefore takes us down into the lower canyon.
I do not believe that construction at that point is going to interfere with the sys-
tematic development of the Colorado River for storage and power above and below. 
As I have said, I think the time will come when a storage dam should probably be 
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erected below Boulder Canyon and that storage dams and flood control dams will 
be erected far above. Those who have looked into the engineering problems involved 
will recognize that the operation of a single dam for the triple purpose is rather dif-
ficult and will not give the maximum power results. For instance, such a dam must 
be partly empty in anticipation of the spring flood and hence the power possibilities 
will be much diminished, and beyond this it will be necessary thereafter to lower the 
head for irrigation purposes. Thus the power production from such a dam will be 
rather irregular.
But in any event, I do not believe that we can not now contemplate the expendi-
ture of the several hundred of millions of dollars necessary to carry out the theoreti-
cal plan; we should confine ourselves to what we can afford to spend now, and I do 
not believe we will destroy the possibilities of the river for systematic development by 
this course. We must await a settlement of population and their demands to create a 
need for the future development.
The proposed Black Canyon Dam of 540 feet, as estimated by the reclamation 
engineers, would cost about $41,000,000 or $42,000,000. The cost of an electrical 
generation plant to go with it would be about another $33,000,000. And the trans-
mission lines to the power market would be somewhere about $27,000,000 more, 
or a total of from $110,000,000 to $115,000,000 for dam and equipment. The loss of 
interest during construction would be $10,000,000 more. The alternative plan of a 
606-foot dam would require something like $20,000,000 more.
Now, the 540 foot dam would apparently develop, theoretically at least, about 
550,000 primary horsepower and another 450,000 secondary horsepower. No en-
gineer could say at the present moment what the actual power development will 
be, because none of us know until we have had experience how much the electrical 
power will need to be made subjective to flood control and irrigation in the manner 
I have referred to[,] but in any event these theoretic figures are possibly near enough.
Now a large part of the power developed will be needed to pump the water for 
the proposed domestic water supply plan for Southern California and both the 
manufacturers and private power companies will need the surplus power. It seems 
to me we need some consideration here of making a settled financial plan if we are 
to expedite this very urgently needed development. The people of Southern Califor-
nia have recognized that the folk in the Eastern and Central states will probably not 
be anxious for the Federal Government to fund the whole of the $115,000,000 for 
this development, and they have already expressed their willingness to make a sub-
stantial contribution to it, both from the municipalities and from the private power 
companies. It seems to me that the Federal Government has a very substantial obli-
gation in this matter. It has been traditional to provide flood control in the protec-
tion of our people at the cost of the Federal Government, and we, of course, have 
the reclamation funds for the development of arid land; so that here is a problem 
of the proper contribution from municipalities, irrigation districts, private power 
companies, and the Federal Government.
All this leads me to the belief that somebody ought to be given authority to 
 negotiate a definite financial contract which could be laid before Congress for 
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approval in connection with the construction of these works. It does not seem to me 
it would take long to do that, and it could possibly be laid on the table here before 
this session of Congress expires. I believe that we should do all we can to expedite 
this matter. It is true that our path would have been smoother if we could have had 
more success in the ratification of the compact, but so long as we have these great 
conflicts and differences of view that I have mentioned we must expect difficulties. 
And in this connection I would remind you that it required, I believe, 10 or 11 years 
to secure a ratification of the Federal Constitution, and I doubt if there was as much 
emotion connected with that proposition as there is with water rights between seven 
States. So we may make progress more speedily than was made by the original thir-
teen States of this Union.
From William Mulholland, “Water from the Colorado” (The Community Builder: 
Regional Planning, Rural Planning, City and Town Planning Monthly 1 [March 
1928]: 23, held by Special Collections, Claremont Colleges Library, Claremont, CA).
California, in common with many other states throughout the Far West, measures 
her advancement in agriculture, industry and population by the yardstick of water 
and hydro-electric power of development.
Twenty years ago, Los Angeles, with a constantly mounting population, began to 
reach the limit of its local water supply. Beyond the banks of the Los Angeles River, 
which had served the city faithfully from its establishment as a Spanish pueblo in 
1787 [actually, 1781], there was no other obvious large water supply source within 
reach. Then we discovered the Owens River, 250 miles to the north, and fed by the 
melting snows of the High Sierras. There were those who regarded the construction 
of the Owens River Aqueduct as an impossible engineering undertaking, but the job 
was completed within the original cost estimate of $24,000,000, and Owens River 
water was brought to Los Angeles—enough to supply 2,000,000 people.
Los Angeles believed it had solved its water problem for two generations, at 
the least. Today, only thirteen years after the completion of the aqueduct, however, 
we find our city rapidly approaching its second million in population, and we are 
 already completing plans for a second much greater water project.
There are no more streams, small or large, within the boundaries of the state 
which may be developed by the great cities of Southern California. Fortunately, 
however, California is bordered on the east by one of the greatest rivers in America, 
the Colorado.
Before the water of the Colorado can be put to use, either for power develop-
ment or domestic use in Southern California, however, it is essential that its present 
dangerous and wasteful flow be regulated by the construction of a high flood control 
and storage dam.
• • •
The Colorado River project became an opportunity for Southern California 
 municipalities to acquire water for future development. A number of these cities, 
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led by Los Angeles, created the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California 
as an agency to plan, build, and finance the system that would bring and distribute 
water from Parker Dam, located just below Boulder Dam, beginning in 1941. The 
legislation to create this district was debated in the 1925 session of the California 
Legislature at a time when municipal ownership advocates in Los Angeles and the 
conservative owner of the Los Angeles Times were in a heated political battle. So 
it is not surprising that Times reporter Kyle Palmer described the legislation as a 
resort to socialism on the part of the opposition. The bill finally passed in 1927, and 
in the following years Metropolitan Water District officials made many attempts 
to explain why it was needed for future growth in Los Angeles and the rest of 
Southern California.
From Kyle D. Palmer, “Water Act Up Today” (Los Angeles Times, April 1, 1925 [Kyle 
D. Palmer and Los Angeles Staff. Copyright © 1925. Los Angeles Times. Reprinted 
with Permission]).
Figure 28. Parker Dam is a much smaller structure than Boulder/Hoover Dam and is located 
farther south on the Colorado River. Built by the Metropolitan Water District in the 1930s, it 
began releasing water to Southern California in 1941 through the Colorado River Aqueduct. 
This image is from April 1, 1966.
From the Otis Marston Collection, P042/0006, courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
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“Water Act Up Today
Defeat of Bill Certain
Legislature Expected to Halt Crafty Scheme of Local Power Bureau Clique
Measure Designed to Build Up Gigantic Political Machine Exposed”
SACRAMENTO. March 31—Inspired and devised by the same clique of municipal 
ownership faddists that has sought to use the Los Angeles Water and Power Bureau 
as a superpolitical machine, the so-called metropolitan water district bill purporting 
to create opportunity for municipal cooperation in distribution of water from the 
Colorado River will be debated in Senate committee tomorrow.
The status of this measure, one of the most Socialistic proposals ever submit-
ted to a California Legislature, is unique in the history of the State and its defeat is 
deemed certain.
The four nominal authors of the bill, Senator Johnson of Pasadena, Senator Swing 
of San Bernardino, Assemblyman Weller of Glendale and Assemblyman Jones of 
Ontario, who agreed in good faith to urge adoption of the proposal under the im-
pression that it was a beneficial act, are themselves unaware of all its ramifications 
despite the introduction of eighty-six amendments.
Legislature Tricked
Stripped of a certain degree of polite language and logical unwillingness to admit that 
they were misinformed as to the real purposes of the water district act, it would appear 
that the four legislators were tricked into sponsoring a foundling whose potentialities 
are somewhat appalling. And, having been once misled, Messrs. Johnson, Swing, Waller, 
and Jones may not be blamed for viewing the amended bill with continued suspicion.
It is doubtful that the radical $500,000,000 water and power act, so emphatically 
rejected by the people of California in two elections, contained more arbitrary provi-
sions. In fact, the metropolitan water district bill in some respects goes farther than 
the $500,000,000 water and power act in its Socialistic tendencies.
Recital of a few of the more drastic articles in the Socialistic scheme as originally 
drawn, will suffice to show the dangerous purposes of the real authors of the bill.
From Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, The Metropolitan Water 
District of Southern California Colorado River Aqueduct (brochure, c. 1931, Box 3, 
Frank Weymouth Papers; held by Special Collections, Claremont Colleges Library, 
Claremont, CA).
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California Colorado 
River Aqueduct
The District—Its Government, Boundaries, Purpose, Population, and Fi-
nancial Resources, Water Rights, Surveys, Plans and Estimates, Consult-
ing Boards, Funds Required, Plan of Repayment, Officers and Directors
Nature and Composition of District
The Metropolitan Water District is a public corporation of the State of California, 
organized in 1928 under authority of the State Metropolitan Water District Act of 
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1927. It is composed of the following thirteen member cities: Anaheim, Beverly 
Hills, Burbank, Compton, Fullerton, Glendale, Long Beach, Los Angeles, Pasadena, 
San Marino, Santa Ana, Santa Monica and Torrance.
Purpose
The District was organized for the purpose of supplying its member cities with water 
for domestic and industrial uses and incidentally to provide a means of creating a 
water supply for such surrounding areas as may find it advantageous to join in the 
enterprise.
Government
The District is governed by a board of directors composed of at least one director 
from each member city, the voting power being distributed among the member cit-
ies upon the basis of one vote for each ten million dollars assessed valuation, with 
the provision that no one city shall have more than 50% of the voting strength of 
the board. The members of the board of directors are appointed by the executive 
officers of the member cities with the consent and approval of the governing bodies 
thereof. The District has authority to acquire, construct and operate a water works 
system, do all the things incidental to these functions, and sell water and levy taxes 
to provide funds for carrying on its business and for paying interest and principal of 
any bonded indebtedness.
Environment
The region within which the cities of the Metropolitan Water District are situated 
embraces the fertile plain surrounding the city of Los Angeles and extending to Red-
lands on the east and Newport Beach on the south. There are 2,200 square miles 
or 1,400,000 acres of first class habitable lands within this basin. Citrus fruits and 
semitropical vegetation grow luxuriantly. The region is very attractive as a place of 
residence and as the site of an intense industrial development. Labor is plentiful at 
moderate prices and foodstuffs are abundant. The oil fields of Southern California 
provide an abundant and cheap supply of fuel, and the Los Angeles harbor is an open 
door to the raw material markets of the world.
Financial Resources
The District at the present time has no bonded or other indebtedness. Current oper-
ating expenses are met by a small tax levy. The total population of the thirteen mem-
ber cities in 1930 was 1,665,833, and the total assessed valuation was $2,410,610,355 
distributed as shown in the accompanying table.
Population and assessed Value of District
City Population, 1930 Assessed Value, 1930
Anaheim 10,995 $8,188,260
Beverly Hills 17,429 64,448,585
Burbank 16,662 25,951,035
Compton 12,516 10,702,885
Rivers of Growth    79
Fullerton 10,860 12,666,140
Glendale 62,736 73,472,110
Long Beach 142,032 189,399,040
Los Angeles 1,238,048 1,788,834,265
Pasadena 76,086 114,574,405
San Marino 3,730 14,885,855
Santa Ana 30,322 21,982,015
Santa Monica 37,146 59,618,185
Torrance 7,271 25,887,575
Total 1,665,833 $2,410,610,355
The above figures are for the cities now in the District. These assessed valuations do 
not include the value of solvent credits, stocks, bonds, notes, etc., the operative prop-
erty of public utilities and the property of public corporations exempt from taxation. 
The Colorado River aqueduct is the only source of additional supply for the entire 
basin previously described and is being so designed that all potential demands can 
be supplied up to the limit of its capacity. The population of the basin in 1930 was 
2,491,000 and its assessed valuation was $3,581,261,000.
Past and Predicted Growth
This region has experienced a remarkable era of expansion during the past few de-
cades. Growth has been particularly rapid since about 1910. There is every reason 
to expect that development will continue until the natural resources of the region 
are absorbed. Past and estimated growths are as shown on the accompanying table.
Past and Predicted Growths
(U.S. Census and Assessment Records)
          Present Member Cities                 Entire Basin
Year Population Assessed Value Population Assessed Value
1890 62,322 140,540
1900 123,294 235,820
1910 391,595 284,000,000 668,038 529,992,000
1920 737,483 668,000,000 1,085,000 995,206,000
1930 1,665,833 2,431,397,2250 2,491,000 3,581,261,000
Predicted for Future
1940 2,500,900 3,646,518,000 3,717,000 5,345,000,000
1950 3,360,200 4,933,826,000 4,940,000 7,104,000,000
1960 4,119,500 6,074,114,000 5,935,000 8,535,000,000
1970 4,824,300 7,131,520,000 6,860,000 9,865,000,000
1980 5,310,500 7,921,031,000 7,525,000 10,821,000,000
Present Water Resources
The region is naturally semiarid, the mean annual rainfall being approximately 15 inches. 
The mountain areas tributary to the basin are not large. Natural stream flow is limited 
and even with careful conservation is inadequate for the needs of the community.
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The areas immediately outside of the encircling hills are arid and yield practically 
no runoff. It is therefore necessary in the development of the region to go great dis-
tances to secure the waters needed to supplement local supplies.
The present Owens River aqueduct of the city of Los Angeles, extending approxi-
mately 250 miles northward to tap the snow banks of the High Sierra, is capable of 
delivering 450 second-feet of water into the valley, or such smaller flow as may be 
available at the source of supply.
Present Deficiencies in Supply
The entire amount of water being developed and used in the metropolitan area for 
all purposes and from local and outside sources is a little more than 1,000,000 acre 
feet per year. This amount exceeds the average yield of the sources from which it is 
being drawn by an appreciable percentage. This excess of use over normal supply is 
made possible by the fact that much of the water is derived from wells driven into 
the immense gravel beds underlying the area, which were filled with water prior to 
the settlement of California.
Many of these wells have been over-pumped until they have gone dry, leaving 
their owners without a water supply. Unless this condition is promptly relieved, 
growth within the metropolitan area must cease and retrogression is inevitable. 
Some further outside source of supply must be made available. At least double the 
present supply will be needed within the readily predictable future.
The Colorado River as a New Source of Supply
Opportunity for the development of the needed supply is being created by the con-
struction, by the U.S. Government, of the Hoover dam on the Colorado River. There 
is available no other source of supply suitable in quality and quantity and the people 
of the metropolitan area have no alternative but to undertake this great water sup-





The construction and operation of a great dam should never be left to the sole 
judgment of one man, no matter how eminent.
—Los Angeles County Coroner’s Inquest, 1928.
Don’t blame anybody else, you just fasten it on me. If there is an error in hu-
man judgment, I was the human.
—William Mulholland, 1928
As booster campaigns attempted to generate political support for huge new water 
projects, other planning went into imagining and reimaging gargantuan aspects of 
water infrastructure. Planners had to figure out if the projects were even necessary 
based on present resources and contemplated growth. If they were not, how much 
more water would be required, or how much flooding would need to be prevented, 
how much would such a project cost to complete, and how would it be paid for?
Engineers of the time had to design and build massive structures to last for 
many decades, if not longer. These engineers increasingly were seen as expert pro-
fessionals in their field. In the heyday of the Progressive Era and after, they were 
admired for their technical contributions to the betterment of society. Many were 
touted as national leaders, even potential political candidates. The construction of 
the Panama Canal and other major water infrastructure across the globe raised the 
status of engineers to that of national heroes in their ability to control nature and 
put it to use for humankind.
Not all of the projects would be completely successful from a construction per-
spective.
Massive floods in Los Angeles County in the 1930s resulted in the questioning 
of previous flood control methods. The catastrophic failure of the St. Francis Dam, 
a component of the Owens River Aqueduct, in 1928 cast a pall on such projects 
for years. Leakages in Hoover Dam (formerly Boulder Dam) eventually demon-
strated that such behemoths might not last forever. Severe climate conditions, 
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earth movements, and faulty construction methods can take a serious toll on the 
best-laid plans for heralded engineering feats.
• • •
The question of whether or not a specific project was actually necessary is certainly 
part of the historical record. Do we need this? Why? When it came to control-
ling floods in Los Angeles County, almost everyone and every major group was 
on board. The chief question was not whether it should happen but, rather, how to 
pay for it. Should all county residents contribute equally, or should only those who 
needed the protection pay for it? Should Los Angeles shoulder the cost, or should 
it be distributed somehow equally or equitably across the many municipalities or 
jurisdictions through which the river flowed? The following 1914 Los Angeles Times 
story describes the early role of organizations in the campaign to support the county 
supervisors in creating an agency to bring flood control to the Los Angeles River.
From “Mammoth Undertaking Fathered by County” (Los Angeles Times, July 2, 1914).
Figure 29. Los Angeles River flood damage in the second decade of the twentieth century.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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“Mammoth Undertaking Fathered by County.
Flood Control Plans are approved at Representative Gathering.
Expenditure of Nine and One-half Millions is Contemplated—State 
and Federal. Aid will be Sought—Tax Levy to Provide Money for Ini-
tial Work Before Winter Floods Arrive.”
Los Angeles County put its hand to a $9,500,000 undertaking yesterday, when 230 
representatives of municipalities, civic organizations, drainage districts, and private 
interests met with the Board of Supervisors in Blanchard Hall, effected a permanent 
organization, approved the flood-control plans of the board’s advisory commission 
of engineers, and authorized the imposing of a tax of 10 cents on the $100 to get the 
work under way.
The amount that will be raised by this tax levy was estimated by Chairman Prid-
ham at $675,000. This sum will be used under the board’s direction to safeguard the 
county against possible flood loss the coming winter and to carry out preliminary 
work in connection with the larger conservation plan.
Eventually it is believed that the State and Federal governments and private inter-
ests will join the county in the work. This will mean, it is believed, an equal division 
of expense. The Board of Supervisors was authorized to take such steps as it deems 
best to secure the co-operation of these other interested parties. It is possible in this 
connection that the State Legislature will be asked at the January session to erect Los 
Angeles county into one homogeneous drainage district similar to that now con-
trolled by the Sacramento River Drainage Commission.
All Together.
With the flood-damage last winter estimated at close to $7,000,000 the assembly 
early manifested the desire to tackle the problem as one in which sectional interests 
should be forgotten. The result was the organization of the Los Angeles County Flood 
Control Association, with Chairman Pridham of the Board of Supervisors as presi-
dent: A. W. Fry of Clearwater as vice-president; Secretary McPherrin of the Board of 
 Supervisors as secretary and Col. H. C. Hubbard of San Fernando as treasurer.
There were few hitches in the proceedings. One was when it seemed possible 
that the resolutions would contain no provision by which money would be provided 
for work this fall. This difficulty was solved when the special tax levy was provided 
for. Another came when Supervisor Norton leaped into the breach, when things 
were going smoothly, with an offer to “save you money.” He suggested “gravel dams” 
 upstream, an idea which brought a storm of derisive handclaps and a reply from 
Mr. Norton that “they are trying to irritate me, but they can’t do it.”
The Platform.
The platform of the organization is contained in the following self-explanatory reso-
lutions, drafted by Percy H. Clark, H. Hawgood, a member of the advisory commis-
sion of engineers; T. P. Lukens and Levi Carse:
“Whereas the floods of the past winter have resulted in the destruction of prop-
erty within the county of Los Angeles, estimated by an impartial board of engineers, 
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as a total direct loss of $7,000,000, of which the county lost $495,000 for bridges and 
highways; utility corporations, $2,275,000, and the city of Los Angeles, $500,000. 
Traffic has been interrupted, business disturbed and the taxable value of county 
property, according to records, reduced over $3,000,000, and
“Whereas, a direct benefit to the county lies in the maintenance of the public 
welfare, [and]
“Whereas the average interval of time between those destructive floods has been 
approximately eight years during the past ninety years, and
“Whereas the rapidly increasing values of property in this county will cause 
greater damage in future years, and
“Whereas, as improvements are made and property values are increased, it be-
comes more difficult with each year’s delay, to obtain necessary rights of way, and
“Whereas, supine indifference and lack of energy to meet these flood damages is 
not in harmony with the successful achievement of this county.
“Therefore, be it resolved, that the Board of Supervisors of Los Angeles county 
be requested by this convention to adopt an aggressive and constructive policy to 
control these flood waters along the following lines:
“First—The Control of the flood waters of the county, should be vested in a cen-
tralized authority, and should be in accordance with a comprehensive plan embrac-
ing the entire county.
“Second—No flood or storm water control construction or structure for water-
ways should be permitted that are not in accordance with the adopted general plan 
and approved by this authority.
“Third—The adopted plan should include consideration of the following essen-
tial physical features: (a) Prevention of overflow and erosion; (b) Reduction of the 
silt and debris of the flood waters, especially in the harbors; (c) The maintenance of 
the underground water supplies by spreading of flood waters on the debris cones; (d) 
The construction of such small mountain reservoirs as will minimize the flood peaks 
and incidentally increase irrigation water supplies; (e) Co-operation in protecting 
the forest cover in the mountains against fire and also by reforestation in the moun-
tains, to restrain the floods and debris resulting from flood erosion.
“Fourth—The cost of the work should be distributed according to benefits, to 
civil divisions of the government and private interests. The division of these costs 
should include the Federal government because of its relation to navigation in the 
harbors, and the State, because of the general public welfare, and the county, because 
of damage to roads and bridges. There is precedent for expenditures by all these 
interests, for reclamation work of this class in California, as evidenced in the Federal 
reports of and appropriations for the California Debris Commission, consisting of 
army engineers, and for the State Flood Control Board, in accordance with acts of 
Congress and of the California State Legislature. Therefore, the Board of Supervi-
sors is requested to have a careful investigation made by their legal and engineering 
advisors of these State and national acts, with a view of preparing necessary bills for 
submission to the United States Congress and the California Legislature. The county 
of Los Angeles should also, for similar reasons, contribute from its funds for the 
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construction and maintenance of these works. We also recommend that the Board of 
Supervisors, by direct tax, shall raise such sums as they may deem necessary for im-
mediate use, while the other provisions of these resolutions are being consummated.
“Fifth—There is precedent for diverting the flood waters out of the harbors. The 
San Diego River has been diverted into False Bay and the Calaveras River has been 
diverted from the Stockton Harbor, both at Federal expense. The diversion of the San 
Gabriel and Los Angeles Rivers from the San Pedro–Long Beach Harbors should be 
made at Federal expense.
“Sixth—It is to the public interest that the main rivers and their principal tribu-
taries should have publicly owned and controlled channels. Near the canyon mouths 
ample publicly-owned areas should be provided on which the flood waters should be 
held and spread by an organized public effort. This will not only involve a large ini-
tial expense, but also persistent maintenance, with provisions for fighting menacing 
floods resembling that provided by the Federal Forest Reserve for fighting fires. The 
cost of these main flood channels should be widely distributed. After the adoption 
of the proposed general plan by the Supervisors, the local storm protection districts 
should be encouraged to proceed with their construction works in accordance there-
with, provision being made for credits for the same in the event of the adoption of 
co-operative general legislation.
“Seventh—The Board of Supervisors is requested to immediately have surveys 
made, defining the necessary rights of way for flood channels, including the protec-
tion of the harbors, for areas on which flood waters should be spread for absorption, 
and for determination of available reservoir sites for storage purposes. Field exami-
nation should also be made to determine all areas that have been menaced, as well 
as injured by the floods of the past season, in order to properly define the outlines of 
the district to be benefitted by these proposed reclamation works. Complete surveys 
and information should be obtained, upon which may be based the definite plan and 
estimate, which should be sufficiently comprehensive in its scope to properly present 
to the engineering officers of the Federal government and those of the State of Cali-
fornia, for the purpose of seeking co-operation by appropriation for the construction 
of these works.
“The Board of Supervisors should promptly initiate all necessary proceedings 
looking towards the adoption of the final plans and organization.”
• • •
Did Los Angeles really need another source of water in the early 1900s? Boosters 
said yes (loudly), while many opponents believed the Los Angeles River could 
provide enough water, at least for the near future. The city’s engineers argued 
that the municipality was reaching its limit. If the population was to expand, 
more water would have to be imported from a second major source. This excerpt 
from the 1905 report of the city’s Board of Water Commissioners presents the 
case for more water based on past usage, present resources, and projections for 
the future.
86    Harnessing the Rivers
From Los Angeles Board of Water Commissioners, Annual Report of the Board of 
Water Commissioners for the Year Ending November 30, 1905 ([Los Angeles: Los 
Angeles Board of Water Commissioners, 1905], 20–24).
Underground Waters Being Depleted
The importance of the underground water supply in Southern California being rec-
ognized by the U.S. Geological Survey, Mr. W. C. Mendenhall, Geologist, was de-
tailed to this work. The results already obtained by Mr. Mendenhall demonstrate the 
value of the investigation carried on by his department. The following data relative 
thereto has in large part been collected by him. Nearly every well south of the Sierra 
Madre Mountains has been inspected and the elevation of its water plane together 
with its output has been ascertained. The records in almost every case demonstrate 
the general lowering of the underground waters and the decreasing of the areas of 
the artesian basins.
In 1898 there were 375 square miles of valleys south of the Sierra Madre Moun-
tains from which artesian waters could be obtained. In six years this area has de-
creased 33 1/2 per cent and in addition to the decrease of area there has been a very 
material decrease in the flow from the wells within the present limits of the basins. 
Numerous individual instances could be cited, but one or two perhaps will suffice. 
A well just above San Bernardino, when completed in June, 1892, flowed five mil-
lion gallons per day. It has decreased 95 percent in output in six years. The famous 
Bouton well near Bixby, bored in 1899, yielded about four million gallons per day. 
On May 13, 1903, this well only flowed at the rate of 823,000 gallons per day, a de-
crease of 80 per cent. Almost every locality has numerous records of wells which 
once flowed, then ceased, and in which the water now stands many feet below the top 
of the casing. The former perennial streams of our lower valleys originated largely in 
certain cienegas which denoted artesian basins. The falling off of the flow from the 
artesian wells has been followed by a notable decrease in the surface output of those 
streams leading from the cienegas. Take the San Bernardino Basin as an illustra-
tion. The records of the Geological Survey show that in September, 1898, the surface 
flow, rising from the gravel beds above Colton, was 78 cubic feet per second or 3900 
miner’s inches. In five years the surface flow has decreased to 46 second feet or 2300 
miner’s inches, a falling off of over 40 per cent.
The statement that the streams of Southern California, rising from the gravel 
beds, may eventually be decreased to such an extent that there will be no surface 
flow except during torrential storms, is not intended as pessimistic, but the serious-
ness of the situation as it exists today and the results of various investigations should 
be faced.
The governing factor in the location of the Southern California towns was the 
proximity of perennial waters. An abundant water supply is absolutely essential to 
the progress and expansion of both city and suburban life. That this fact was recog-
nized by the Mission Fathers is clearly demonstrated[,] and the growth of the towns 
of Southern California has been in almost every case directly proportional to the 
abundance or scarcity of its water supply.
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While the artesian basins have been decreasing in area and output, a general low-
ering of the water plane throughout all Southern California has been taking place. 
This is of course more pronounced in some localities than in others, depending on 
numerous natural causes, as, proximity to stream channels from which the gravel 
voids are filled, porosity of soils, relative location in basin, whether at its upper or 
lower rim, etc. The Government records show many instructive examples of the 
lowering of the water plane. A few citations here of wells which are not exceptions 
but merely general in character, may be interesting. The water in the Johnson well, 
located north of the city of San Bernardino, has lowered from fifteen feet six inches 
below the ground surface in June, 1899, to forty-five feet below in June, 1904. In one 
well near San Dimas the water plane has fallen 65 feet in four years. In the well of 
J. B. Neff of Anaheim in March, 1898, the water stood 23 feet below the surface of 
the ground, and on August 1, 1905, it was 52 feet 7 inches. The Williams well near 
San Bernardino flowed over the casing in 1893, while last year the water stood 38 
feet below the surface of the ground. Many instances similar in character could be 
cited but those noted above will suffice to demonstrate the seriousness of the deple-
tion of our underground supply. Almost every rancher who has been depending on 
pumped water for the vitality of his orchards has realized the decline in the plane of 
saturation not so much because of the decrease in volume of the supply but because 
of the increased cost.
City Demand and Supply.
It has become fully recognized, by students of this problem, that the limit of the 
present available water supply for the city of Los Angeles is being approached. This is 
also true of Hollywood and Pasadena. This may be too strong a statement to readily 
accept, but investigations of the past ten years in connection with data previously 
compiled, so forcibly present facts that a conclusion differing from the above can 
only be arrived at by assuming that nature will in some bounteous and providential 
way come to our rescue. Should we have a series of wet years in which the rainfall 
is above the average, the necessary withdrawals may be made from the gravel beds 
without lowering the water levels, but even with an uninterrupted sequence of wet 
years the growth of our city and its surrounding territory if continued in a ratio at all 
similar to the years just passed, will demand all of the water which can be developed 
from our present sources, and that, without allowing a surplus for the recharging 
of the already depleted underground sources of supply. On the other hand, should 
nature continue her delinquency for another series of years similar to those of 1897–
00 we can surely anticipate a shortage, unless all development and progress, both 
commercial and agricultural, cease. The third annual report of the Board of Water 
Commissioners of the City of Los Angeles, dated November 30, 1904, shows that 
there were three periods during the summer of 1904 when the water consumption 
of Los Angeles exceeded the supply by nearly three and one-half million gallons per 
day. The report further states that “it was only by appealing to the people through 
the press and otherwise, to practice the strictest economy” that the consumption 
dropped sufficiently to allow of filling the domestic reservoirs again. The same  report 
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states that the city’s supply was only endangered during the three extremely hot pe-
riods and that the minimum supply was equal to the maximum withdrawals at all 
other times, but that the margin left after supplying the amount actually essential 
for domestic use did not permit of any water for the Park lakes during that season 
of the year. Again quoting from the report mentioned above: “In former years when 
such heated terms occurred it was only necessary to make temporary drafts on the 
surplus water that was usually used for irrigating purposes, but the whole flow of the 
stream is now devoted to domestic use, and the zanja system abandoned. This caused 
a great deal of hardship to many who had rich alfalfa fields and orchards within the 
city limits, but they patiently accepted the inevitable and relinquished the rights they 
or their predecessors had held for over a century.”
Those were the conditions obtaining in the summer of 1904, and since that time 
the city has added probably twenty thousand people to her population, requiring 
under ordinary conditions of temperature and season three million gallons more 
water each day; during the hot summer months this will mean an increased demand 
of four million gallons per day.
• • •
Almost two decades after the issuance of the previous report, a board of three lo-
cal engineers was charged with again examining the city’s water-supply situation. 
The board concluded that, based upon estimates of population growth over the 
next thirty-five years, there would surely be water shortages unless new supplies 
were found. Statistical models wrestled with three main questions: how many 
people, how much rain, and how much groundwater should the city expect? 
Although their population projections would prove to be generous, the three 
engineers—Louis C. Hill, J. B. Lippincott, and A. L. Sonderegger—were sure that 
another source of  water would have to be found if the metropolitan area was to 
grow and thrive.
From Board of Engineers, “Summary of Report on the Water Supply for the City of 
Los Angeles and the Metropolitan Area” (August 14, 1924, typescript copy, 5 pages, 
held by Special Collections, Claremont Colleges Library, Claremont, CA).
Los Angeles, California,
August 14, 1924,
Board of Public Service,
The City of Los Angeles.
Gentlemen:
Pursuant to your instructions, this Board of Engineers has investigated the pres-
ent and future water supply which might be obtained from the Owens Valley, from 
Mono Basin, and from local sources, and has estimated the future needs of the City 
of Los Angeles and of the Metropolitan area considered as all of the Los Angeles 
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County south of the High Mountains. As requested, we have confined the report to 
a finding of facts.
The future growth of the City of Los Angeles and of the Metropolitan Area is 
dependent upon the water supply. Assuming a full supply, by 1940 the City will have 
about 1,720,000 inhabitants and the County about 2,740,000. By 1950 the City will 
have 2,180,000 and the County 3,270,000 population.
The available local supply for the City of Los Angeles is about 139 second feet 
continuous flow. In addition 400 second feet can be delivered by the aqueduct from 
Owens Valley during the driest years and leave 30,000 acres under irrigation in Ow-
ens Valley. It is assumed that adequate storage is provided at both ends of the aque-
duct and pumping rights acquired.
The water requirements of the City within its present boundaries will absorb all of 
those supplies including return water from the aqueduct by 1940. If all Mono Basin 
water is added to the entire amount which can be conserved in Owens Valley after de-
stroying all irrigation, and there is built a second aqueduct of 350 second feet capacity, 
then including the local supply, there would be available 920 second feet continuous 
flow or about enough for the City within its present boundaries for the next thirty-five 
years. However, the entire possible safe supply for the Metropolitan Area, including 
all local supplies in Los Angeles County, all of Mono Basin and all of Owens Valley 
water[,] is but 1315 second feet continuous flow and will only serve adequately the 
Metropolitan Area until 1933. By 1950 this area will require about 1870 second feet 
continuous flow of 555 second feet more than all possible available supply from local 
sources, Owens Valley and Mono Basin. If irrigation in Owens Valley is not destroyed 
and a second aqueduct not built the deficit will be about 900 second feet.
In 1905 when the City of Los Angeles determined to construct its aqueduct, it 
built it with a capacity not only adequate to care for the area within its boundaries, 
at that time, but also sufficient to permit of its expansion over 100,000 acres or more 
additional. It was this wise policy which had sustained the phenomenal growth of the 
City during the past twenty years. We are today facing a similar situation and it will 
be more difficult each year to obtain a large additional water supply.
Continued growth of the community coincident with the occurrence of a series 
of wet years might make a shortage of water unapparent. At the first recurrence of 
dry years, however, an acute shortage would result if an additional water supply is 
not provided.
cyclic fluctuations of water supply
California as far north as Owens and Mono Valleys is subject to synchronous peri-
odic fluctuations of rainfall and stream flow. In the past, the periods of drought have 
averaged about eleven years.
In Southern California the water crop of dry periods is supplemented by under-
ground storage. Sole reliance on surface streams is particularly hazardous for water 
users. The water supply must be gaged by dry years. Storage is required to regulate 
the excess flow of wet years. To base the development of a country upon the supply 
of wet periods will lead to disaster.
90    Harnessing the Rivers
In Owens Valley the present drought is the most severe of record[,] but in South-
ern California that of the late nineties was worse. The Owens River is not subject to 
as great fluctuation in flow as other large streams south of the Yosemite. The esti-
mates of available local supply have been based upon the dry period 1893–1904 and 
for the Owens and Mono Valleys upon the past nine years.
local water supply
The local water supply available in the Metropolitan Area during a dry period de-
pends principally upon the ground water storage accumulated during wet periods, 
which becomes available in rising streams as at the Los Angeles and San Gabriel 
Narrows, or by pumping. The ground water reservoirs of San Fernando Valley, San 
Gabriel Valley, Southern and Western Coastal Plains and portions of Pomona Valley 
are very deep and of such capacity that over one half million acre feet, or a supply 
of 350 second feet[,] could be abstracted for two years with moderate pumping lifts. 
This enormous available ground water storage represents the accumulation of long 
periods. The permanent water crop is to be gaged by the average recharge. Most of 
these underground basins are now being overdrawn by the operation of hundreds of 
pumping plants.
The San Fernando Valley is the terminus of the aqueduct. Located along its pe-
riphery are some of the principal surface reservoirs for the storage of the winter 
surplus of aqueduct water. The valley itself is a great underground reservoir. The City 
has established its control of this water supply. The Los Angeles river in July, 1924, 
flowed 78 second feet of which 20 second feet was return water from irrigation in 
that valley. There has also been accumulated in the gravels underlying the valley an 
additional 100,000 acre feet of water from irrigation.
future population
The growth of the City of Los Angeles in the past has paralleled that of Chicago and 
probably will continue to do so for the next 25 years. The estimated population of 
Los Angeles is 960,000 at present; in 1930, 1,130,000; in 1940, 1,720,000; in 1950, 
2,180,000; in 1960, 2,500,000. The estimated population of the Metropolitan Area 
is 1,400,000 at present; in 1930, 1,000,000; in 1940, 2,740,000; in 1950, 3,270,000; in 
1960, 3,640,000.
Louis C. Hill, J. B. Lippincott, and A. L. Sonderegger
NOTE: One acre foot is the amount of water that will cover one acre one foot deep. One acre 
foot = 325,850 gallons. One second foot = 646,320 gallons per day.
• • •
F. E. Weymouth, chief engineer of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California, made a similar appeal for more water in this 1931 article for a profes-
sional engineering journal. Beyond the flood-control and hydroelectric benefits of 
Boulder Dam, then being built farther north on the Colorado River, Weymouth 
concentrates here on the need for a dependable water supply for the future growth 
of Los Angeles and the other ten cities in water partnership with the MWD. 
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Weymouth’s population estimates and his conclusion that more water would be 
“urgently needed” proved optimistic, since little water from the Colorado would 
be taken by the cities when the Colorado River Aqueduct was completed in 1941. 
But it would be needed in the years to come.
From F.  E. Weymouth, “Colorado River Aqueduct” (Civil Engineering 1, no. 5 
[ February 1931]: 372–376).
“Colorado River Aqueduct
Route Selected for Metropolitan Water District Requires Pumping”
The Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is, in effect, a confederation 
of cities in the south coastal plain. It was organized in 1928 under the Metropolitan 
Water District Act of 1927, which authorizes the joining together of non-contiguous 
municipalities, or water districts, for the purpose of developing a domestic water 
supply. The district is governed by a Board of Directors composed of at least one 
director from each city, the voting power being distributed among the member cities 
on the basis of one vote for each $10,000,000 of assessed valuation, with the provi-
sion that no city shall have more than 50 per cent of the voting strength of the board. 
Figure 30. F. E. Weymouth, chief engineer of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern 
California; William Mulholland, chief engineer of the Los Angeles City Water Department; and 
W. P. Whitsett, chairman of the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, on a desert 
survey trip in 1931.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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Each city has the right to appoint an additional director for each $200,000,000 of 
assessed valuation without, however, increasing its voting power. The enabling act 
requires that the water be distributed among the member cities in proportion to their 
assessed valuations, the apportionment to be adjusted from time to time to conform 
to the growth of the various communities.
There are, at the present time, 11 cities in the district, having an aggregate popula-
tion of 1,850,000, and an assessed valuation of two and one-third billion dollars. The 
act provides for the addition of other cities from time to time, and for separations. 
Three new applications have been recently submitted and formally accepted by the 
Board of Directors. Ratification by the people of the applicant cities is necessary be-
fore these applications become effective. Several other communities have expressed 
interest in the project. The area, which may be regarded as prospectively a part of the 
Metropolitan Water District, has a present population of 2,750,000[,] and this num-
ber must be considered in estimating future demands on the water supply.
Present Demand for Water
In 1929–1930 the City of Los Angeles used a total of 268,000 acre-ft. of water. A 
portion of this was developed from local wells; some of it was derived from surface 
flows in Owens Valley; and some was pumped from the Owens Valley gravels. No 
appreciable flows, subject to diversion by the city, went to waste and no water was 
accumulated in other surface or underground basins. In fact, ground water levels 
generally went down. In other words, the City of Los Angeles actually took more 
water from its sources of supply than was put back by nature. This does not mean 
that the city is actually facing an immediate water famine. There is still water in the 
underground basins available for emergency use, but the volume of underground 
water is not inexhaustible, and overdraft upon it cannot continue indefinitely. We 
are now, admittedly, in the midst of a dry cycle[,] and some relief may ultimately be 
expected through increased rainfall.
Rainfall records at Los Angeles, for a 50-year period, are shown in Fig. 1 [not in-
cluded in this volume]. The precipitation has been declining, more or less gradually, 
since 1916. However, there have been many years with a lower rainfall than 1930, 
even in the brief period covered by these records. The 1893–1904 drought was more 
severe than the present one. It would be bold to assume that others, still more severe, 
will not occur in the future. It appears that Los Angeles is in a dangerous position as 
to future water supply, and it is evident that more water will be urgently needed by 
the time Colorado River water can be brought in.
Estimated Ultimate Demand
The habitable area of the coastal plain is approximately 2,200 square miles, or 
1,400,000 acres. The contemplated Colorado River Aqueduct, after allowing for 
losses, will deliver something less than 1,000,000 acre-ft. per year into local stor-
age reservoirs or, say, 0.70 acre-ft. per acre. The Los Angeles Aqueduct, extended 
to Mono Basin, can be depended upon for perhaps 0.20 of an acre-ft., bringing the 
supply up to 0.90. Run-off from the 3,900 square miles of the south coastal plain may 
be counted upon to supply an additional 0.4 acre-ft. per acre.
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Then the total supply, with all prospective importations, amounts to approxi-
mately 1.30 acre-ft. per acre. This is a gross figure, and with no allowance for losses 
in handling and distributing. As an irrigation supply, it is a modest amount, but as a 
domestic supply it is low, even for sparsely settled sections, and it makes no allowance 
for the heavy usage in congested and industrial districts. This allowance will probably 
be slightly increased by sewage reclamation and perhaps more notably by “return 
flow” from irrigation when a more bountiful primary supply is made available.
A proposed aqueduct capacity of 1,500 sec-ft., or 1,086,000 acre-ft.[,] per year at 
the point of diversion, was not selected by the above process of reasoning. But these 
general statements show that, although the region will not be overwhelmed by a 
surplus of water from the Colorado River Aqueduct, it will nevertheless be placed in 
a reasonably secure position for a time.
The amount of the proposed Colorado River diversion was arrived at by a study 
of predicted population curves, based upon past and present population trends and 
comparisons with the growth curves of other large and progressive communities, 
such as Chicago and New York.
From 1930 to 1980, the contemplated construction and amortization period, 
the estimated population increase for “Metropolitan Los Angeles” is 7,500,000. At 
the point of wholesale delivery, 1 sec-ft. of flow is sufficient for approximately 5,000 
people. Therefore, according to these curves, the district will need the entire 1,500 
sec-ft. of new water by 1980.
• • •
Opponents of the Colorado River Aqueduct argued that engineers such as Wey-
mouth exaggerated regional population projections, the methods for financing the 
project without imposing taxes, and other elements of the project only to gain 
public support for it. As reports of consulting engineers favoring the project ap-
peared, critics countered the assertions point by point. A summary of some of the 
objections presented to the Los Angeles Chamber of Commerce by businessman 
John Treanor appeared in the Los Angeles Times in 1931.
From “Do We Really Need a $200,000,000 Aqueduct?” (Los Angeles Times, May 
10, 1931 [Copyright © 1931. Los Angeles Times. Reprinted with permission.]).
“Do We Really Need a $200,000,000 Aqueduct?
Both Sides of Enormously Important Colorado-Project Question; 
Huge Saving Possible, Says Analyst”
Construction of the Metropolitan Water District aqueduct to 1500 second feet ca-
pacity will be a serious economic mistake, and the engineers who have estimated 
that amount of water as necessary or desirable are basing their estimate on error, ac-
cording to an analysis of the Colorado River project by John Treanor, industrial and 
water expert, who declares that an aqueduct large enough to carry 500 second feet is 
ample for the requirements of the four counties (Los Angeles, Riverside, Orange and 
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San Bernardino) for the next thirty to sixty years, with full development of less costly 
supplies nearer at hand.
Further, he holds, such an aqueduct need only be of the “standby” variety, as no se-
rious results will follow its temporary interruption, and he estimates it could be built 
for $50,000,000, or about one-fourth of the cost of the Parker Route $200,000,000 
aqueduct which the Metropolitan Water District engineers have recommended.
Mr. Treanor’s analysis of the water situation in the four counties is contained in a 
letter to Henry O. Wheeler, chairman of the Water and Power Committee of the Los 
Angeles Chamber of Commerce.
In his discussion he assumes that part of the water may become available for 
irrigation, or that temporary irrigation with a part of it may be possible, notwith-
standing its legal restriction to domestic use. His argument, of course, would be even 
stronger against the present aqueduct plan if no irrigation use was to be considered. 
His references to irrigation, therefore, must be taken as assuming that irrigation use 
is legally possible.
Besides Mr. Treanor’s analysis, the Chamber committee has before it papers by 
Chief Engineer Weymouth of the Metropolitan Water District and by A. L. Sondereg-
ger, a consulting engineer, both of whom declare that the aqueduct as now planned 
is necessary. A summary of those papers follows the summary of Mr. Treanor’s, to-
gether with a statement in reply from the Metropolitan Water District organization.
Points of Analysis
In brief, Mr. Treanor makes the following points:
(1) That no adequate engineering judgment has yet been had upon the water 
needs, present and prospective, of the community, but that the Metropolitan 
District engineers have merely been trying to plan for and locate correctly 
an aqueduct of predetermined size.
(2) That it has been assumed that a 1500-second feet aqueduct is needed on the 
basis of projecting fifty years into the future the growth-curve of this sec-
tion between 1920 and 1930. This curve is not typical, he declares, because 
the rate of growth between 1910 and 1920 was below normal, while that 
between 1920 and 1930 was above normal, so that the curve constructed on 
those two points is exaggerated.
(3) That no irrigation users can pay the cost of Colorado River water except citrus 
growers, and that an expansion of the citrus industry at the rate figured by 
proponents of the big aqueduct is physically and economically impossible. The 
water will cost too much to make it available for alfalfa or other field crops.
(4) That there is no shortage of agricultural water except in Orange county, and 
the Whittier–La Habra district, and that an abundant supply for all the ir-
rigation needs of this section may be had from reclaiming sewage, of which 
about 180 second feet are being wasted into the ocean at present from the 
Los Angeles area. This can be accomplished at much less cost than bringing 
in Colorado water.
(5) That without recourse to the Colorado all water needs, domestic and agri-
cultural, for an additional population of 1,600,000, including 57,000 acres of 
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new citrus planting[,] can be supplied from comparatively near-by sources, 
with the possible exception of 20,000 acres of alfalfa in the Chino basin, 
which cannot afford Colorado water any way.
(6) That the population of the four counties will not exceed 5,000,000 by 1960, 
requiring an additional supply of about 180 second feet, for which the provi-
sion of 500 second feet, as he proposes, is more than ample.
• • •
Engineers, politicians, and boosters were concerned about how to pay for the 
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California project without creating new 
taxes, especially during the depths of the Great Depression. In this excerpt from 
a 1935 pamphlet, the financing scheme is laid out as a fact—no new taxes would 
be needed, just repayment of bonds, as part of any water bill. However, residents 
would eventually be assessed additional fees for the water to pay off the bonds and 
the continued operation of the aqueduct in the future.
From Facts—Colorado River Aqueduct: Answers to Your Questions (pamphlet, 1935, 
held by Special Collections, Claremont Colleges Library, Claremont, CA).
Aqueduct Financing
8. Are there any steps being taken to eliminate the necessity of collecting any taxes 
whatsoever during Aqueduct construction?
Yes.
(a)  It is provided in the Metropolitan Water District Act that Aqueduct bond 
funds may be used to pay interest charges during the construction period, 
thus eliminating the necessity of collecting any tax money to pay interest 
charges on these bonds during the period of construction. Approximately 
three-fourths of the main Aqueduct construction work is already under way 
and contracted for, and the cost of this work is several million dollars under 
the original cost estimated—thus leaving a margin of bond funds available. 
The validity of the section of the Act just referred to has been established by 
a State Supreme Court decision.
(b)  In the Federal Government’s National Recovery Act it is provided that the 
Public Works Administration may give money amounting to 30% of the cost 
of materials and labor to such public works as the Colorado River Aqueduct. 
The District has applied for this grant of money. If this grant of money is re-
ceived by the District it may be used to pay interest on outstanding Aqueduct 
bonds, and thus eliminate the necessity of making any tax levies whatsoever 
during the Aqueduct construction period.
9. What additional benefits will be derived from securing assistance from the 
P. W. A.?
Such assistance would immediately and greatly relieve unemployment in all 
the cities in the District. Under the District’s present normal construction 
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program 5,500 men were employed on the Aqueduct on March 15, 1935. If 
the Government grants the District’s application, construction work on the 
Aqueduct immediately will be accelerated to the extent that several thousand 
more would be on the job within four months thereafter.
10. How will the cost of Colorado River water compare with the average cost of do-
mestic water in the United States?
In 183 of the largest cities of the United States, the average maximum domes-
tic rate for water is eighteen cents per 100 cubic feet. Careful studies of present 
and future water consumption in District cities reveal that if an average rate 
even less than this nation-wide average is charged, sufficient revenue will be 
derived to pay all bond interest, operating and maintenance charges entirely 
from water revenues. However, each city in the District has the power and 
right to decide how it is to meet its share of Aqueduct costs from water rev-
enues, or whether it desires to meet these costs in part from water revenues 
and in part from taxation.
• • •
The adequacy of engineering and other facets of overall planning for water proj-
ects proved a common and regular concern. To devise a plan to prevent future 
flooding on the Los Angeles River and other rivers in the county, knowledge of 
flooding in the past one hundred years was deemed crucial. After the devastating 
1914 floods, J. W. Reagan, a consulting engineer for the county and the U.S. Army 
Corp of Engineers, sent agents into the field to interview residents who had ex-
perienced past floods. With the help of “early pioneers,” whose families had lived 
in the region for a century or more, the engineers assembled residents’ knowledge 
of how the rivers had flooded and shifted in their beds since 1825. (See map 1 in 
chapter 1 for an illustration of the shifting river.) Their fascinating report would 
serve as the basis for planning and was also a compelling document of the social 
history of the region dating back to the Mission Era.
From U.S. Army Corp of Engineers, Engineer Office, “Los Angeles County Flood 
Control Records” (2 vols., 1914–1915, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA).
Mr. Wm. H. Workman
224 Douglas Bldg., L. A.
Mr. Workman remembers the floods of 1862–67–76–84 and 89 and more particu-
larly about the Los Angeles river. It was commonly understood and talked of in early 
days by old Mexican people that the Los Angeles river flowed out through the south-
east part of the city by Ballona and into the Santa Monica Bay until the flood of 1825. 
At that time the floods were probably the greatest for a great many years, when the 
river broke eastward into the San Pedro Bay. Many people here told Mr. Workman 
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that this was the case. The floods of 1884 were perhaps the greatest in his memory. 
In that year immense amounts of wood floated down or were washed down from the 
mountains and supplied fuel for a long time.
The country from El Monte southward was immense sheets of water, and around 
Downey, Clearwater, Compton and Watts the country was covered with water for 
many weeks after the rain had stopped. The country down around Watts, Compton 
and southward was all willows, and especially near the so-called bed of the river, the 
willows were very dense. . . .
In early days the Los Angeles river had its bed where Los Angeles street now is; 
later it changed over to Alameda street, and in 1889 it changed its present course. The 
river was at all times very shallow until efforts were made to confine it to a certain 
channel, then it began to scour out as is clearly seen in the present channel.
Mr. Workman relates an incident of the flood of 1884, when Martin Aguirre, now 
a Deputy Sheriff, rescued a woman from drowning on upper Alameda street by rid-
ing his horse into the stream and bringing her out.
The floods of 1884 threatened his lands, and especially his apple orchards, but by 
keeping a force of men working for some little time he was able to divert the stream 
away from his place. One of the means by which he did this was to get a big gum tree 
and anchor the roots well into the solid bank, and then let the top drift down stream 
against the bank. This effectively turned the water and stopped the cutting. . . .
Judge G. Sepulveda, Room 1126 Merchants Bank Bldg.
Judge Sepulveda was seen at his office on Tuesday morning, August 11, as to the 
floods of his time.
His father was born here, and he also, and has some relatives here, but the ones 
who would know are dead. He says, however, that the Los Angeles River once flowed 
at the west side of the valley right up against the bank near the Plaza, and down along 
what is now Los Angeles St., and thence to Ballona Bay.
In 1825 there was a big flood and the channel of the river changed from the bank 
near the Plaza to the eastward and turned into the San Pedro Bay. . . .
Mr. Randall H. Hewitt, 529 Merchants Trust Bldg.
Mr. Hewitt was seen at his office this morning, August 31, by F. Z. Lee. He came to 
Los Angeles in 1876, and being connected with newspaper work for a great many 
years, attained intimate knowledge of the conditions of the country and the actions 
of the Los Angeles river since that time.
The year 1876 was a dry year and no water flowed below what was called the 
“toma” in those days, above the Downey St. Bridge, which is now North Broadway, 
where the boys used to go swimming.
The first big flood was in 1884. There were two sections of it. The first came down 
in the latter part of February, but did little damage. A great quantity of water fell and 
the country was very well soaked. Everyone thought the storm was over. The City 
Council was forced to take notice of the great danger the city was placed in should 
another flood come of equal magnitude or even greater. . . .
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. . . It was decided to take some action to protect the city against overflow by the 
river[;] Don Antonio Coronel told them that there was a map in existence among 
some of the old early citizens which showed the river flowing along the bank which 
is now 6th St. from the southwesterly into Nigger Slough and into Playa del Rey and 
Ballona. Don Antonio said the map was practically only a sketch map but clearly 
showed the relative location of the hills and rivers; that succeeding floods had gradu-
ally forced the river eastward in its channel to where it is now.
In Mr. Hewitt’s mind there is no doubt about the river having once flowed out 
through the southeast as there are plenty of indications to show it. . . .
Mr. Jos. W. Wolfskill, 540 S. Ardmore Av.
Mr. Wolfskill was seen at his home this afternoon, September 1, 1914, by F. Z. Lee. 
He claimed he had very little knowledge of the floods for he was never out in them. 
He has no memory of dates.
In early days the Los Angeles river had very low banks[,] and when the rains came 
the river was easily overflowed. The waters spread over the country and did little dam-
age in those days. The water did not run so fast and did not cut so badly. The Arroyo 
Seco controlled the river at its junction because the fall of the Arroyo is so much 
steeper than that of the river. The flow of the Arroyo Seco against the bluffs has done 
much to turn the river eastward. Had this not been so, the river would be flowing 
where it used to, down near Main Street, as the banks at 6th down to 9th clearly show. 
The river has, no doubt, flowed into the Ballona in early days, but before this time.
Mr. Wolfskill’s father told him that in early days the valley down towards Comp-
ton was almost impassible, for it was covered with marshes and lakes and there was 
a growth of willows and some large cottonwood trees. . . .
Mr. Geo. A. Wright, 466 P. E. Bldg.
Mr. Wright was seen at his office this morning by F. Z. Lee. Has lived here for 38 years 
and has witnessed some of the floods.
The flood of 1884 was probably the greatest of his time. The whole country was 
flooded. In Los Angeles the water came almost up to Main St. and he has seen the 
water three and four feet deep in Alameda St. These flood waters would cross over 
Main St. and flow to the southwest into Ballona Bay. This was also the case in 1889. 
This was no doubt the natural channel of the Los Angeles river in earlier times.
The country called the Cienega clearly shows this[,] as at one time it was all a 
swamp and always had three or four feet of water standing in the low places. The 
whole valley was marshy, swampy and covered with tullies [sic]. Now that the water 
has been kept out of there to a certain extent and the valley drained, people do not 
suspect that it is subject to floods.
The floods last year did a great deal of damage and in some cases people have 
blamed the railroads for some of the conditions, as the bridges held up the water 
until it flooded everything above them. The bridge or embankment would break and 
let a deluge of water down on the people below. Such was the case with the Laguna 
people last year. They are thoroughly sore about it. . . .
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Mr. Jose Ruiz, Abila, P. O. at Watts.
Mr. Ruiz was seen at his home this P.M., Sept. 3, by F. Z. Lee. He is familiar with many 
of the events of the past sixty years, having come here from Santa Barbara when a 
child of three months with his family. He is now 68 years old.
When his father settled in the valley there were only four or five ranchers be-
tween Los Angeles and San Pedro. The land was covered with a heavy growth of 
blackberries, batamotes, willows, tullies, etc. There were marshes and lakes in several 
places around Watts and Compton. There were trails across the valley and between 
the ranches. Along the washes where the water stood or ran at times, the growth of 
willows and blackberries were especially dense. A man on horseback could scarcely 
get through.
In the early days, the old people used to say that the Los Angeles river flowed out 
through the southwest of Los Angeles and into the Ballona. The Cienega and Nig-
ger Slough were low marshy places until only recent years[,] when efforts have been 
made to drain the country and to keep out the floods.
When he came here the Los Angeles river ran to the west of his place, and on 
down by the Dominguez hill. Later the river changed and flowed about a mile east of 
his place and again changed over as far as Tweedy.
His father has told him that he saw the valley from Boyle Heights to the Plaza 
one solid sheet of water. Mr. Ruiz has on his place some boulders, about the size 
of three-quarters of a cubic foot which came from a cellar dug by the Reyes family 
when their home was at 7th and Main. And just below the Reyes home, Mr. Reyes 
says there was a bluff fifteen to twenty feet high. Again, at about Alameda and Aliso 
St., he says there were high bluffs.
The 1889 flood covered the whole country and was impassable for several weeks. 
The rains set in and did not let up for about twenty days in one stretch. No one 
thought much of the floods in those days as they would only cover the ground and 
not wash to amount to anything.
Later when there was so much farming there[,] it began to wash more, and had 
there been as much rain last winter there would have been much greater damage. 
Some day big floods will come and then people will really be flooded. Nearly all 
the old people are gone who could tell about the floods in the early times. The 
young people do not care about these things, only spending the money coming 
off their land.
Mr. S. B. Reeve, Civil Engineer & Surveyor, 844 Title Ins. Bldg.
Mr. Reeve was seen at his office this afternoon, Sept. 1, 1914, by F. Z. Lee. He has been 
in Los Angeles County since 1878 and has been a close observer of the floods. . . .
When the first big aviation meet was held at Dominguez Field [in 1910], Mr. 
Reeve was chief engineer of the fields. He had a great deal of work to do in February. 
It had been raining a great deal and he was uneasy that he would not get the work 
completed. On one Sunday he had rushed his men out there to do some work and[,] 
along about noon[,] noticed the flood of water that was then coming down the valley. 
It spread out so much and looked as though there would be difficulty getting back to 
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town[,] so he called his men off and caught an electric car to the city, which proved 
to be the last one in that day. The whole valley was one mass of water. . . .
Mr. Joseph Mesmer, 200 Franklin St.
Mr. Mesmer was seen at his office in the Jeffersonian this afternoon, September 8th, 
by F. Z. Lee. He has lived in Los Angeles since 1859 and from the nature of his father’s 
business[,] which was that of a baker, and his connection with it delivering bread all 
over the “pueblo” at that time, many things are very vivid to him.
The first flood in Mr. Mesmer’s time was that of 1860–61. This flood did little 
damage, but was remembered for the large amount of water that fall. The next flood 
and the largest of all, but not the most distinctive, was that of 1862–3.
During the winter there was a period of incessant rain, and on only one or two 
occasions was the sun seen and that for only a short time. The wet weather became 
so monotonous that on one occasion about a dozen men about town started out on 
a jamboree to drive “dull care away” by going about from hotel to hotel and from bar 
to bar, drinking and creating whatever fun they could. . . .
Mr. J. R. Ramirez, 812 N. Broadway.
Mr. Ramirez was seen this afternoon, Sept. 24, 1914, by F. Z. Lee, at his home.
Mr. Ramirez was born in Los Angeles in 1839. His great, great grandfather came 
to Los Angeles in 1786,—he thinks—and the descendants have lived on the old home 
place ever since. At the old home was made the first wine and brandy in Los Angeles.
In those early days up to 1825 the river flowed along San Fernando St. which is 
just below North Broadway at this point. In 1825, the floods were the greatest in the 
past 100 years. This flood filled the whole Los Angeles river valley from the bank be-
tween North Broadway and San Fernando Sts. to the S.P.R.R. yards on the other side 
of the river. This flood changed the course of the Los Angeles river eastward from 
its old bank, along Main St. to somewhere near Alameda St. Its entire course was 
changed to the south side of the city. The river flowed out through the Ballona Creek 
before this flood, but after this time it passed near the foot of the hills at Dominguez, 
and into San Pedro Bay.
There were other floods but none like that of 1825. There were big floods in 
1832–42–49–52–59 and 62. The flood of 1862 was the largest since that of 1825.
In 1849 the river again changed its course from near Alameda St. further east-
ward to perhaps near its present location. It could change very easily anywhere[,] 
for there were very low banks and there was nothing to keep the water from going 
anywhere. The land was all swampy from Los Angeles to the sea. In the San Fernando 
valley there was a great marsh where the Lankershim ranch now is. There were few 
trees, some few Alamos and some willow. . . .
Mr. J. Frank Burns, 4315 Burns Ave., Los Angeles.
Mr. Burns was seen at Ball’s Cigar Store this noon, Sept. 25, 1914, by F. Z. Lee. He 
came to this part of the country settling in the San Gabriel valley in February 1853, 
where he lived until 1860 when he moved to Los Angeles. He has lived here ever 
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since with the exception of five years when he was back east. The flood of 1884 came 
during this period and he therefore did not see it. . . .
Mr. Burns talked to the old people of those days, one of whom was old man Pico, 
who was 93 years old at that time, but died eight or nine years ago. Another witness 
was 137 years old at that time. Both of these men told him that the Los Angeles river 
up to 1825 flowed along the high bank just east of Main St. down to about 17th St. 
and thence southwesterly into the Cienega and from there into the Ballona Creek 
and into Ballona Bay. . . .
The flood of 1889 came on Christmas day[,] when the greatest damage was done. 
Mr. Burns remembers this for he went down to help and did not get away for three 
days and nights. This flood carried out bridges and washed away the railroads and 
immense damage to the whole country. The Los Angeles river changed to the east-
ward below the city limits, broke into the Laguna ranch and joined with the San 
Gabriel river. The whole country was covered with water.
They should build dams to hold the flood water and build ditches along the hill-
sides to catch the water as it comes down the side. . . .
Romola Pico, 777 W. 16th St., Los Angeles.
Was seen at his home, 777 W. 16th St., Los Angeles, Sept. 22, 1914, by R. A. Borthick.
Says he went to San Fernando in 1859 when he was twelve years old[,] and lived 
and farmed in that section until about 1900. The first big flood he remembers was 
about 1861 or 1862 and there were very heavy and long rains[;] but he don’t remem-
ber what section was under water in that flood. In 1867 and 1884 there were heavy 
floods and the country was overflowed much worse than in 1914. The section in 
through where Van Nuys and Lankershim is was badly flooded in 1884.
When the S.P.R.R. built their railroad they ran a dam or dyke from where they left 
their opening for the Tujunga waters, which is where the bridge on the San Fernando 
road closes [sic] to the town of San Fernando is, up to the point of hills to catch all 
the waters of both the Tujunga canyons and keep it from going down toward Rosco. 
Most of the dyke was washed out in the 1884 flood, but there is a part of it left. There 
was a mile or two of track washed out on the S.P. in 1884. The country was so wet in 
1884 that a great deal of the grain could not be harvested in the valley.
Mrs. Lopez, San Fernando, Cal.
Was seen at her home in San Fernando October 5th, 1914, by R.  A. Borthick. 
Mrs. J. T. Wilson, Mrs. Lopez’ daughter[,] acting as interpreter.
Mrs. Lopez was born in Los Angeles in 1831, and came to San Fernando 63 years 
ago when she was married, on her wedding trip, and has been here ever since. She 
and her husband lived in an adobe house, which stood where the dam of the San 
Fernando aqueduct reservoir is now, and which was torn down to build the dam. She 
says the Wilson Canyon used to come down about where the S. P. pumping plant is[,] 
and on down and empty into the Mission reservoir, which was just a little piece above 
the Old Mission[;] and it was a live stream, and the Fathers used to store the water to 
irrigate with, and for domestic purposes for the mission.
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In flood times, or heavy rains, the flood water would go out and overflow and 
spread over the flat section below the Mission, but there was no wash below the Mis-
sion[;] water just spread over the ground, and did no cutting. She says the Mission 
Fathers used to have a ditch from the Pacoima that led over to the Mission Reservoir, 
and they used to wash and scrub out the reservoir after a flood. In big rains or flood 
times there would be lots of trash and mud come down from Wilson’s Canyon and 
fill the reservoir, so they dug a ditch from the Pacoima so they would have plenty of 
water. . . .
In 1858–9 there was a very big flood. She remembers the date and flood very well, 
because she went to Los Angeles to a christening, and looked the date up in the Fam-
ily Bible, and it was between January and February, 1859. Her husband had just had 
a new carriage made that cost $300, and she was very much afraid they were going to 
lose it in crossing some of the streams. She says it rained for twenty days, and it was 
two weeks before they could get out of Los Angeles, and then they would not have 
tried it if they had not left some of their children at home, and were very anxious 
about them. She says there were several adobe houses just north of Cahuenga Pass 
that melted down and washed away in 1859. . . .
.  .  . Mrs. John T. Wilson says she drove from San Fernando to Los Angeles in 
1884[;] and it seemed to her they were in water very nearly all the way from San 
Fernando, until they got across the Los Angeles River, and all down through the flat 
country where Van Nuys and Lankershim is[,] was a regular lake. She was going to 
Pomona, and was held up at El Monte—the bridge was washed out.
Mr. J. J. Morton, R.F.D. #1, Box 16, Compton, Cal.
Mr. Morton was seen at his home, October 9th, 1914, by R. A. Borthick. Lives on 
Main Street in Compton, between Long Beach Blvd. and Gibson St., on North side 
of Main St. Came to Compton in 1867 and has lived there ever since. Was elected 
Supervisor in 1876 and served to 1880. . . .
He says the 1867 flood formed a lake covering several hundred acres of land at 
least a mile and a half square, above and between Gardena and Los Angeles on the 
old Amstoy Place, and was known as the Amstoy Lake[;] and he thought [it] would 
always be there, but [it] disappeared, he does not know just when, but was there 
several years. . . .
In the early days of his time all of Watts and Willows were swamps, sloughs and 
tullies, and where the black soil in Watts is was a tullie and peat bed. He says some 
people used to cut and dry that soil and burn it. It afterwards dried out and they 
burned it off and cultivated it. . . .
He says when the big water came in December 24, 1867, it came in a rush and 
looked like a wall two or three feet high; the country was covered with mustard 
patches which a man could hardly walk through—higher than a man’s head[;] and 
the waters gathered that and brush, and he claims thousands of snakes, squirrels and 
rabbits, and the next day the bed of the stream was practically level with the rest of 
the country[;] and the brush, mustard and sand went down to Rattlesnake Island, and 
filled up thousands of acres of sloughs, and connected the island with the main land.
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He says they went up above Compton and tried to turn the water back into the 
old channel, but could not do so. . . .
He says the people imported a lot of carp about 1878 or 1879[,] and everybody 
that had a lake or pond got some carp and stocked them up and in 1889 was over-
flowed[;] and their ponds washed out and their fish were carried down to Nigger 
Slough[,] and when Nigger Slough began drying up some years later, the fish com-
menced dying and made such a stench the supervisors had to hire men to clean them 
up and burn and bury them. . . .
In 1876 there was a bad flood. The water was so deep between his place and 
Compton or near Long Beach Blvd. that he had to put his feet up on the neck of the 
horses to keep them out of water. That flood was particularly bad in the section of 
the country near Lugo and a part of what is now Linwood [sic], and a portion of the 
Tweedy ranch.
Mr. Morton thinks the whole section around Compton that has been overflowed, 
and the most of it has been overflowed at one time or another since he has been here, 
has been filled from two to four feet. He says in 1867–76–84 and 89 the whole section 
of Compton was more or less overflowed, but says there were sections in one year 
that would not be under water and in other years the section that was overflowed 
would be filled up so much it was not covered in the next flood. He says in the 1889 
flood the ground at the schoolhouse at the corner of Main and Gibson Sts. was not 
covered with water[;] and in the 1914 flood the water was about three feet deep.
In the 1914 flood the water got very nearly to Long Beach Blvd. but was very shal-
low, only about eight inches deep at his house[;] and the water was from his house 
east over past Clearwater and as far north as you could see and as far south as you 
could see.
• • •
The planning of the Owens River Aqueduct was hailed by engineers and others 
before and after the aqueduct’s completion. One such story heaping praise on the 
project is this short notice about the Los Angeles engineers’ successful struggle 
with nature in comparison to a similar project in New York. It appeared in Sci-
entific American in November 1913, just days after local celebrations marked the 
completion of the aqueduct.
From “Completion of a Great Engineering Work” (Scientific American 109 [No-
vember 8, 1913]: 38).
“Completion of a Great Engineering Work”
The completion of the Los Angeles aqueduct, as described elsewhere in this issue, 
marks the successful ending of an arduous struggle with nature in its most rugged 
aspects of mountain and desert, and with powerful and subtle private interests for 
the possession of a priceless supply of water. The ten aqueducts of ancient Rome 
were marvels of engineering skill and durability; but their construction stretched 
Figure 31. A scouting party of engineers in Owens Valley, 1903.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
Figure 32. Los Angeles Aqueduct survey team in Owens Valley, 1906–1907.
From the Frank Rolfe Collection of Negatives and Photographs in the Historical Society of Southern California Col-
lection, photCL 400 vol. 12 (13), courtesy of The Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
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over a period of five centuries, against the eight years that have lapsed since the Los 
Angeles aqueduct was first proposed, and the length and dimensions of the ancient 
Roman aqueducts bear no comparison with that of modern Los Angeles. The longest 
of the Roman aqueducts was 62 miles, while the Los Angeles aqueduct is 254 miles 
in length, from the intake on Owens River to the city limits of Los Angeles. The ir-
rigation aqueducts of the Inca Indians of ancient Peru, one of which was 360 miles 
long, are among the wonders of the world, especially so when it is considered that 
they were constructed by a people uninformed as to modern engineering science 
and its methods, but these probably exhausted centuries of time. The 350 miles of 
iron pipe line, 30 inches in diameter, which conveys water across the arid plains of 
western Australia to the gold mining districts of Kalgoorlie and Coolgardie, is one 
of the triumphs of modern constructive hydraulic engineering; but this construc-
tion, although in a hot and waterless country, was comparatively level, while the Los 
Angeles aqueduct bores through miles of mountains of solid rock, crosses valleys on 
pillars of concrete in some places, and through huge steel siphons in others, and is of 
far greater dimensions than the notable Australian structure.
The great Ashokan aqueduct to supply the city of New York, now in course of 
construction, is the only modern hydraulic enterprise intended mainly for domestic 
and industrial use, that compares fairly with the Los Angeles aqueduct. The New 
York aqueduct crosses the Hudson over a thousand feet beneath the river bed, and 
it will furnish the metropolis with 500,000,000 gallons daily at a cost, including its 
various reservoirs, of about $165,000,000. The Los Angeles aqueduct has not much 
more than half the capacity, it is true; but it is about twice as long, passes through an 
incomparably rougher country, and its cost, when completed, will be less than one 
fifth that of the great New York enterprise.
• • •
Critics of the planning of the Boulder Dam charged that there were a number of 
deficiencies in the planning process; many of these charges, however, were based 
to some degree on the agenda of the critic. In this excerpt from a 1927 booklet 
printed by the National Utilities Association, author Frank Bohn summarizes the 
major points of criticism from a private-enterprise perspective in criticizing the 
early plans of engineers working for government agencies. The argument reveals 
disagreement among engineers concerning the present plan for the project; some 
of the details would change as the plans progressed.
From “The Engineering for this Project is Wholly Inadequate,” in The  Boulder 
 Canyon Dam: The Essence of the Swing-Johnson Bill, ed. Frank Bohn ([n.p.: 
 National Utilities Association, 1927], 17–18, held by Special Collections, Claremont 
Colleges Library, Claremont, CA).
“The Engineering for this Project is Wholly Inadequate”
Proponents of the Swing-Johnson bill often represent that no project ever came 
 before Congress so well supported by authoritative engineering; that the plan for 
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this high dam at Boulder Canyon is the result of the “composite” engineering stud-
ies of many leading engineers who have examined and reported upon the plan. The 
engineers most frequently alluded to in these representations are F. E. Weymouth, 
and other engineers of the Reclamation Service—a board of six Government engi-
neers appointed by Secretary Work; engineers employed by the Los Angeles Bureau 
of Power and Light, Gen. George W. Goethals and Secretary Herbert Hoover.
An analysis of the facts reveals that these representations are grossly misleading, 
and that the facts are:
First: The engineering plan for this proposed dam at Boulder Canyon, and the 
estimates of cost and time required[,] are endorsed only by engineers of the U.S. 
Reclamation Service and in part supported by engineers of the Los Angeles Bureau 
of Power and Light. All of these engineers are employees of “interested parties.” Cost 
estimates by Reclamation Service engineers admittedly are usually too low, and 
 experience shows they are often only one-half or one-fourth of what they should be.
Second: The Board of six Government engineers appointed by Secretary Work did 
not recommend the construction of the dam proposed in this bill, and were only able 
to agree that as a part of a plan for development of the Colorado, a dam at or near 
Boulder Canyon of some height should be constructed at some time. They further 
strongly indicated the advisability of investigation of an alternative site—the one at 
Topock in Mohave Canyon.
Third: Two of these six engineers appointed by Secretary Work, one the chief 
engineer of the Federal Power Commission, the other representing the Geological 
Survey, criticized essential parts of the “high dam” scheme. One of these engineers 
definitely condemned it; the other pointed out that the outstanding fact was that 
insufficient data was available from which to arrive at any definite plan.
Fourth: Neither Gen. Goethals nor Secretary Hoover has examined the engineer-
ing plans or attempted to pass upon the estimates. Secretary Hoover has expressed 
approval of the general plan to construct a high dam, but has not attempted to pass 
upon the engineering. Gen. Goethals has suggested the advisability of another kind 
of dam and expressed doubt as to the strength of a masonry dam such as is proposed. 
He expressly stated that he had not examined the cost estimates. He therefore not 
only has not passed upon the engineering for this dam, but has advocated the con-
struction of an entirely different kind of dam.
Fifth: Secretary Work, in submitting the Reclamation Service’s plan for a high 
dam at Boulder Canyon, suggested to Congress the necessity for further study before 
appropriating Government funds for an undertaking of such magnitude.
Sixth: The only further study made of the Colorado development problem since 
the submission of the Reclamation Service’s report to the Congress was made by 
the Geological Survey, which in 1925 published as Water Supply Paper 556, a full 
and careful study of the lower Colorado River and submitted a plan of development 
which did not include the high dam at Boulder Canyon. The chief author of that 
report, Mr. E. C. La Rue, Engineer of the Geological Survey, who has spent fifteen 
years studying the river and possible damsites thereon, and who admittedly knows 
the river better than any other living man, condemns the plan for the dam proposed 
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in the Swing-Johnson bill, and does not recommend the building of any dam in 
Boulder Canyon.
• • •
The major civic and business organizations in the region generally approved of 
the overall planning of the Colorado River Aqueduct, believing that it would un-
questionably spur population and economic growth. But concerns over the future 
population and water usage estimates used by the planners were brought up by 
civic leaders and some public officials as a threat to prosperity, especially during 
the Great Depression. One such criticism was raised by Los Angeles city council-
man Roy Donley in 1933. In this short excerpt from Donley’s sensational “Does the 
Colorado River Aqueduct Mean Economic Suicide for the City of Los Angeles?” 
he argues that the inflated estimates that would help win approval of the project 
would result in much higher property taxes that city residents would have to pay 
to finance water that would be used by others in the district. As it turned out, An-
gelenos would not need that water for some time to come.
From Roy Donley, “Does the Colorado River Aqueduct Mean Economic 
 Suicide for the City of Los Angeles?” (typescript, c. 1933, 15–16, Box 1, A. L. 
Sonderegger Papers, held by Special Collections, Claremont Colleges Library, 
Claremont, CA).
The engineers have accepted the figure of 2,500,000 as the present population of the 
Metropolitan Area, one half of this population being within the City of Los Angeles, 
and one half comprising the balance of the District. When the population of the 
District reaches the 3,000,000 mark, the population of the City will have increased 
250,000 and the outside area an equal amount. There will then be required 50 CFS 
[cubic feet per second] of water for the City and 50 CFS for the outside area. The City 
will not need this 50 CFS because we already have that water available from our Inyo 
and Mono Counties’ supply. The annual operating cost at that time will amount to 
$5,080,000.00. The annual sales to member cities ($0.04 per 100 cu. Ft.), will return a 
revenue of $630,000.00, leaving an annual operating deficit of $4,450,000.00. The an-
nual fixed charges will approximate $11,000,000.00, making the net annual charge to 
member cities $15,450,000.00. The share which the City of Los Angeles will have to 
absorb will be $10,800,000.00[,] and a little figuring shows you that this will increase 
the annual tax rate of the City of Los Angeles 72 cents. How can you reconcile that 
with the cry for tax reduction? What effect do you think that will have on industries 
which may be inclined to locate with us? Do you believe that this city can continue 
to progress with such a staggering burden on its real estate?
Not until the population of the Metropolitan area reaches the figure of 5,000,000 
souls will we ever need a drop of water from the Colorado River. Not until the City 
of Los Angeles has increased its population 1,250,000 over what it now has, will it 
be necessary to use more water than is now available in Inyo and Mono basins, but 
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in the meantime we are paying 70 per cent of the cost, to provide water for the area 
outside the city.
We are packing an unnecessary and dangerous load until 1960 and for no good 
reason. Isn’t it time to stop, look and listen? Isn’t it time to review the entire matter, 
lest we awaken too late to avert economic disaster?
• • •
Engineers of water projects were hailed when the projects proved successful. In-
deed William Mulholland, chief engineer for the city’s water department, became a 
local hero when he completed the Owens River Aqueduct on time and under bud-
get. With this engineering feat to his credit, he was prodded to run for mayor of 
the city in 1913. He refused. He then moved on to become a leader in the quest for 
more water, this time from the Colorado River. Mulholland received many glow-
ing tributes in engineering publications in the 1920s and 1930s. This one, which 
appeared in Western Construction News and Highways Builder in 1933, traces the 
life and career of this “man of history and the maker of Los Angeles.” There is no 
mention of the catastrophic 1928 failure of Mulholland’s St. Francis Dam, a disaster 
that claimed about four hundred lives.
From “William Mulholland—Maker of Los Angeles—Pioneer in Southern Cali-
fornia’s Ceaseless Quest for Water—His Energy and Vision Have Made Possible 
the Colorado River Aqueduct” (Western Construction News and Highways Builder 8 
[August 1933]: 330).
About fifty years ago “Bill” Mulholland camped near Upper Parker damsite, built a 
raft, and floated down Colorado river. Shortly after this he arrived in the little village 
of Los Angeles. Twenty years later, as the head of the fast-growing Los Angeles Water 
Department, he turned to the High Sierra in the eternal search for water—life’s blood 
of the great Southwest. Hitching a pair of mules to a buckboard he sought—and 
found—in the shadow of Mt. Whitney in the Owens valley what then seemed to be 
an ample supply for several decades of progress in his rising metropolis.
In the ten years beginning in 1908 Mulholland overcame a succession of tre-
mendous obstacles to complete, within his original estimate of $24,500,000, the 430 
c.f.s. aqueduct extending 275 mi. from Owens valley to Los Angeles. That aqueduct 
stands today as one of the great hydraulic feats of the new century and has given effi-
cient service since November 5, 1913, when Mulholland turned to his fellow Los An-
gelans gathered in San Fernando valley for the opening ceremonies and said, simply, 
“There it is—take it!” Thus on a highly dramatic occasion and with typical modesty 
he opened an era of unbounded growth along the south-coastal plain of California.
Demands on the Owens valley aqueduct and the city of Los Angeles’ San Fernan-
do valley well field as early as 1923 indicated to the visionary Mulholland [the] need 
for a large and dependable additional water supply. Turning again to Colorado river, 
scene of his investigations of 40 years before, he began surveys of the vast region 
Harnessing the Rivers    109
bounded by Boulder canyon on the north, Colorado river on the east, the Mexican 
border on the south, and the coastal plain on the west.
In December 1928 the Metropolitan Water District of Southern California was 
established and took over all engineering in connection with the Colorado River 
aqueduct. Frank E. Weymouth was made chief engineer of the district and under 
his direction the complex engineering studies on aqueduct location and design were 
carried forward. More than 50,000 sq. mi. of territory was surveyed and subjected 
to the most careful engineering and geological studies in the work of selecting the 
best, safest, and most economical aqueduct route. These studies, in 1930, led to Wey-
mouth’s recommendation that the aqueduct be constructed along the Parker route, 
with its intake above Upper Parker damsite, 16 mi. north of the little Arizona town 
of Parker. His recommendation was approved by a board of consulting engineers 
in the fall of 1930, and within a year the thirteen member cities of the district had 
Figure 33. Los Angeles Water Department chief engineer William Mulholland.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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voted a $220,000,000 bond issue for constructing the greatest hydraulic project in 
the known world.
William Mulholland was born in Belfast, Ireland, September 11, 1855, and edu-
cated at the Christian Brothers School, Dublin. At 15, with his brother, he answered 
the call of the sea and shipped 4 years before the mast. Eventually he landed at San 
Francisco—keen for adventure in America’s land of promise. At 21 he bought a horse 
which carried him to southern California.
Destiny had determined that Bill Mulholland’s career should be in hydraulics. 
His first job in Los Angeles was boring wells. He soon became superintendent of the 
water system of what was to become the west’s largest city. In the next half-century in 
this capacity his sound judgment, unfailing sense of humor, and keen vision brought 
him well-earned recognition as a man of history and the maker of Los Angeles.
Three months ago, when the Colorado river aqueduct progress celebration was 
held at Cabazon to mark official commencement of construction, Mulholland spoke 
in these words to a friend and former employe: “I don’t know whether I’m happy or 
sad. I’m the only one left of the old-timers who was instrumental in this project.”
• • •
One component of the Owens River Aqueduct system was the St. Francis Dam, a 
180-foot storage facility located about forty miles north of the city. William Mul-
holland had supervised the construction of the dam and deemed it safe when it 
was first filled in March 1928. On March 12 it collapsed, sending a flood of water 
to the Pacific Ocean. At least four hundred people were killed in the deluge, and 
property damage was in the many millions of dollars. Mulholland was held re-
sponsible for the catastrophe in the several resulting investigations. One of them 
was the Los Angeles County Coroner’s jury inquiry, with its conclusions and rec-
ommendations printed below. In later jury testimony, a guilt-ridden Mulholland 
concluded (oddly) that “the only ones I envy about this thing are the ones who 
are dead.”
From Los Angeles County Coroner, “Transcript of Testimony and Verdict of the 
Coroner’s Jury in the Inquest over Victims of St. Francis Dam Disaster” (Case 
26901, filed June 4, 1928, 2–5, Box 14, Richard Courtney Collection, Huntington 
Library, San Marino, CA).
Conclusions:
After carefully weighing all of the evidence, that has been presented, we have reached 
the following conclusions:
1st. The St. Francis Dam was defective due to the very poor quality of the underly-
ing rock structure upon which it was built and to the fact that the design of the dam 
was not suited to inferior foundation conditions. The actual failure was caused either 
wholly or in part by these defects.
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2nd. The construction of this dam, without having the design and foundation 
conditions passed upon by independent engineers and geologists, and without more 
thorough and systematic methods of design, supervision and inspection, involved 
two basic errors.
One of these was an error in engineering judgment in determining the character 
of the foundations at the St. Francis Dam site and deciding upon the best type of dam 
to build there,
The other was an error in regard to fundamental policy relating to public safety.
The responsibility for the error in engineering judgment rests upon the Bureau of 
Water Works and Supply, and the Chief Engineer thereof.
The responsibility for the error in public policy belongs to those to whom the 
Chief Engineer is subservient, including the Department of Water and Power com-
missioners, the legislative bodies of city and state, and to the public at large. It is a 
logical result of a set of conditions that the citizenship has allowed to develop and 
continue. This is the more fundamental error, for if proper safeguards had been pro-
vided in the city charter and in the state laws, making it impossible for excessive re-
sponsibility to be delegated to or assumed by any one individual in matters involving 
Figure 34. The last standing section of the St. Francis Dam in 1928.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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great menaces to public safety, it is unlikely that the engineering error would have 
escaped detection and produced a great disaster.
A sound policy of public safety and business and engineering judgment demands 
that the construction and operation of a great dam should never be left to the sole 
judgment of one man, no matter how eminent, without check by independent expert 
authority, for no one is free from error, and checking by independent experts will 
eliminate the effect of human error and insure safety.
The exemption of municipalities from supervision by state authorities in the 
building of dams involving public hazards is a very serious defect of the state law 
that should be corrected.
Recommendations
We respectfully recommend:
That the regulations governing the conduct of all municipal and county bodies 
engaged in building and operating dams be revised so that the construction and 
operation of all such dams will be subject to review by competent experts in addition 
to the regular executive engineering organization of the respective public bodies. It 
should not be left to the discretion of the Chief Engineer of such a body to submit 
such matters to experts, but should be mandatory upon the highest executive author-
ity to employ thoroughly competent consultants that will not be subservient to the 
Chief Engineer.
That steps be taken to the end that all existing dams be thoroughly examined 
as to their safety by a board or boards of outstanding experts on the construction 
of dams.
That steps be taken to change the state law so as to place the building of municipal 
and county, as well as privately owned[,] dams under the jurisdiction of the state 
authorities.
The intent and effect of these measures would be to have three independent 
groups of experts pass judgment upon the design, construction and operations of 
dams and other structures which might involve hazards to public safety.
We, the jury, find no evidence of criminal act or intent on the part of the Board of 
Water Works and Supply of the City of Los Angeles, or any engineer or employee in 
the construction or operation of the St. Francis Dam, and we recommend that there 
be no criminal prosecution of any of the above by the District Attorney.
• • •
The St. Francis Dam failure served as a wake-up call for engineers to take a critical 
look at future dam construction plans. One engineer, M. H. Gerry of San Fran-
cisco, took another look at the plans for Boulder Dam (also called Hoover Dam 
by 1930) and was convinced that it was unsafe, that its proposed foundation was 
faulty. In an article in Civil Engineering in July 1931, he compared its planning to 
that of the St. Francis Dam, a recipe for disaster. This summary of Gerry’s article 
appeared in the Denver Post in July 1931, along with a response from U.S. Bureau of 
Reclamation chief Elwood Mead.
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From M. H. Gerry report on the safety of the Boulder Dam, as reported in Howard 
Blakeslee, “Hoover Dam Will Not Be Safe, Predicts California Engineer” (Denver 
Post, July 11, 1931 [Used with permission of The Associated Press Copyright © 2015. 
All rights reserved.]).
“Hoover Dam Will Not Be Safe, Predicts California Engineer Says 
Faulty Foundation May Result in Disaster
Critic Compares Blueprints With Those Used in Construction of St. 
Francis Dam, Which Collapsed Three Years Ago.”
New York, July 11—Safety of the Hoover dam is questioned—is said to risk repeti-
tion of the St. Francis dam disaster—in the July issue of Civil Engineering, official 
publication of the American Society of Civil Engineers. The writer is M. H. Gerry Jr., 
a consulting engineer of San Francisco, and member of the society.
Hoover Dam, 727 feet high, the greatest hydraulic structure ever undertaken, still 
is in the blue print stage, but the design has been selected and the contract let, and 
the safety questions are raised about this design. The danger is said to be due to the 
rock upon which the dam will rest rather than in the structure itself.
Figure 35. Hoover Dam (originally Boulder Dam) under construction, 1934.
Courtesy of the University of Southern California, on behalf of the USC Libraries.
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This risk, the article claims, can be wiped out for an additional expense of 
5  million dollars or less.
“It should not be forgotten,” says the writer, “that three years ago the St. Francis 
dam, built by the city of Los Angeles, did fail, and without the slightest warning. Even 
a cursory examination of the plans now proposed will convince engineers that the 
Hoover dam is designed in accordance with the same school of thought and on all 
other similar lines.
“Like the St. Francis dam, it is deficient in gravity section when uplift is considered; 
it is curved in plan, on the same radius; and it is designed on the same general theory 
that some concurrent arch action will take place and thus overcome the limitations of 
the section—a theory widely disputed by engineers.”
The statement, “deficient in gravity section when uplift is considered,” means the 
dam’s weight is insufficient to keep it from sliding with the weight of water pushing 
it from behind. The “uplift” is [the] upward push of water seeping under the dam, a 
push of tremendous power when the water is deep behind the dam.
• • •
Although the St. Francis Dam disaster cast a short-lived pall on dam construction, 
by late 1928 planning for the Boulder Dam passed the scrutiny of many engineers. 
One such group was a federal board of review appointed to analyze the design and 
construction features. These engineers approved the project as safe and  feasible 
based on contemporary principles of engineering. Their report is described in 
 Engineering News-Record in 1928.
From “The Boulder Dam Report” (Engineering News-Record 101 [December 13, 
1928]: 868–869).
“The Boulder Dam Report”
Public service of unusually high type is reflected in the report of the Engineering 
Board of Review on the Boulder dam project. Responding fully, sanely and unequiv-
ocally to the queries placed before it, the report answers the major doubts with which 
Congress and the general citizen were disturbed last spring in the discussion of this 
contentious issue. It illuminates many points in which the main issue has been ob-
scured. It accomplishes these things by means of broad and wise treatment of the 
subject—and herein the report is distinguished. All too often the work of a board 
or a committee exhibits less wisdom than is possessed by its individual members; in 
the present instance the excellence of the results embodies the conjoined wisdom of 
the group.
What does the board set forth? It gives full answer to four major questions.
First, it declares that the proposed 550-foot dam is feasible, is capable of being 
safely and readily built. Last spring, it will be recalled, suspicion was cast upon the 
feasibility of this great structure: at a time when bitter opposition was being centered 
upon the project on the score of power and of Arizona royalty claims, the failure 
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of the St. Francis dam served as [the] basis for intimations that the proposed dam 
would not be safe, since, apparently no dams were safe. The report states positively 
that it is safe, whether placed in Boulder Canyon or in Black Canyon. The board 
takes an extreme attitude of conservatism in its comment on the design, and this 
cannot reasonably be criticized, for in a work of such character and magnitude it is 
indeed wise to purchase extra insurance. . . .
Second, it finds that the project will be effective to carry out the specific combina-
tion of purposes for which it was devised—namely, flood control, silt removal, flow 
equalization for most efficient water supply, and power generation. Here also impor-
tant doubts were at issue, having been raised by many claims, based on small-scale 
facts and interpretations, that the combination of hydraulic functions is not practi-
cable. Therefore, the clear-cut judgment expressed by the board is highly valuable. 
Here again a most conservative attitude is taken. The board rates the total flow lower, 
and the possible flood flow higher, than heretofore estimated—a sound procedure in 
a review by an appellate tribunal of a stream having such limited records and such 
picturesquely varied phenomena as the Colorado. The board’s figures may not be 
nearer right than those previously calculated, but they are on the safe side.
Third, it concludes that the canal into the Imperial Valley can be built and main-
tained successfully, contrary to what had been claimed by many critics.
Fourth, it holds that the power byproduct of the dam is needed and is valuable, 
and that the project will pay, after due deduction (which, as we understand the past 
proceedings, has previously been contemplated) of flood-protection charges and the 
cost of the Imperial Valley canal. Significant and unreserved is the board’s statement 
that the near-by territory has a power demand large enough to absorb the output 
of the project. This verdict sweeps away most of the background of the antagonism 
displayed by some of the utility interests—though the most farseeing have long 
 appraised the situation in a more progressive light.
Several auxiliary questions are also disposed of by the report, but these four 
are of outstanding moment. They are sufficient to strip the project of much of the 
doubt in which it has been veiled and to place the central issue fully and fairly 
before Congress.
The board confined itself to the questions which it was instructed to answer, and 
therefore it did not touch many of the sore points of the Boulder dam case. But it is 
for Congress to decide whether this great, costly and far-reaching enterprise of con-
trolling a menacingly wild river for the protection and development of the Southwest 
is a proper and desirable national function; to decide, among other things, whether 
the Colorado River compact is a secure basis for the utilization of the water; to de-
termine how the inevitable involvement of power production in the project shall be 
dealt with; whether the Imperial Valley canal is a constructive method of improving 
the dangerous status of water supply on the Mexican border; whether it is best to al-
lot the stored water by states or to leave it subject to established doctrine of beneficial 
appropriation under the remarkable circumstances surrounding the use of the lower 
Colorado; and whether the insistent claims of Arizona for power royalties ought to 
be recognized.
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These and related questions were not before the board, and they would have been 
dangerous obstacles to a clear and firm disposal of the question specifically placed 
before it. That the board kept its studies and judgment free of these complications is 




And at last the drop that fell like a snowflake upon the Sierra’s crest and set 
out to find its home in the sea, shall be taken up from beneath the ground 
by a thirsty rootlet and distilled into the perfume of an orange blossom in a 
garden of the City of the Queen of the Angels.
—Allen Kelly, 1916
All of these large water development projects took a toll on the rivers and their 
watersheds as natural features were sacrificed for the greater good.
The treatment of the Los Angeles River by nearby residents has always been less 
than sympathetic. Used for drinking, bathing, and dumping over centuries, it has 
been polluted and cut into by irrigation and drainage ditches. Pollution has been 
addressed by municipal ordinances that have not always been effective. Frustra-
tion at the river’s periodic and occasionally ferocious flooding spurred the city to 
try the Pyrrhic remedy of lining the riverbed with concrete to speed the water to 
the ocean; it also carried pollution and debris, which was then deposited at the 
mouth of the river, at the Port of Los Angeles. Lining of the river undoubtedly 
altered its ecology, as did the harbor complex at its mouth. Only in recent years 
have concerted restoration and revitalization efforts imagined a different river, a 
different riparian future.
The Owens River Aqueduct transferred so much water to Los Angeles from 
Owens Lake that the latter reverted to a saline bed with its drainage area battered 
by windy salt storms. Conflicts between Inyo County and Mono County residents 
and environmentalists and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power con-
tinue today.
Ecological changes to flora and fauna as a result of the construction of Boulder 
Dam and the Colorado River Aqueduct became evident years after the completion 
of Boulder Dam. Both the additional water taken by the seven states for further 
development in the later twentieth century and climate change have depleted a sig-
nificant amount of its supply. Concern about taking any more of it is still a major 
issue among the states and Mexico.
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• • •
City officials and residents have long noted that the Los Angeles River is an easy 
target for abuse. Los Angeles archival records contain many reports by city officials 
documenting the trashing of the river by residents and businesses. One of them is 
this request by the city’s park commissioners in 1912 for the city council members 
to view the “unsightly” condition of the river as it appears to visitors and “enforce 
reasonable restrictions” for its protection.
From “Report of Los Angeles City Park Commission” (Los Angeles City Council 
Minutes, February 13, 1912, 87:263–264, Los Angeles City Records Center).
The Park Commissioners reported:—
At a meeting of the Board of Park Commissioners held Monday, February 5th, 
1912, I was directed to advise your honorable body as follows:—The official channel 
of the Los Angeles river extending from the mouth of the Arroyo Seco to the south 
boundary of the City, a distance of approximately four and one-half miles, with a 
width of approximately three hundred feet, cuts through the center of the city and 
is crossed by eleven streets and five railroad bridges. Both banks throughout its of-
ficial course are occupied by railroads; in short it is an extremely prominent physical 
feature of the City for those residing therein, as well as for those entering and passing 
through. Its present condition is unsightly in the extreme; the bulkheads intended 
to restrain floods have either rotted or fallen down; and it is the dumping ground 
for the City. Large gravel pits are being dug, apparently without restraint or order, 
and teams engaged in removing gravel frequently haul back trash and dump it in the 
river bed. Members of the City Council are requested to observe these conditions 
when next in that vicinity. This gravel is the property of the City and is being taken 
in large quantities indiscriminately and as far as we know without permits. So much 
has been taken, that a general lowering of the river bed has resulted, and it has been 
necessary to lower bridge foundations and pipes, at a substantial expense to the City. 
The gravel is being mined in pits. A count has been kept by the Park Department, 
and it has found that an average of six hundred and seventy loads of gravel per day, 
Sundays excepted, is being removed and about twenty seven loads of rubbish per 
day, Sundays, excepted, is being dumped therein. It would be expensive and difficult 
if not impossible, ever to make the river bed a thing of beauty, but it is not necessary 
to have it so ugly and unsanitary.
If the honorable City Council will fix a charge of say ten cents per load for all 
gravel removed and authorize the Park Board to enforce reasonable restrictions for 
its protection, the Board would be pleased to expend the revenue so obtained in the 
parking and improvement of this unsightly back yard of the City. It appears to be a 
plain business proposition, that those who take the gravel should pay enough to keep 
the river bed in order.
• • •
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Complaints to the city council about the condition of the river also include many 
communications from private businesses, organizations, and citizens. This 1926 
letter from the representative of an Eastside homeowner group describes the river 
in his area as a disgraceful dumping ground that needs to be cleaned up.
From C. R. Vesper to Mayor and City Council, Los Angeles (January 26, 1926, File 
984, Box A-274, Los Angeles City Records Center).
To the Honerable [sic] Mayor And
City Council of the City of
Los Angeles California
At a regular meeting of the Board of Directors of the Hollenbeck Heights Improve-
ment Assn. the following Resolution’s [sic] were adopted, And your attention and 
consideration is as, ed [sic] in this important matter.
Whereas; The voting of the City Bonds, The Citizens of the east side were lead to 
believe that with the coming of the aqueduct water supply that the Los Angeles River 
Bed would be Beautified by running water and the plantings of appropriate Plants 
and Shrubery [sic] along its banks.
Whereas The East Side is making rapid strides and is entitled to this improvement 
which will be not only a credit to the whole City but would favorably impress the 
Stranger within our gates.
Therefore Be it Resolved; That we the members of the Board of Directors of the 
Hollenbeck Heights Improvement Assn. Do deplore the present condition of the Los 
Angeles River Bed in its present disgracefull [sic] condition.
Resolved, That this Orgenazation [sic] do hereby request The Honerable [sic] 
Mayor and City Council too [sic] take such steps and employ such means to con-
vert this River Bed into a place of Beauty rather than a Disgracefull [sic] Dumping 
ground and a Weed Patch that it now is.
And Be it Further Resolved That a copy of this resalution [sic] be sent to the 




One of the main responsibilities of the chief engineer of the Los Angeles County 
Flood Control District was to make sure that the river channels were free of ob-
stacles that would back up raging waters and contribute to flooding. In this note, 
chief engineer J. W. Reagan asks the Los Angeles City Council to order dumping 
to be stopped.
From James W. Reagan to Los Angeles City Council (October 7, 1920, Los Angeles 
City Council, File 2606, Box A-121, Los Angeles City Records Center).




A dump of refuse is being made in the channel of the Los Angeles river upon the 
west side and immediately below the Macy Street Bridge. This dump is making a 
rather serious contraction of the channel at this place. It is true that at time of flood 
a portion, or perhaps all of it, will be eroded and carried away, but it is made up of 
such materials as will work a detriment and an injury to our channel below the city.
Respectfully yours,
Jas. W. Reagan
Chief Engineer, Los Angeles
County Flood Control District
• • •
A major report on planning for a parks system in the Los Angeles region by the 
nation’s premier landscape architecture firm, Olmsted Brothers and Bartholomew 
and Associates, in 1930 incorporated flood control drainage for the Los Angeles 
River. Unfortunately, the overall plan commissioned by a private group of civic 
leaders proved to be too costly in the early stages of the Great Depression. How-
ever, it provides an insight into past development practices near the river and of-
fers inspiration for those involved in the river’s restoration.
From Olmsted Brothers and Bartholomew and Associates, Consultants, Parks, 
Playgrounds and Beaches for the Los Angeles Region: A Report Submitted to the 
Citizens’ Committee on Parks, Playgrounds and Beaches by Olmsted Brothers and 
Bartholomew and Associates, Consultants ([Los Angeles: 1930], 14–16, 124–125).
parks and the drainage problem
To the experienced eye, the slopes of the land show approximately where water must 
concentrate in times of heavy rainfall. No matter how innocent it might look in dry 
weather, low land must always be far less valuable for building purposes than other 
land. But the lowlands may be just as good as any other for providing spaciousness of 
open scenery for parks and parkways; and it ought to be relatively cheap to acquire. 
Because of the innocent look it has in dry weather, it is not as cheap as it ought to be. 
Between floods it looks pretty good for building purposes to those who never saw 
what storm water can do in this country. Unsuspecting purchasers, victims of their 
own ignorance, will fall into the traps laid for them by the sharp practice of ruthless 
promoters, and such lands will be cut up, sold, and occupied. Unfortunately, the bur-
den of such a wrong development does not fall on the purchaser alone, and scarcely 
ever on the vendor, but most heavily on the community at large. There is, of course, 
a remedy, but it requires vision and vigor to apply it. Remedial legislation might pre-
vent further mistakes and correct those of the past.
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To sum up this vexatious matter: The community is confronted with four possible 
courses:
First, and best, police regulation can be adopted to prevent costly improvements 
in floodways unless and until adequate spaces have been set apart for handling the 
maximum floods and the floods have been confined to them by permanent chan-
nels, reservoirs, and reserved areas for percolation into the ground. The cost would 
thus be fairly divided between the community at large and the owners of land more 
or less subject to flooding. Such a policy would not only be a direct financial benefit 
to the community, but would indirectly prevent the sharp practice above mentioned 
and stop the ill-directed spread of the population. It would also open the way to an 
economical purchase of park lands in the very areas where nothing else is so clearly 
practicable.
Second, the community can purchase such lands for park and flood-control pur-
poses, while still vacant, but at speculative prices, that are high because based on the 
cupidity of speculators unrestrained by police regulations.
Third, the community can permit the lands to become built up, and periodically 
spend large sums to repair recurrent flood damage.
Fourth, after long delay, the community can, through heavy expenditure, per-
manently remove the flood menace by the purchase and destruction of costly 
improvements.
These are, of course, primarily flood-control and water-conservation problems; 
but there are many opportunities for combining with them, at little extra cost, parks 
along natural drainage lines on lands relatively cheap, and extensive enough for rec-
reation purposes. Such land would only have to be acquired once, yet would serve 
a double purpose—flood-control use and park use—not conflicting but positively 
beneficial to each other. Especially would this be true of the land acquired as a mar-
gin of safety; the open land skirting the chief flood-control area which prudence 
would include in the purchase.
Where flood control alone is dealt with in computing the size of anticipated 
floods, there is a natural tendency to curtail the area of land to be acquired in this 
speculative market. Such curtailment is likely to reduce the factor of safety beyond 
the danger point. Such a policy defeats itself. It compels large outlays for costly con-
struction on narrow rights of way which would not be necessary on wider rights of 
way. The combination of parks with flood-control necessities is frequently possible, 
and wherever practiced it not only will yield a double return on the investment of 
land but also may lead to an ampler and better solution of both problems at a much 
lower cost of construction than either would separately pay [italics in original]. . . .
The most serious question in any plan for improvement will necessarily be that of 
providing satisfactory and effective revetments or other forms of river control with-
out seriously injuring the landscape value of the river bed. The prospect of a dam in 
the mountains to control the river offers a possibility of materially reducing the size 
of revetments required.
The river banks offer opportunities for special types of tree growth and special ef-
fects of foliage with cottonwoods, sycamores, willows and poplars, wild grapes and 
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even sweet gums and sour gums. The already interesting foliage masses can be kept and 
made a striking feature of the district instead of giving way to an ugly vacant channel.
At the northerly end on the east bank is the old Pio Pico Adobe House, owned by 
the State, that should be included within the parkway reservation.
54. Lower Los Angeles River Parkway
From Long Beach northward to the Rio Hondo at South Gate the Lower Los An-
geles River offers much the same problem as the Lower San Gabriel. Below Los Cer-
ritos the river has already been confined between revetments 300 feet apart[,] and 
commercial use of the edges has been encouraged and made possible so that parkway 
construction of an interesting character would be difficult and costly if attempted, but 
above there where a right of way 400 feet or 500 feet wide is needed for flood control 
a width of 1,000 feet or so should be acquired, and above Center Street where the 
channel is broad and meandering a width of 1,500 feet or so in places seems desirable.
• • •
The impact of nature on urban growth sometimes takes the form of devastating 
floods; 1938 floodwaters roared through the Los Angeles Basin with particular 
fury. In their wake, flood control engineers studied what could and should be done 
next, contemplating, for instance, a comparison of historical rainfall totals against 
1938 figures. In order to prevent another such catastrophic flood, the engineers de-
cided to capture the floodwater and force it quickly to the Pacific Ocean by lining 
the riverbed in concrete.
From M.  F. Burke, hydraulic engineer, “Flood of March 2, 1938” (Los Angeles 
County Flood Control District, May 20, 1938, Box 18, Los Angeles County Public 
Works Department Technical Library).
Introduction
On March 2, 1938, Los Angeles County experienced a major flood which equaled 
or exceeded any previous flood of record. A preliminary survey made shortly after 
showed a toll of known dead of 113 persons and an estimated damage amounting to 
forty-five million dollars.
Because future planning must be based in large part upon past records, and be-
cause the Los Angeles County Flood Control District is specifically organized for 
the business of planning Flood Control and protection works, the present report is 
compiled. It presents factual data on rainfall, runoff and debris movement as far as 
these data are available at the present time, and makes comparisons with past and 
anticipated storms and floods. It is essentially a compilation and preservation of re-
cords, rather than a solution to the problems arising. Only the obvious comparisons 
are drawn and speculation reduced to a minimum.
Summary
Meteorological conditions previous to and during the storm were not unusual, but 
may be expected to occur, and have occurred, several times each year since the 
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 District has engaged in meteorological analysis and forecast. From a meteorologi-
cal point of view, worse conditions are possible and could be expected to produce a 
storm more intense and of longer duration than that which occurred from February 
27 to March 4, 1938.
The total rainfall during the storm varied according to location in the County, 
ranging from seven inches near the ocean at Long Beach to a maximum of thirty 
inches on the face of the San Gabriel mountains and decreasing to about four inches 
in the desert near Lancaster. As far as records are available, this storm total about 
equaled the rainfall during the storm of December 1922, and exceeded all other 
storms during known flood periods. The maximum day’s rainfall exceeded previ-
ous days’ maxima during flood periods by about twenty per cent. As an average, the 
maximum day’s rainfall had a probable recurrence frequency of sixty-five years. . . .
The runoff peaks for the large catchment areas equaled or exceeded any known 
peaks during previous floods and in some cases, approached the computed capital 
flood peak based on a fifty year rainfall frequency. In the smaller catchment areas, 
the present flood peaks have been exceeded by previous records, notably in the storm 
of New Year’s, 1934. For these small drainage areas, the present flood peaks were only 
small percentages of the peaks computed for the capital flood. This is believed to be 
a direct result of the subnormal short time rainfall intensities experienced during the 
present storm. . . .
Even though the present storm may be considered the maximum of record, the 
actual areas subjected to inundation and flooding by water escaping from regular 
stream channels is less than was expected from a flood of this magnitude. This may 
be largely attributed to the channel protection work recently accomplished, and to 
the peak reduction effected by regulating reservoirs. . . .
Comparison of Rainfall on March 2nd with Daily Amounts Having a 
Probable Frequency of 50 Years as Determined In 1929
In the area bounded by the Santa Monica mountains, the Whittier Narrows, the Pu-
ente Hills and eastern County boundary, the March 2nd rainfall generally exceeded 
the 50 year storm rainfall. In the vicinity of Torrance the two were equal, while in the 
vicinity of Vermont Avenue and Santa Monica, the current storm exceeded the 50 
year value by about an inch. . . .
As a summary, it may be said that for the drainage areas of the Los Angeles River, 
San Gabriel River and Ballona Creek, and for the Santa Monica mountains, the rain-
fall for March 2 exceeded, in general, the computed 50 year maximum rainfall.
Comparison of the Storm Rainfall for Known Flood Periods
In comparing the rainfall in various stations for known flood periods, nine stations 
were selected from those having the longest rainfall records. Four of these stations 
represent valley or foothill conditions, and five are mountain stations. The periods 
of known floods for which some rainfall records are available include eight storms 
in addition to the storm of March 2nd. . . . While the times during the day at which 
the day’s readings are made will vary between stations, each station is presumably 
consistent in its own readings. . . .
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Computing the storm rainfall values for each station in terms of the March 2nd 
record and obtaining the average percentage for each storm, the figures . . . seem to 
show that for the maximum day’s rainfall, the March 2nd storm was the greatest, fol-
lowed by the New Year’s storm at 80 per cent and the 1921 storm at 78 per cent. For 
the total storm rainfall, the recent storm was the greatest, followed by the 1921 storm 
at 95 per cent and then by the 1914 storm at 79 per cent. The storms of 1884 and 1889 
apparently show relatively low percentage values, but this may be explained by the 
absence of any mountain rainfall records. . . .
Major Stream Channels—Comparison of Floods
On the Los Angeles River, it is apparent that the recent flood materially exceeded any 
previous flood for which runoff records are available. It was from two to four times 
as large as the storm of New Year’s, 1934, and about twice as big as any recorded 
flood previous.
• • •
An early report on the concrete lining of the Los Angeles riverbed by the U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers celebrated the use of such technology for “literally re-
building” the river. The author describes it as a novel engineering approach that 
combines flood control and water conservation in the same project.
From Andrew R. Boone, “River Rebuilt to Curb Floods” (Scientific American 161 
[November 1939]: 264–265. [Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2016. 
 Scientific American, a division of Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved.]).
“River Rebuilt to Curb Floods
Engineers are protecting Los Angeles and Surrounding Area . . .
Flood Control and Water Conservation Dual Aim”
Under conditions existing until recently, according to Major Theodore Wyman, Jr., 
U.S. Engineer Department district engineer, a great flood would practically cut off 
access to the city of Los Angeles, with its population of 1,500,000. In fact, Major 
Wyman pointed out that the wide plain on which Los Angeles is situated is under a 
more dangerous flood menace than any similar region in the United States.
Accordingly, Army engineers and the Los Angeles County Flood Control District 
are literally rebuilding the Los Angeles River, a stream which, in 40 miles, experi-
ences a fall equal to that of the Mississippi River between Omaha, Nebraska, and the 
Gulf of Mexico. Rebuilding the river is part of a broader flood control plan. Already 
Los Angeles County has spent $60,000,000 in building parts of the protective works. 
Present plans call for an expenditure of $70,000,000 more. But amounts of money to 
be spent give no idea of the engineering difficulties and problems involved; not only 
must flood waters and debris of the discharging flood be curbed, but also as much 
water as possible must be conserved to replenish ground water storage. The life of 
much of southern California depends upon such stored waters.
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Work to date, recommended by the Board of Engineers, for Rivers and Harbors 
and approved by the Chief of Engineers, has been done at points where floor danger 
was most imminent. In foothill areas, some 600 basins and dams have been con-
structed to control the water flowing from these basins. Below the foothills and on 
the coastal plain, various channels have been enlarged, straightened, and provided 
with bank protection, or enclosed within reinforced concrete channels. . . .
Most important of the streams, insofar as their rampages may affect concentrated 
population, is the Los Angeles River. This stream, 70 miles in length, may be bone 
dry in summer, and then carry water at the rate of 90,000 cubic feet a second through 
downtown Los Angeles during a winter flood. Hence, to save congested areas within 
the city proper, as well as outlying areas, the improvements proposed for the river 
include construction of a leveed channel from its headwaters to the ocean; construc-
tion of three flood-control basins; and channel improvement in two washes which 
empty into the river, as well as on other tributaries. . . .
From many points of view, re-building this fractious stream presents engineer-
ing novelty. It is only part of a larger program, however: that of saving both life and 
property over a wide area of southern California and conserving water that agricul-
ture and industry may not suffer. How well the engineers have built only time and 
flood can tell.
Figure 36. The Los Angeles River being prepared for concrete.
Courtesy of the Los Angeles Public Library Photo Collection.
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• • •
Concreting riverbeds was a method not supported by all. Opponents argued that 
attacking the problem of flooding and mudslides in the foothills, where it began, 
would prevent inundation of the lowlands and not require concrete. The engineers 
and public officials who criticized the concrete solution remained in the minority 
as the concrete was poured. In this plea to the federal government, the representa-
tive of the Los Angeles chapter of a national civic organization argues that the con-
crete method for flood control is a massive waste of federal funds for the benefit 
of concrete and equipment manufacturers. In addition, it ignores the initial plans 
of flood control engineers to build less costly infrastructure in the mountains and 
foothills to prevent mudslides and flooding farther downstream.
From a copy of Anthony Pratt (Municipal League of Los Angeles) to [U.S.] Board 
of Engineers for Rivers and Harbors (December 11, 1939, Box 10, John Anson Ford 
Papers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA).
Board of Engineers for Rivers & Harbours,
Washington, D.C.
Gentlemen:
The Municipal League of Los Angeles is an organization that for 39 years has been a 
watch dog on Municipal, County and School Board waste. It has especially exposed 
waste in alleged flood control programs that have been put over on the people by the 
big material manufacturing interests hereabout.
When after fighting for years, sometimes successfully, the graft in Flood Control 
projects under County Government administration, the problems were more recently 
dumped into the lap of the Federal Government, we looked on askance but hoped for 
the best in spite of the reputation for extravagance that has followed in the wake of 
many of the United States Army Engineers’ reclamation and flood control projects. 
We still had the idea that though extravagant, these army engineers did do a good job.
So we have been quiescent while the recent millions of dollars have been spent 
here under their plans and with their sanctions.
But we can be quiescent no longer in view of the way their work in the Los An-
geles County Flood Control District has signally failed in part and in view of the 
new report and recommendations of these engineers who are now advocating the 
expenditure of some $200,000,000 more along the same general lines that have been 
followed by them for the expenditure of the last $70,000,000 federal allotment to this 
Flood Control District.
The Municipal League has long strongly protested the twisting of the original 
program favored by four of the five engineers who reported for the county of Los 
Angeles in 1917 into a material man’s paradise with one dam in San Gabriel Canyon 
that was to have been “the highest dam in the world,” and that would require millions 
of dollars for cement alone.
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The majority report of that original Flood Control Commission stressed the 
greater importance of keeping the rains, as they descended upon the mountains, up 
in the same mountain areas in the natural reservoirs beneath the soil, and in pre-
venting erosion by such simple things as contour trenches, terraces and the humble 
check dam.
But the recommendations of the majority report were not followed. The first 
bond issue was thus diverted as to the modus operandi from its original purpose. It 
was for only $4,500,000 and the public was led to believe that the proper treatment 
for the higher altitudes could be effected by this original investment. But the material 
manufacturers and the big dam contractors proved too strong for our weak Board 
of Supervisors and after this first bond issue was spent according to the plans of the 
minority member of the Commission, Mr. Reagan, a second bond issue was pro-
posed for $35,000,000, $25,000,000 of which was for the above mentioned “highest 
dam in the world,” in connection with which one supervisor was convicted of taking 
an $80,000 bribe. The Municipal League opposed this bond issue but it was voted by 
politically spreading the promised benefits widely throughout the county.
The Executive Board of the Municipal League is now protesting to your Hon-
orable Board of Engineers at Washington against these further flood control 
plans that contemplate another $200,000,000 largely for channel work in the val-
leys and that pay so little attention comparatively to the correct treatment in the 
mountain areas.
We trust that our protest may be thoroughly considered by you. John Anson Ford, 
the outstanding liberal supervisor of Los Angeles County and member of the Los 
Angeles County Flood Control Board, presented to our public forum last Tuesday 
an alternate suggestion that instead of the $200,000,000 as proposed $100,000,000 
or as much thereof as may be necessary be used in the higher altitudes for creat-
ing, everywhere possible, small reservoirs and for small dams, check dams, terraces, 
contour trenches, etc.
We are sending copies of this letter expressing the sentiments of the Executive Board 
of the Municipal League to all the congressmen from this area and also to our Senator.
Yours very truly,
municipal league of los angeles
By Anthony Pratt (Signed)
Secretary
• • •
In the 1920s, residents of Owens Valley complained that they had been cheated by 
Los Angeles water officials who had purchased their property and water rights. In 
a letter to Mary Austin, a portion of which is reproduced here, Bishop merchant 
Julian E. Eibeshutz states that the farmers did well in the transactions, but that 
the valley’s business owners paid the price when the population decreased. At the 
same time he notes his belief that the valley is gradually turning from a robust 
agricultural region into a desert.
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From Julian E. Eibeshutz to Mary Austin (May 8, 1925, AU2290, Mary Austin Pa-
pers, Huntington Library, San Marino, CA).
The City of Los Angeles has purchased nearly every acre of Ground from Georges 
Creek to Bishop—buying the water rights and conveying the water through an aq-
ueduct across Mojave Desert to Los Angeles—I have a vision of our beautiful Ranch 
properties going back to Desert and our beautiful valley ruined—Our Towns are 
without any visible means of support—with the exception of Tourist Trade which is 
good for only about four months of the year and the principles and problems that 
we have fought out for years to bring this valley into a state of civilization wherein 
it would be a pleasure to dwell was all for nothing and we have been visited with a 
blight—
The Ranchers who sold are comfortably fixed as the city paid them good 
prices—You will probably remember the “old Fort” Country—Gormans, Walters, 
Shabbell, Densmores, Bells, etc.—They can all retire—some have moved from here[,] 
others will remain for a while—I do not know what the city intends doing with our 
communities but it looks as if we would be compelled to sue for reparations.
• • •
The acquisition of water for a thirsty Los Angeles forever left its mark in the Owens 
Valley. As described in this report by a committee in the California State Legis-
lature, printed in 1931, the removal of water through the aqueduct left the Ow-
ens Lake and its drainage area utterly transformed. A prosperous agricultural and 
business environment in the valley became a desert, the lake a “shifting body of 
alkali, soda, sand and dust.” Over the years, Los Angeles officials have carried on a 
variety of programs to mitigate the changes, often by court order, although conten-
tion between the city and Inyo County interests and environmentalists continues 
to this day.
From California Legislature, Senate, Special Investigating Committee on Water 
Situation in Inyo and Mono Counties, Report of Special Investigating Committee on 
Water Situation in Inyo and Mono Counties (Sacramento: California State Printing 
Office, 1931).
Findings
The situation existing in the Owens River Valley, Inyo County, is very different from 
that of the Mono Basin in Mono County, and, therefore, we deal with these two situ-
ations separately.
The Owens River Valley is situated east and almost in the shadow of the lofty Sier-
ra Nevada mountains. The snows from these mountains furnish an abundant supply 
of clear, pure mountain water, which reaches the valley through various creeks[,] and 
make up the supply for Owens River. This water formerly found its way into Owens 
Lake, which, at one time, was a large body of water in the southern end of the valley.
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The soil of this valley is exceedingly fertile, when irrigated, and raises valuable 
crops of alfalfa, grain, fruits and vegetables, and it furnishes abundant pasturage for 
cattle, and has been cultivated since 1860, continuously. The land, without water, 
will become barren and worthless and revert to sand and sagebrush, its former state.
The evidence shows that about the year 1860, the settlers moved into this valley, 
endured the dangers and privations attendant to pioneer life, improving the land, 
taking the water from the high Sierra for irrigation. Soon Owens Valley blossomed 
forth as one of the richest agricultural sections of the state of California. Several 
hundred farms and farm houses dotted its green meadows.
Thousands of head of cattle grazed in its fields. Valuable crops of hay and grain 
were produced, and hundreds of acres were planted to productive orchards of peach-
es, pears, apples and other deciduous fruits. The climatic condition, the fertile land 
and the natural beauty of the scenery made of this valley a veritable paradise.
Towns sprang up in the valley, supported and sustained by the rich farming ar-
eas. Bishop became the principal business center, and had, at one time, a popula-
tion of approximately 2500. Independence, the county seat, Big Pine, Lone Pine and 
Laws were flourishing communities, and, in addition to these, were other smaller 
trade centers. All these communities were surrounded by rich agricultural lands that 
Figure 37. Dry Owens Lake and blowing alkali dust, 2008.
Courtesy of Eeekster (photographer Richard Ellis) via Wikimedia Commons.
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produced a large revenue. Testimony shows that up to the year 1923 each one of 
these towns did an enormous business with the agricultural elements.
These towns grew and flourished because of the agricultural development of 
the valley, and this development was made possible by the ample supply of water 
from the mountains on the west side of the valley. Substantial business houses of a 
permanent character were erected in these towns. Beautiful residences, comparable 
to those in other towns of California were built and occupied. Business flourished. 
Public buildings that would be a credit to any town or to any county were erected in 
the various communities; in short, Owens Valley became one of the most prosperous 
and beautiful agricultural sections of the State of California.
Testimony shows that in about the year 1904, the growing city of Los Angeles, 
realizing that the future prosperity of that city depended upon an abundant supply 
of pure water for domestic, industrial and municipal uses, began the task of building 
of the vast aqueduct a distance of nearly three hundred miles, to carry these waters 
to the city of Los Angeles. Prior to the construction of the aqueduct, the city of Los 
Angeles sent its agents into Owens Valley and began purchasing lands in order to 
secure the water rights appurtenant to these lands. This process continued until, at 
the present time, the city of Los Angeles owns about 90 per cent of the lands in the 
valley. The city of Los Angeles buys the lands for the water only, and the water is 
taken into the aqueduct. The rich lands formerly irrigated by this water are dried 
up and allowed to return to desert conditions. Orchards are torn up, buildings are 
torn down or burned, and, in a short time, lands that were rich and productive have 
returned to their former condition.
In addition to taking the surface water, the city of Los Angeles has put down a 
series of wells in the valley, approximately 150 in number. These wells are pumping 
constantly, and the water from them augments the supply of the aqueduct. In this 
manner, the underground water table of the valley has been lowered to the point 
where Owens Valley is drying up. Owens Lake is already dry, and what was once the 
lake bed is now a shifting body of alkali, soda, sand and dust.
The damage wrought by the taking of these waters is apparent. The farming lands 
purchased by the city of Los Angeles are reverting to desert. The lands not yet pur-
chased are suffering from the shortage of water due to the exhaustion of the subsur-
face water by the pumping and drainage carried on by the city of Los Angeles. The 
former occupants of these lands have migrated to other portions of the State and the 
west. The few remaining landowners find themselves confronted with a condition of 
isolation. Their neighbors are gone. Their local markets are gone, and most of their 
ranches are being surrounded by complete desolation.
The remaining landowners now realize that they can not hold their lands and 
farms, and that they can not prosper without cooperative neighbors.
Damage to business houses and property in the towns that were supported or 
were dependent upon the farm areas is very apparent. These towns are dwindling 
away. With the farming lands which caused the towns to prosper gone, the towns 
are gradually dying. Business is lost. Residences must be abandoned. Most of these 
people must leave everything they have and go elsewhere to earn a livelihood. The 
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water which sustained and gave life to the valley has been and is being taken out of 
the valley.
Your committee also found a condition existing as to the town of Keeler entirely 
different from that of the other part of the valley. Keeler is situated on the eastern 
edge of what was formerly Owens Lake. The lake now being dry, a vast body of alkali, 
soda and sand is whirled about by the valley winds and into the former prosperous 
town of Keeler, clouding the air and filling the roads and streets with sands not un-
like drifted snow. Dust and dirt sift through the crevices in doors and windows and 
cover floors and furniture, making life at Keeler practically unbearable. The body of 
water formerly in Owens Lake moderated the temperature, but, as it is now dry, the 
summer heat is almost intolerable.
• • •
Harnessing the power of nature for the public good was a common progressive 
objective in the early twentieth century, although there would be many complaints 
later on. In this 1926 article in Scientific American, the title “The Subjugation of 
the Colorado” tells it all. Nature was there to be conquered, tamed, controlled, and 
used for the good of humankind.
From Guy Elliott Mitchell, “The Subjugation of the Colorado: Substituting Pow-
er, Light and Fertile Lands for Disastrous Flood Waters” (Scientific American 134 
[March 1926]: 158–159. [Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2016. Scientific 
American, a division of Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved.]).
“The Subjugation of the Colorado
Substituting Power, Light and Fertile Lands for Disastrous Flood Waters”
The great Colorado River of the west is no longer a mystery, an unknown danger. 
It has given up all of its secrets to engineering and scientific exploration and, even 
now, definite plans have been formulated to prevent its disastrous floods, to harness 
its vast power and to spread its huge volume of fertilizing, irrigating waters over 
millions of desert acres. The complete subjugation of the Colorado is an engineer-
ing undertaking of stupendous magnitude—one, not of millions but of hundreds of 
millions of dollars of cost.
The Monster Will Be Tamed
The Colorado has its sources in the high mountains of the Continental Divide. Its 
waters drop some 14,000 feet in their 1,500-mile course to the sea. Every workable 
horsepower in that great fall is to be utilized as needed—and, after this energy has 
been harnessed, the same waters, gathered from a watershed of 244,000 square miles, 
will be let out to irrigate millions of acres of thirsty, desert lands and there to produce 
crops of fabulous magnitude.
If there is poetry in engineering, surely the Colorado is a fascinating theme for 
contemplation. A wild and cruel monster, a giant of destruction to human life and 
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property, its evil tendencies may all be corrected; it may bring staple foods and lus-
cious fruits to millions of people; it may turn the wheels of a thousand industries; 
and though now a region of almost utter inaccessibility, a fact not very generally real-
ized, it may become a place of lake and canyon splendor surpassing perhaps anything 
in the world to be visited with ease and comfort.
Looking somewhat ahead of the present interest in the Colorado, the United 
States Geological Survey has for many years been making a close study of the river 
and its great watershed. The Survey’s hydraulic and topographic engineers have tra-
versed and mapped every foot of its great canyon and its many tributary canyons, 
and its geologists have examined the rock structure of its multitude of dam and res-
ervoir sites; for the river can be controlled and utilized only by the creation of great 
artificial lakes or flood-storage reservoirs. We are apt to think of storage reservoirs 
as ponds of a score or possibly a hundred acres or so in extent, retained by masonry 
walls; but the storage lakes of the Colorado will be hundreds of square miles in extent 
and they will be bounded by rugged canyon walls.
The volume of the flow of the Colorado and that of its tributaries has been mea-
sured and plotted by the Geological Survey engineers during a period of over twenty 
years. This close scrutiny of the behavior of the river, of its range in flow from a com-
parative trickle of 3,000 cubic feet of water per second to wild floods of over 200,000 
second-feet, and the examination of inaccessible dam sites, culminated two years ago 
in the voyage by engineers and geologists through the 200 most dangerous miles of 
the Grand Canyon itself.
And now comes the result of this labor of magnitude, analyzed and presented in 
a government engineering report—a definite plan for the complete subjugation and 
utilization of the river. It is a project to construct 13 great dams and reservoirs and 
create hundreds of miles of artificial lakes, whereby all the floods of the Colorado 
will become only historic; since they will be converted into a great resource by the 
utilization of all the water for power and irrigation.
One Comprehensive Plan Essential
E. C. La Rue, the author of the Colorado River report and plan, is a hydraulic engi-
neer of the Geological Survey, and throughout the southwest you may often hear him 
referred to as the “father of the Colorado.” He has known the river for half a lifetime; 
he has made hundreds of miles of boat trips through its wild and treacherous canyon 
reaches charged with the responsibility of selecting all possible dam sites and super-
vising their survey.
But even in this report, the Geological Survey is not presuming to promote any 
particular power or irrigation project. It is making available the mass of informa-
tion needed for outlining a feasible scheme for the full development of the river and 
especially for an orderly and wise planning. The river must be developed as a single 
undertaking, piecemeal it is true, but according to a general plan; and no single or 
initial project must be permitted which will ruin or detract from the later and greater 
possible ultimate development. In order that this may be accomplished, there must 
be government regulation of the engineering phases of the work.
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The beginning in construction will doubtless be to prevent flood damage. There 
is urgent need for the building of a dam to protect the hundred or more million 
dollars invested along the lower reaches of the river in the Imperial Valley and else-
where. The recurrence of any one of the big floods of the Colorado would wipe out 
this property and perhaps cause great loss of life—and it may come next year, or in 
any year. It is also probable that a dam for the development of power will be built at 
an early date. But these or any other dams should be built as part of the whole, big 
adventure.
• • •
In a 1928 article, Elwood Mead, commissioner of the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, 
referred to the project as “Conquering the Colorado.” As was common at the time, 
environmental consequences of such an undertaking were not considered, in light 
of the “interest that is worldwide.”
From Elwood Mead, “Conquering the Colorado” (Literary Digest 97 [April 21, 
1928]: 50–58).
“Conquering the Colorado
Boulder Dam—Symbol of the Epic Conquest of the Southwest”
Into the hottest and driest part of the country the Colorado River brings the melted 
snows of the loftiest summits of the main range of the Rockies.
It carries the clear, cold water of the Green River morainal lakes into a region of 
lonesome brown deserts and to homes which under irrigation are made beautiful by 
a tropical opulence of fruit and foliage.
This water, symbol of motion, life, and change, is the key to the future of the 
Southwest. It is needed to develop mineral riches of southern Nevada, to irrigate the 
fertile unpeopled mesa lands of western Arizona, and to give to cities like Los Ange-
les and San Diego in California the water essential to their growth.
Without regulation and control, the river has comparatively little value. When 
the snows are melting it is turbulent and destructive; when they are gone it shrinks 
to a shadow of what it was a few months before. In its highest stages it carries water 
enough to irrigate a million acres of land in a single day; at its lowest recorded flow 
it will do little more than wet the bottoms of canals already built. Although the 
limits of profitable development of the unregulated river have been reached, if its 
floods are stored and released to meet the needs of agriculture, to light cities and 
turn the wheels of factories, it will feed and clothe ten million more people than 
now live there.
When President Coolidge signed the Boulder Dam bill on the 21st of last 
 December, he ended an epic struggle in Congress which had lasted eight years. It 
had taken Congress that long to decide how the Colorado should be regulated and 
who should do it. He also began a new era in the reclamation of the arid West and 
the harnessing of its rivers for that service.
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The prolonged discussions in Congress, and the months given to hearings by 
committees, were due largely to the fact that this bill embodied about every problem 
of reclamation[,] and its discussion started an evolution of ideas and methods that 
is still going on.
The pioneer idea of development was for each man to look out for himself and 
let the devil take the hindmost. Individuals and companies claimed rivers, and dug 
canals to divert them, without thinking what others were doing above or below on 
the same stream. We have reached the end of that kind of unrelated action. It has 
already brought contests in the courts between states, and bitterness of feeling be-
tween communities. Boulder Dam and its great related works are to be built by the 
federal government under a water-right compact framed by representatives of the 
seven states of the river’s watershed and ratified by the legislatures of six of those 
states. It has enlisted the cooperation of the nation, states, cities, irrigation districts, 
and important hydroelectric corporations.
To harness this river requires a dam 700 feet high, nearly twice the height of any 
now in existence. Above this dam will be a lake 100 miles long and nearly 600 feet 
deep. The lake will have a surface area of 140,000 acres and will hold 26,000,000 
acre-feet of water, enough to cover the state of Kentucky one foot deep. It will not 
only be the largest artificial reservoir in this country but it will have ten times the 
capacity of the Elephant Butte reservoir, which is now the largest. The power plant 
will generate 1,000,000 horsepower, equal to all those of Niagara. The All-American 
Canal, which will be 200 feet wide on the bottom and 20 feet deep, will carry wa-
ter enough to irrigate nearly one hundred thousand acres in a single day. The mere 
statement of these dimensions grips the imagination. It has aroused an interest that 
is worldwide.
• • •
The quality of Colorado River water for public consumption was an issue raised 
by several critics who believed it could never be made pure enough to drink. One 
such critic was Los Angeles businessman Lewis Clark Stubbins. He included such 
an argument in a much longer speech he delivered during the 1931 political cam-
paign before the vote on whether to support the bond measure to finance the Col-
orado Aqueduct project. For Stubbins, water quality was but one reason of many 
that should have convinced voters to oppose the bonds.
It turns out that he was right to a certain degree. Salinity of Colorado River 
water increased over the years because of agricultural practices and the decrease of 
the water flow for other uses. Agricultural land in the lower area suffered tremen-
dous damage, which resulted in massive costs to mitigate.
From Lewis Clark Stubbins, “Vote No on September 29th, 1931, on the Colorado 
Aqueduct Bonds” (pamphlet, 1931, 4–6, held by Special Collections, Claremont 
Colleges Library, Claremont, CA).
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1. Quality of Water.
No matter what may be your conclusion regarding the other points, the quality 
of water is paramount. If it is not fit to use after obtained, all other considerations 
are of no moment.
A tremendous technical controversy over this question has raged ever since the 
Colorado scheme has been proposed.
Study of the quality by the United States Geological Survey and the Reclamation 
Service as well as many technical experts from various Colleges and Universities 
have been made and the resultant conflicting conclusions published.
Out of all this great mass of conflicting statements and opinions a few facts stand 
out. We all know Colorado Water when clarified is used for Domestic purposes in 
Needles, Yuma, and Imperial Valley. Against this statement I will call your attention to 
an article in one of the Metropolitan Dailies of August 11th, which carried an article re-
garding labor conditions at Hoover Dam, from which the following sentence is quoted:
“Discarding the River water on account of its danger to health at this time of the year, 
the contractors are hauling water from Las Vegas Artesian Springs to the Dam Area and 
this is distributed in milk cans.”
Extensive salt beds exist on the Virgin River, which will be flooded by Hoover 
Dam. The Metropolitan Water District in its report entitled “Summary of Surveys, 
etc.”, published in December, 1930, on page 18, states, “Recent topographical surveys 
by the Metropolitan Water District show the area of salt actually exposed to solution 
to be but 1.8 acres with 4.6 acres of soil containing more or less salt.”
I personally have spent days walking over thousands of acres of salt impregnated 
lands where veritable mountains of salt exist, all of which will be flooded by the 
Reservoir.
Charles R. Fletcher, formerly Geologist for the Union Pacific Railway Company, 
after describing the deposit and referring to its vast extent and great though un-
known depth said, “I have protested for years that if the salt deposits in the vicinity 
of the confluence of the Colorado and Virgin Rivers be inundated, as it will by the 
Black Canyon Reservoir, its water will be unfit for domestic, agricultural 
and municipal uses.”
Analysis of Colorado water indicates salts in solution under present conditions 
are near the point of maximum tolerance. Flooding these vast salt beds cannot 
do other than increase to some degree the salt content; and evaporation from the 
Hoover Reservoir will further concentrate this salt.
I am not prepared to state, although a good many do, that after the construction 
of Hoover Dam, Colorado River water will be unfit for human consumption, but I do 
fearlessly say that after delivered to Southern California it will provide Los Angeles 
with, by long odds, the poorest Municipal supply of any large City in the Country.
• • •
As part of the Los Angeles River and Owens Valley Aqueduct projects, reservoirs 
were built to store water for later use. In the case of the Boulder Dam project on 
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the Colorado River, “conquering nature” included the creation of what was, at the 
time, the world’s largest human-made lake. In this 1938 article in Scientific Ameri-
can, the new lake is described as being filled for the purpose of water storage. 
Since then, Lake Mead has also been used for all manner of recreational purposes, 
although its level has dropped considerably in the last few decades.
From “Lake Mead, Largest Man-Made” (Scientific American 158 [February 1938]: 
108–109. [Reproduced with permission. Copyright © 2016. Scientific American, a 
division of Nature America, Inc. All rights reserved.]).
“Lake Mead, Largest Man-Made”
In the desert of the southwest, a new and major lake is forming, Lake Mead, created by 
Boulder Dam. Named for the late Dr. Elwood Mead, Commissioner of Reclamation 
during the period of construction of Boulder Dam in Black Canyon of the Colorado 
River, Lake Mead is by far the largest man-made body of water in the world.
It extends up the Colorado River 101 miles at this time (autumn, 1937) and even-
tually will reach a maximum length of 111 miles. It will be eight miles wide at the 
Figure 38. Lake Mead in 2010 showing its white “bathtub ring” illustrating the drop in the 
water level over the years.
Courtesy of Tom Sitton, photographer.
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widest point and, when filled, will have a maximum depth at the dam of 589 feet.
Lake Mead will store 30,500,000 acre-feet of water, sufficient when expressed in 
terms of gallons to supply 5000 gallons for each and every person on earth. Today it 
is slightly more than half filled. It now has a depth of about 460 feet and covers more 
than 91,000 acres.
Prior to 1935, there were few localities in the world more forbidding or more 
difficult to access than the bed of what now is Lake Mead. In the midst of a desert 
and desert mountains, the Colorado River then flowed through this area principally 
at the bottom of tremendous canyons. Only a few parties of daring explorers had 
ever traversed the length of the future Lake Mead, and many of the side or branch 
canyons, now covered in the lake, were unexplored.
When the diversion channels were closed at Boulder Dam February 1, 1935, Lake 
Mead immediately began to form. One year later, it held 3,000,000 acre-feet of water. 
Two years later, it contained 9,000,000 and was extending far up the river, through 
the sheer-walled Boulder Canyon, through Virgin, Iceberg, and Travertine canyons 
and was beginning to reach into the lower and unvisited end of the Grand Canyon 
itself. It can safely be navigated now over this entire reach of river.
The Colorado River was a fluctuating stream. It still is variable above Lake Mead, 
although Boulder Dam has made it a reliable, perennial watercourse downstream. 
When the snows of the mountains at its headwater melt in the spring, great floods 
move down the Colorado. After they have passed, the flow drops erratically to little 
more than a creek. The floods do not pass Boulder Dam, but are caught and stored 
to fill in the valleys of the flow in the summer and fall to protect the water users 
downstream.
As a result of these periodic floods, Lake Mead grows by fits and starts. It rises 
rapidly from March to July, but will decrease in size between August and February. 
During three or four months, the inflow into Lake Mead is greatly in excess of the 
outflow through Boulder Dam. But during the remainder of the year, the inflow and 
outflow are about equal or the outflow exceeds the inflow.
During 1936, 5,634,425 acre-feet of water were allowed to pass Boulder Dam. In 
the future and until the states of the upper Colorado River basin are prepared to use 
the water allotted to them, this diversion may increase to the normal flow of the river, 
or about 15,000,000 acre-feet a year. The amount of water diverted through the dam, 
of course, has a definite bearing on the speed with which Lake Mead fills. Another 
factor is the total amount of run-off in the river above the dam. This varies with the 
rain and snowfall over the watershed. If normal conditions prevail, Lake Mead may 
be filled in three years.
• • •
Earthquakes! Always a heavy jolt to the natural landscape, they were not antici-
pated in the original planning of the Boulder (later Hoover) Dam project, since 
the area was not known as earthquake country. But many earthquakes shook the 
area as Lake Mead filled and long after. Two measuring 5.0 on the Richter scale 
rocked the area in 1937, and hundreds more occurred until the 1960s, when the 
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completion of the Glen Canyon Dam helped to moderate the flow of water down-
river and reduced the occurrences of quakes. But the shakers haven’t stopped, as 
evidenced by notable quakes in the area in 2014 and 2015.
From “Quakes Linked to Lake Mead” (Los Angeles Times, May 19, 1939. [Used with 
permission of The Associated Press. Copyright © 2015. All rights reserved.]).
“Quakes Linked to Lake Mead
Colorado Water Behind Hoover Dam Suspected of Causing Shocks”
Washington, May 18 (AP)—Waters of the Colorado River which have backed up 
behind Hoover Dam to form Lake Mead were linked today to a sharp increase in 
earthquakes.
Admiral L. O. Colbert, director of the Coast and Geodetic Survey, disclosed dur-
ing House hearings on appropriations for the Commerce Department that there were 
no records of earthquakes in the area in the 10 years prior to the filling of the lake.
Water began to back up in the lake in 1935, he said, and 65 quakes were felt in the 
vicinity in 1936 and 1937. A seismograph was installed in 1938, and during that year 
it recorded 505 earthquakes, of which 55 were strong enough to be felt by persons 
living near the lake.
“Three of these were very strong,” the admiral added.
He said the Budget Bureau is considering a proposal for the Coast and Geodetic 
Survey to spend $25,000 studying the situation.
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Epilogue
What’s Next? What’s the Future?
Given our ambition for this book—that it will carry you through documents and 
ideas back to a river and urban past that must be grappled with in order to fully 
understand the present—we would be remiss if we did not at least contemplate the 
future of metropolitan Los Angeles in terms of exactly those riparian places and 
spaces. The future, unknown and unknowable, is nonetheless inextricably tied to 
what has come before—which roads or paths were taken or not and how the his-
tory of rivers moves and shifts and changes course like a river itself.
Los Angeles celebrated, in 2013, the hundredth anniversary of the opening of 
the Los Angeles Aqueduct. It was an anniversary that prompted a wide variety of 
responses—from celebration to antipathy and everything in between. For many, 
the century’s mark passed without notice or care. For some, the moment offered 
an opportunity to celebrate all that metropolitan Los Angeles had become since 
1913, watered in part (in large part) by the snowmelt waters of the Owens River. For 
others, however, the centennial offered the chance to look again at the “water grab” 
performed a hundred years earlier. The anniversary meant that Los Angeles, or its 
municipal Department of Water and Power, was yet again trying to wrap a bold 
and ultimately imperial play and ploy in adjectives that speak to legacy, growth, 
inevitability, vision, and ambition.
To be sure, the hundred-year history of the Los Angeles Aqueduct is fraught 
and deeply complicated. Nothing is simple about moving a river hundreds of miles 
from its bed. It wasn’t simple in 1913, and it is certainly not simple today; and we 
could say that the matter grows more complex with each passing year. For one 
thing, there are two aqueducts now, two giant metal straws of cavernous diam-
eter sucking on the melted Sierra snowpack and hustling it southwest to a thirsty 
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global metropolis. Atop all the engineering and physics and hydrology issues at 
stake—and they are legion—there remain issues of upkeep and maintenance and 
environmental impact.
That is but the tip of an aqueduct iceberg. Long-simmering resentment and 
anger in the Owens Valley (especially vociferous there, for obvious reasons, but 
not only there) about the creation of the Los Angeles Aqueduct has, as we might 
have expected, found its way into courtrooms and litigation. Remarkable legal de-
cisions have resulted, in more than one instance, that have altered the perceived, 
if misleading, simplicity of two big straws stuck into a flowing river. Citing history 
(as in the case of a once-full, now-dry Owens Lake) and health concerns tying dust 
to pulmonary and respiratory disease and difficulty, antagonistic individuals and 
organizations took on the city of Los Angeles and its chief water agency and won 
a series of important battles and concessions. These amount essentially to Los An-
geles leaving water in the Owens Valley or putting some of it back. The city is now 
responsible for a series of mitigation exercises that is putting water back into the 
ancient lakebed of Owens Lake, as well as into Mono Lake as a protective measure 
for the fragile geologic structures within it. Legal action is not likely to abate in 
the short term, and it is entirely possible that climate-change ramifications (most 
specifically the depleted Sierra Nevada snowpack) will add to the complexities of 
mitigation and further legal disputes between entities in the Owens Valley, or their 
proxies, and the city of Los Angeles.
Climate change is undoubtedly going to play a huge role in determining the 
future of the Metropolitan Water District’s place in supplying water from the Colo-
rado River to its client entities, with the Los Angeles Department of Water and 
Power being chief among them. As the water district’s ability to draw from the 
state water project (a largely north-south conduit bringing water to Southern Cali-
fornia) evaporates—its allotment has gone down dramatically in recent years—
the role of the Colorado River becomes even more prominent. The legal issues 
attendant on this situation are, if anything, more complex than those in dispute 
regarding the Owens River, the Owens Valley, and the thirsty giant metropolis far 
to the southwest.
So, too, is the fate and future of the Colorado River a complex, tangled tale of 
water, climate change, international treaties, and widespread thirst. Asked to water 
great chunks of seven states, as well as parts of northern Mexico, the Colorado 
River watershed is the most important in the United States, perhaps even in North 
America. Recent onslaughts of drought across the American West have resulted in 
drastic changes in the ways in which Colorado River water is stored and delivered 
to a divergent and far-flung customer base of agencies, municipalities, and entire 
states and nations. By virtue of long-standing agreements, Southern California is 
entitled to a lion’s share of the Colorado River (always dependent on the annual 
wintertime Rocky Mountain snowpack on the western slope of the Continental 
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Divide). This legal allotment amounts to over four million acre-feet of water (an 
acre-foot is a standard water measurement: one acre spread with water to a depth 
of one foot, or three hundred thousand gallons of water). Because the state-to-
state agreements were formulated in especially “wet” years, and because California 
threw its considerable weight around back in the early 1920s, when the most im-
portant agreements were signed, the Golden State can keep drawing water while 
states such as Arizona and Nevada will lose water . . . all from a water source that 
is itself losing water to climate change at a fast (and accelerating) rate.
As drought and climate change alter the snowpack levels from year to year in the 
Colorado high country, the cities, states, and water agencies will continue to strug-
gle with the consequences. And these consequences will of course affect individuals 
at every point along the Colorado River’s watercourse. Preservation and conserva-
tion efforts will and must continue. These will take many forms, and undoubtedly 
new innovations will come to the fore. Water restrictions—how much, how often, 
aimed at what, and at what times—will become more common. Water reuse will rise 
in popularity—household water will find its way more and more often into outdoor 
and gardening use. Roofs will be better fit with water catchment devices for rainwa-
ter capture. Drain spouts will catch water instead of rushing it off to storm sewers 
and the ocean. Trees will be planted in places, such as school playgrounds, once 
covered in asphalt or concrete (trees catch water and hold it around their roots).
Broader innovations will have to be implemented as well. Individual efforts—
which will include smartphone technology applied to, for example, household 
irrigation systems and timing (off it goes when it rains)—will make some differ-
ence. But bigger actions, on a statewide or even a federal scale, with regulatory 
or enforcement teeth, are needed. Water trading between states will rise in im-
portance, and these innovations will have to be carefully modeled and regulated. 
Water pricing will be intricately related, of course, and it is likely that disparate 
water costs, which are now the rule rather than the exception, will be leveled out 
(though allowed to fluctuate in times of relative abundance or relative scarcity). 
Perhaps most important, the rural-urban divide regarding water use will need to 
be addressed and hard decisions made, backed up by legislative innovation. Rural 
users account for most of the water use—by far—across California and the en-
tire American Southwest. Demand is rising in urban centers, but so much water 
is being used on agricultural crops that the urban demand—however modest by 
comparison—is not being efficiently met. What kinds of crops are grown, and how 
they are irrigated, will and must change, lest Southern California face even worse 
conditions born of water scarcity, drought, and the loose and inefficient “water 
culture” that has been allowed to develop over the past century.
Environmental awareness and environmental sustainability will go hand in 
hand with greater awareness of water’s preciousness and scarcity. We think his-
torical knowledge is required in order to gain that kind of critical perspective. One 
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of the key features of changing cultural and environmental attitudes will be simple 
“river awareness” in California cities, which, at this writing, we can say is grow-
ing. Los Angeles is and will be the most important locale for this, and all attention 
will be focused on the rivers of the Los Angeles basin. Ironically, perhaps (given 
its puny size in relation to far bigger rivers and watersheds), none will be more 
important than the Los Angeles River.
The Los Angeles River is the riparian canary in the coal mine of Southern Cali-
fornia sustainability. It has, in just over one hundred years, gone from promise to 
problem and now again to promise in the regional imagination. After 1941, post-
war floods, spilling out across the basin, led to more concrete being poured into 
and up the banks of the river. Still a vital cog in the machine of flood control—the 
concrete that encases the body of the river is critical to corralling floodwaters—the 
Los Angeles River is simultaneously the central focus of a great deal of environ-
mental reimagining of green space and greenbelts throughout the metropolitan 
Los Angeles basin. From biking paths to kayaking and possible reintroduction of 
steelhead trout, the river is being rethought in very large terms and scales as the 
twenty-first century opens; much of this is due to the long-standing advocacy and 
activism of groups, none more critical than the Friends of the Los Angeles River. 
“Greening” the Los Angeles River, pulling out some of the concrete straitjacket, 
and becoming more aware of the riparian environment at the very center of a 
global metropolis of millions of people, is a large-scale effort—of imagination, of 
money, and of engineering and environmental know-how. Each innovation, each 
step forward, will further the collective knowledge about rivers and about water, 
and this consciousness change (from “what Los Angeles River?” to “our Los An-
geles River”) can only lead to further benefits in conservation, preservation, and 
“waterwise” awareness. That path to a differently imagined riparian future will 
be complicated, with political, fiscal, and hydrological hurdles of daunting scale 
strewn hither and yon at each step of the way. We suggest optimism about the Los 
Angeles River, a faith born of diehard grassroots activism and a level of renewed 
political leadership gazing on a river too-long ignored or expected to provide but a 
single, flood-control purpose across the landscape it traverses. Perhaps now more 
than ever, the Los Angeles River is a site of dreams and disagreements, as various 
constituencies imagine what it could or might become; and as such futures are 
pondered, so, too, are questions about where the money comes from and who and 
how people (and nonhumans) benefit from riparian changes large and small.
This is not to say that the other two rivers are any less important. They are 
hugely important. But the symbolic burden placed on the Los Angeles River is, 
especially within the Los Angeles Basin, palpable and magnetic. “How are we do-
ing?” people ask, wondering about water, water shortages, water conservation. 
And the answer, for many at least, will be found with reference to the Los Angeles 
River. However, to the north and east, the fate of the Owens River, and especially 
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the Owens Valley, dry and getting drier, will provide additional perspective. And 
much of that will be colored by controversy: what can Los Angeles do, what should 
Los Angeles do, as environmental penance for its century-old role in desiccating a 
landscape? The questions can and will be asked regarding “how are we doing?” up 
there, up in the Owens Valley. That site, since midcentury, has prompted lawsuits 
against the city of Los Angeles for water loss and the resulting environmental dam-
age. What can people—through advocacy and activism—claim or insist, and what 
can various courts or legal decisions obligate the city of Los Angeles to do? These 
are not issues that will go away, either; on the contrary, as dryness accelerates and 
snowpacks retreat, these issues will creep up in the headlines and in the lists of 
imperatives for the region and its populace. We simply urge that such awareness 
go hand in hand with appreciation of the interlocking histories and meanings of, 
for example, Los Angeles and the Owens River.
So, too, with the mighty Colorado. Entire careers are forged out of figuring 
out the dynamic realities of that river’s place in the American West. Where does 
the river go? Who gets to decide? Which state or agency or nation gets to dip the 
largest buckets into it? And where to they get to dip? Where do the rights of states 
come into dialogue or conflict with the rights of indigenous people whose ances-
tral or reservation homelands sit alongside the river? How does Mexico interact 
with the various states that, in their thirst, deplete the Colorado so that it now 
peters out far from its former mouth on the Gulf of California?
Southern California lives because it can take so much Colorado River water 
to satisfy the thirst of its people and the thirst of what it grows. What happens if 
that gets shut off, or, more likely, what happens if the flow gets cut back, by law, by 
drought, by climate change? Major international decisions reached by treaty in the 
years since 1941 have reduced the amount of water Southern California can take 
from the Colorado River, in favor of other states, indigenous polities, or Mexico. 
One thing is sure: the Colorado River cannot supply all the water that treaties or 
other agreements promise, and this has been true for decades. It carries a great 
deal of water. But not enough to meet demand, unless that demand is cut by con-
servation or other water-saving practices. Furthermore, what happens if the re-
gion’s reliance upon water from Northern California, by means of the state water 
project (a “fourth river,” which we do not take up in this book), becomes ever more 
compromised by state decisions that cut off supplies going to Southern California 
through the Metropolitan Water District’s systems? Less Colorado River water, less 
Northern California water—where will those roads take us?
Amid all the uncertainties of rivers and waters, one thing is incontrovertible: 
the Colorado, the Owens, the Los Angeles: these are not infinite bodies of flowing 
water. They wax and they wane, they dry up (in actuality, or relatively, in response 
to wetter periods or years). Legal decisions act as dams, shutting off water that 
used to go from “here” to “there.”
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Arid times are here. Drought times are here. New rivers will not arise to solve 
the problems. We are stuck with what we have, and we want you to know what we 
have—what you have—and how we got from there to here, from then to now. This 
is a history we all share, just as it is a future we must all help to make better. One 
way to get there is to know more.


























































Map 3. Besides providing water and hydroelectrical power to Los Angeles, the entire Colorado 
River system provides these resources to large areas of seven states, as well as northwestern 
Mexico. The gradual drainage of the river owing to drought, climate change, and other factors 
will continue to have a profound effect on a major portion of the American West.
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Study Questions for Consideration
GROW TH STUDY QUESTIONS
1. How do you think Los Angeles would have developed had the Los Angeles River 
not been channelized during the twentieth century? Can you compare the story 
of Los Angeles and its namesake river with those of other rivers in other cities at 
the same time or in other eras? How?
2. What is the current understanding of the role of the Los Angeles River in 
Greater Los Angeles? What are the differing points of view?
3. How would you describe the interconnectedness of the Colorado, Owens, and 
Los Angeles Rivers? Are there particular moments, years, or eras in which you 
think the histories of these three rivers overlap in significant ways? If so, when 
and why?
4. Can you find any evidence to suggest that ideas about water’s scarcity or about 
water preservation played any role in the early twentieth-century history of any 
of the three rivers?
TECHNOLO GY STUDY QUESTIONS
1. Do you think there are differences in the technical skill used on, and the 
 approach to the histories of, the three rivers under review here? Was the  paving 
of the Los Angeles River a technologically more sophisticated operation than 
the transfer of the Owens River to the city limits of Los Angeles? Was the 
construction of Hoover Dam and the Colorado River Aqueduct the grandest of 
these acts of technological enterprise and riparian development? Defend your 
rankings with a few sentences explaining your point of view.
148    Study Questions
2. Big engineering projects such as those we have studied in this book are not 
limited to the Progressive Era. How would you compare—and with what 
measurements—something like the transcontinental railroad project of the Civil 
War era to the Colorado River damming and aqueduct projects a lifetime later?
3. How would you compare the relative importance of the generation of electricity 
by means of hydroelectric processes and of the provision of freshwater by the 
Colorado River system?
NATURE STUDY QUESTIONS
1. What do you think are the trade-offs in the use of concrete in the Los Angeles 
River, as far as environmental and safety issues are concerned? Why have ideas 
about the river undergone real shifts in the last generation or so?
2. Compare the watershed size and the river flow capacity of the three rivers in 
visual format (graph, drawing, etc.).
3. Over the past decade or so, how have rising aridity, decreasing snowpack, and 
hotter temperatures affected each of the three rivers and its role in supplying 
water to Southern California?
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Chronolo gy
1825  Flood results in the Los Angeles River changing its course and emptying into San 
Pedro Bay instead of Ballona Creek.
1884 Major flood in Southern California.
1889 Major flood in Southern California.
1902 Los Angeles purchases its water system from a private company.
1905  Los Angeles voters approve $1.5 million in bonds to purchase land in Inyo County 
in order to transfer water from Owens River.
  Colorado River breaks through into Imperial Valley and eventually forms Salton Sea.
1907 Los Angeles voters approve $23 million in bonds for construction of Owens River 
Aqueduct.
1912 Report of the Aqueduct Investigation Board criticizes construction and private in-
vestments.
1913 Owens Valley Aqueduct is completed, and water flows to Los Angeles.
1914 Major flooding in Southern California spurs flood control planning.
1915 Los Angeles County Flood Control District is formed.
1922 Colorado River Compact apportioning water to two groups of states is signed by 
representatives of seven states, in Santa Fe, New Mexico.
 First Swing-Johnson Bill to build Boulder Dam and All-American Canal fails.
1923 Los Angeles City engineers begin survey of Colorado River for water  aqueduct.
 Six States (all but Arizona) ratify Colorado River Compact.
 Second Swing-Johnson Bill to build Boulder Dam and All-American  Canal fails.
1924 Colorado River Aqueduct Association organized in Pasadena.
 First bombing of Owens River Aqueduct.
1925 First bill to approve creation of metropolitan water districts in California is introduced.
 Los Angeles voters approve $2 million in bonds for Colorado River project.
1926 Third Swing-Johnson Bill fails in Congress.
150    Chronology
1927 Metropolitan water district bill in California passes and is signed by governor.
1928 Metropolitan Water District of Southern California is incorporated.
 Boulder Canyon Project Act (Swing-Johnson Bill) passes and is signed by President 
Calvin Coolidge.
 St. Francis Dam fails; at least four hundred deaths result.
1930 Contracts specifying allocation of water signed by secretary of interior and Metro-
politan Water District of Southern California.
 Contracts specifying allocation of electrical power signed by secretary of interior 
and Metropolitan Water District of Southern California and by the latter’s individual 
cities.
 Los Angeles voters approve $38.8 million in bonds to extend the Owens River 
 Aqueduct system to the Mono Basin.
1931 Contract for construction of Boulder Dam awarded to Six Companies, Inc.
 Voters approve $220-million bond issue in cities of Metropolitan  Water District of 
Southern California by a five-to-one margin.
 Comprehensive Plan for Flood Control approved for Los Angeles County.
1933 Contract executed by the federal government and the Metropolitan  Water District 
of Southern California for construction of Parker Dam.
1934 Contract for construction of Parker Dam awarded to Six Companies, Inc.
 Major flooding in Los Angeles County; forty deaths in La Crescenta.
1935 U.S. Supreme Court enjoins Arizona governor from using state militia to stop con-
struction of Parker Dam.
 Congress approves Emergency Relief Act to address 1934 flooding  nationwide.
1936 Boulder Dam is completed.
 Flood Control Act authorizes $70 million for improvements and places U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers in charge of major projects.
1938 Major flooding in Los Angeles results in almost fifty deaths in Los Angeles County.
1941 Colorado River Aqueduct water reaches cities of the Metropolitan Water District of 
Southern California.
 Congress approves Los Angeles County flood control plan for major construction 
throughout the Los Angeles County system.
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